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By George Alexandridis 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine whether specific variables that have been directly identified as 
factors that have a bearing on asset pricing constitute significant determinants of short 
and long run gains to acquisitions. Existing literature, starting from Miller (1977), 
explicitly associates these factors, namely the degree of short selling constraints and 
disagreement among investors, with overvaluation and asset pricing bubbles. Along 
these lines, I examine whether these also determine the degree of overpricing of 
acquiring firms prior to acquisitions and thus their subsequent performance around the 
acquisition announcement and in the post-acquisition period. In this investigation I 
control for a number of distinctive characteristics and performance determinants 
identified in the literature related to gains to acquiring firms. Results indicate that 
indeed binding short selling constraints and high divergence of opinion about the value 
of an acquirer leads to its stock being severely overpriced in the pre-acquisition period 
or around the announcement. This rationally leads to extensive underperformance in 
the post acquisition period. My evidence can help explain several anomalous stock 
return patterns related to acquisitions and suggest that the success of an acquisition in 
terms of creating value for shareholders can be to a large extent determined by the 
extent of disagreement between investors about the price of the acquiring firm's stock 
preceding the acquisition announcement. 
1 
The material contained in this thesis has not previously submitted for a degree in this 
or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without his consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
2 
Acknowledgements 
While this thesis is clearly a product of my personal work and dedication I strongly 
feel the need to acknowledge the help and support of some people that have 
significantly contributed towards its completion. Firstly, i would like to thank Prof. 
Antonios Antoniou from the bottom of my heart for his academic help. His 
contribution and support towards the completion of this thesis have been immense and 
really I have no words to thank him for everything he has done for me in the past few 
years. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Dr. Huainan Zhao who inspired 
me to pursue a PhD for his great help with identifying a topic and academic support 
during this period. 
Further, I would like to thank Prof. John Doukas for his immense contribution in the 
selection of topic and academic support towards improving the quality of my work. 
Further, special thanks to Prof. Krishna Paudyal for his very useful advice. 
Lastly, I would like to deeply thank my father Prodromos and mother Marina for all 
their sacrifices and massive support during the period I was abroad and my uncles 
Stelios and Iakovos and their families. A special 'thank you' to my friend Dimitris for 
his support, especially in all difficult moments I had to go through. 
3 
George Alexandridis 
September 2006 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 7 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................... 14 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15 
2.2 Building Blocks of the Theory ........................................................................... 17 
2.3 Measures oflnvestor Disagreement and Empirical Findings ............................. 19 
2.4 Divergence of Opinion and Event Studies ......................................................... 24 
2.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 27 
Chapter 3: Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: The Case of Corporate 
Takeovers .................................................................................................................... 28 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 29 
3.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................... 31 
3 .2.1 Determinants of Long Run Post Acquisition Performance ......................... 31 
3.2.1.1 Post Acquisition Performance in general.. ............................................... 31 
3.2.1.2 Method of Payment ................................................................................... 36 
3.2.1.3 Mode of Acquisition and Book-to-Market ratio ....................................... 40 
3 .2.2 Short Selling Constraints and Post Acquisition Performance ..................... 43 
3.2.2.1 Miller's Hypothesis and the role of Short Selling Constraints ................. 43 
3.2.2.2 Institutional Ownership, Short Sale Constraints and Market Anomalies 43 
3.2.2.3 Institutional Ownership trends ................................................................. 45 
3.2.2.4 Hypothesis Development ......................................................................... 47 
3.3 Data and Methodology ....................................................................................... 50 
3.3 .1 Hem scott's Blockholder Ownership Database ............................................ 50 
3.3.2 Sample Selection ......................................................................................... 53 
3.3.3 Sample Statistics .......................................................................................... 54 
3.3.4 Methodology .............................. -.................................................................. 55 
3.4 Empirical Results ........................................... · ..................................................... 59 
3.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 65 
Chapter 4: Divergence of Opinion and Post Acquisition Performance ................. 73 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 74 
4.2 Data and Methodology ....................................................................................... 79 
4.3 Empirical Results ................................................................................................ 82 
4.3.1 Long-run Post-Acquisition Stock Returns ................................................... 82 
4.3.2. Divergence of opinion and Post-Acquisition Stock Returns ...................... 85 
4.3.3. Two-dimensional Sorting Tests .................................................................. 86 
4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 90 
Chapter 5: Belief Asymmetry and Gains from Acquisitions ................................ 103 
5.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 104 
5.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................. 109 
5 .2.1 Short Run Gains to Acquisitions ............................................................... 1 09 
5.2.1.1 Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Public Targets .............................. 109 
5.2.1.2. Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Private Targets ............................ 112 
5.2.1.3. Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Subsidiary Targets ...................... 116 
5.2.1.4. Method of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions ................................. 117 
5.2.1.4.1. In general ............................................................................................ 117 
5. 2.1.4. 2. Determinants of Method of Payment .................................................. 117 
4 
5.2.1.4.2.1. Asymmetric Information Hypothesis ............................................... 117 
5.2.1.4.21 Relative Size Proposition ................................................................. 119 
5.2.1.4.2.3. Managerial Ownership Proposition ................................................ 120 
5.2.1.4.2.4. Taxation Implication Proposition .................................................... 122 
5.2.1.4.2.5. The Growth Opportunity Proposition .............................................. 123 
5.2.1.4.2.6. Joint Method of Payment ................................................................. 124 
5.2.2 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 125 
5.3. Data and Methodology .................................................................................... 125 
5.4. Empirical Results ............................................................................................. 131 
5.4.1 Gains from Acquisitions of Private Targets .............................................. 131 
5.4.2 Belief Asymmetry and Short-Run Gains from Acquisitions ..................... 132 
5.4.3 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis ........................................................ 134 
5.4.4 Belief Asymmetry and Long-Run Abnormal Returns ............................... 138 
5.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 140 
Chapter 6: Conclusion .............................................................................................. 150 
6.1 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 151 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 157 
5 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3. 1: Ordinary Share Ownership- UK Listed Companies (31 Dec 2001) ......... 47 
Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics: Size, Book to Market Ratio, and Method of Payment. 
······································································································································ 68 
Table 3. 3: Block-holder ownership statistics and allocation of acquirers in sub-
samples ......................................................................................................................... 69 
Table 3. 4: Calendar Time Portfolio Monthly Average Returns in Excess of the 
CAPM and Fama and French 3-Factor Model ............................................................. 70 
Table 3. 5: Zero-Investment Portfolio and Economic Differentials between Calendar 
Time Portfolio Monthly Average Returns in Excess of the Fama and French 3-Factor 
Model ............................................................................................................................ 71 
Table 3. 6: Sorts on B1ockholder Ownership, Mode of Payment, Size and Book-to-
Market value of the acquiring firm ............................................................................... 72 
Table 4. 1: Summary Statistics ..................................................................................... 92 
Table 4. 2: Post-acquisition Performance ..................................................................... 93 
Table 4. 3: Post-Acquisition Performance by Acquirer's Size and Book-to-Market 
Value ............................................................................................................................. 94 
Table 4. 4: Post-Acquisition Performance by the Target Origin and Industry of Target 
and Acquirer ................................................................................................................. 96 
Table 4. 5: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) ......... 98 
Table 4. 6: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) and 
Deal/ Acquirer Characteristics ..................................................................................... 1 00 
Table 4. 7: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) and 
Target Type ................................................................................................................. 102 
Table 5. 1: Summary Statistics by Target Type ......................................................... 141 
Table 5. 2: Summary Statistics by belief Asymmetry and Target Type ..................... 142 
Table 5. 3: Short Run Gains to Acquisitions .............................................................. 144 
Table 5. 4: Belief Asymmetry and Short Run Gains to Acquisitions ......................... 145 
Table 5. 5: Cross Sectional Regressions ..................................................................... 147 
Table 5. 6: Belief Asymmetry and Post Acquisition Performance ............................. 148 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 : The role of Diversity of Opinion ................................................................... 18 
Figure 2: The role of diversity of opinion: Acquisitions involving stock issuance ....... 26 
Figure 3 : Block-holder Ownership Portfolios (sub-samples) ...................................... 52 
6 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
7 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions has been one of the most extensively researched areas in 
the field of corporate finance within the last two decades. The main question that 
motivates this strand of research concentrates on whether acquisitions create value for 
shareholders of acquiring as well as target firms. While there exists some agreement 
that target firms' shareholders gain significantly after acquisition announcements, there 
exists extensive debate on whether acquiring firms benefit from acquisitions. The main 
rationale behind creating value from mergers is that the present value of synergies 
must be greater than the premium paid. Nevertheless, most M&A transactions 
globally involve a premium of 35-50%. Further, the practical constraints of mergers 
often prevent the expected benefits from being fully achieved and the synergy 
promised by dealmakers might just fall short. 
Given that post acquisition integration is rarely as smooth as expected, it is not 
surprising that mergers in general fail to create value for acquiring firms' shareholders 
in the long-run. In fact, a large number of studies on long-run post takeover stock 
performance have disturbingly documented persistent negative abnormal returns to 
bidding firms acquiring listed targets. Several reasons have been offered in the 
voluminous merger literature that aims to explain this pattern. Along these lines, a 
number of recent papers argue that the well documented long run underperformance is 
by no means a universal phenomenon and clearly depends on specific deal and 
acquirer characteristics such as the method of payment used in the transaction, the 
· mode of acquisition, the size of the acquiring firm and/or the size of the target and the 
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benchmark model used to assess performance. On the other hand, literature related to 
short run gains from acquisitions mainly documents that such gains mainly depend on 
the type of target firm acquired and the method of payment used in the transaction. In 
this thesis I examine whether additional factors that are believed to play a major role in 
asset pricing determine such long and short run gains from acquisitions. 
Accordingly, most valuation models used in academic literature and to an extent in 
investment institutions for the purpose of pricing financial assets assume that investors 
have identical estimates of expected returns and that information is commonly 
available to all agents. In reality, evidence based on the sciences of economics, 
finance, and psychology suggests it is possible that investors disagree about asset 
values as they interpret the same information in different ways. In addition, it is likely 
that in some cases there may exist informational asymmetries in financial markets, 
leading to a more "rational divergence" of investors opinions. 
Academic interest on this nexus has been renewed in the last thirty years mainly 
due to a seminal paper published by Edward Miller in 1977 that essentially stimulated 
the beginning of more sophisticated studies surrounding this issue. The author laid a 
theoretical ground for divergence of opinion to have a direct effect on asset valuation 
and hence stock returns. His theory suggests that when optimistic investors drive 
security prices to "unreasonable highs" and pessimistic investors are obliged to stay 
out of the market due to the existence of short selling constraints, prices may 
overshoot. This overvaluation will naturally lead to subsequent underperformance and 
thus, by using this theory as a benchmark, we could theoretically identify overpriced 
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stocks and avoid them. This is in sharp contrast with the cornerstone of the rational 
side of finance predicting that return predictability is virtually impossible. Moreover, if 
we consider that the more investors disagree, the higher the uncertainty in the market, 
this theory significantly diverges from the view that higher uncertainty should generate 
higher returns rather than lower. 
Miller's theory has only recently been empirically tested due to the difficulties 
researches face in constructing a proxy that realistically measures investors' difference 
of opinion. The majority of studies find great support for Miller's hypothesis, although 
due to the controversial nature of recent findings the issue remains far from settled. 
Most recent papers examine the relation between investors' divergence of expectations 
and stock returns in the cross section. In other words, they sort stocks every month or 
quarter based on the degree of opinion difference or short selling constraints they are 
subject to and then examine their subsequent performance. In this thesis I use 
acquisition announcements to test this hypothesis. In this way, as argued earlier, I 
examine whether divergence of opinion among investors and short selling constraints, 
the two main components of the "premium hypothesis", are also significant 
determinants of short and long-run gains to acquisitions. 
According to my conjecture, if an acquiring firm is already severely overpriced 
before it announces an acquisition due to optimistic investors' determining its value, it 
is very much likely that it will at some point underperform irrespective of whether the 
acquisition decision itself was of high quality or not. Of course the quality of the 
acquisition and valuation play a direct role in determining the success of an acquisition 
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but an overpriced acquirer, say at a high valuation period, will naturally underperform 
when more information arrives in the market about its value, ceteris paribus. Along 
these lines, one reason for some acquiring firms destroying value for investors after 
acquisitions may be related to the pre-event differences of opinion about their stock 
and the degree of short selling constraints they are subject to. 
Accordingly, in chapter 2, I review in great detail the literature related to Miller's 
premium hypothesis. The building blocks of the theory and the empirical findings of 
existing research that tests this theory are discussed. Further, the proxies used to 
capture short selling restrictions and dispersion of investors' opinion are outlined. 
Lastly, I review the empirical findings of any existing tests of Miller's hypothesis 
under an event study framework. Note that the literature related to acquisitions and the 
link between this literature and the divergence of opinion literature are reviewed and 
explained in each of chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
In chapter 3, I investigate the role that short selling constraints play in determining 
post acquisition performance. Given that most common asset pricing models assume 
that investors can freely short sale any stock and that several stock market anomalies 
have been attributed by researchers to market wide short selling constraints, it is also 
possible that the long run underperformance of acquiring firms bidding for listed 
targets can also be attributed to shorting restrictions. I thus examine whether 
acquirers that are relatively hard to short (i.e. are subject to low institutional 
ownership) underperform acquirers that are easy to short. The main finding that 
emerges from this study is that indeed statistically significant post acquisition value 
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destruction is only present in segments of acquirers subject to binding short selling 
restrictions prior to the acquisition. 
Along these lines, chapter 3 uncovers a significant role of short selling constraints 
as proxied for by the degree of institutional ownership in determining post acquisition 
performance. In Miller's setting however, given that there exist market wide short sale 
constraints and the fact that acquirers are in general hard to short according to existing 
literature, divergence of opinion should actually be a main determinant of the 
magnitude of overpricing for acquiring firms' stock. Thus, in chapter 4, I examine the 
role that divergence of opinion plays in determining post acquisition performance. 
Results indicate that indeed divergence of opinion among investors about acquiring 
firms' stock can independently determine post acquisition performance. 
The research design of chapter 4 was based on the fact that most empirical studies 
assume that short run overpricing is manifested through long run underperformance. 
However, no study actually examines the short-run effect of opinion dispersion on 
stock returns. In the case of an acquisition announcement, high pre-event dispersion of 
opinion about the value of an acquirer can indicate that there exist many optimistic as 
well as pessimistic investors about the value of its stock. If the negative opinions are 
somehow restricted after the announcement and this announcement conveys in general 
positive news to investors about the future of the acquiring firms then we would expect 
the optimists to lead the price of the acquirer in the short run to unreasonable highs. 
12 
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Therefore, the higher the short run gains, according to Miller's theory, the worse 
the long-run performance. As a result, chapter 5 links Miller's theory with behavioral 
theories based on investors' overreaction and subsequent burst of bubbles to explain 
both short and long-run performance of acquiring firms. For this purpose i limit my 
sample to acquisition announcements that are likely to further encourage optimistic 
opinions and prevent the pessimistic ones. Results clearly reflect that divergence of 
opinion is also a major determinant of short run gains to acquisitions and indicates that 
investors should dispose acquiring firms' stocks that were subject to high value 
ambiguity shortly after they experience the short run gains. 
13 
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2.1 Introduction 
The rational school of thought predicts that in financial markets no abnormal 
returns can be earned consistently on the basis of publicly available information (Fama 
(1970, 1991)) 1• The most common asset pricing models that are explicitly related to 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) such as the CAPM or the Fama and French 
(1993) three factor model imply that return is a compensation for bearing risk and thus 
attribute any observed profitable investment strategies to significant risk exposure 
involved. These models assume that information is commonly available to all investors 
and that the latter interpret information in an identical way. Accordingly, the main 
assumption set in most common asset pricing models and valuation formulas used both 
in academia and investment institutions are that investors are rational and have 
homogeneous expectations. The second fundamental assumption ensuring that prices 
do not deviate from fundamental values persistently is that arbitrage takes place 
rapidly and effectively. These building blocks do not allow for: i) investors to interpret 
information in different ways, that according to the behavioral finance school of 
though constitutes a plausible possibility, ii) the existence of informational 
asymmetries in financial markets, and iii) market frictions such as trading costs and 
short sale constraints to deteriorate arbitrageurs. 
The divergence of opinion theory, as developed by Miller (1977) has recently 
revolutionalised the world/literature of finance as it involves relaxation of the above 
1 Fama (1991) suggest that an efficient market is one in which deviations from the extreme version of 
the effic,iency hypothesis (strong form efficiency) are within information and trading costs. If frictions 
are large, efficient prices may be far from frictionless prices. 
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assumptions. It posits that when investors disagree about the value of equities then 
optimistic investors with the highest valuations for these stocks temporarily drive stock 
prices away from fundamental values. The mechanism of arbitrage predicts that 
pessimistic investors in the latter case will engage in short selling2 and prices will 
immediately fall back to reflect the average valuations of all investors. Nevertheless, 
short sale constraints could theoretically lead to arbitrage in this case being ineffective 
and hence to prices being driven temporarily to "unreasonable highs". 
The original hypothesis relied in demand and supply analysis within which it was 
demonstrated that wide divergence of opinion leads to a downward sloping demand 
curve that in turn results in a temporarily inflated price. This hypothesis has been only 
recently tested in a reliable way and indeed it was showed that opinion divergence 
plays a major role in stock valuation. On the one hand, several empirical investigations 
confirm the original hypothesis that premiums or 'bubbles' are the result of wide 
disagreement among investors and severe short sale constraints. On the other hand 
others have proved that differences of opinion reflect Knightian (Knight (1927)) 
uncertainty and suggested that such component should be priced in markets in addition 
to risk. Motivated from the controversial nature of the empirical evidence this project 
aims to review the relevant literature and propose additional research that will shed 
light to this puzzle. 
2 The sale of shares not owed by the investor but borrowed though a broker and later repurchased to 
replace the loan. Jones and Lamont (2002) suggest that in order to sell short, one must borrow the stock 
from a current owner, and this stock lender charges a fee to the short seller. The fee is determined by the 
forces of supply and dema~d for the stock in the stock loan market. 
16 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the 
theoretical building blocks of this theory. Section 2.3 explains the measures of 
investors' disagreement and presents the relevant empirical evidence. Section 2.4 
discusses the empirical evidence related to event studies. 
2.2 Building Blocks of the Theory 
Miller (1977) argues that opinion divergence is priced at a premium when short sale 
constraints that prevent the revelation of negative information by pessimistic investors 
are imposed. More specifically, given a constant vertical supply curve, wide opinion 
dispersion leads to a steep demand curve hence rising security prices (Figure 1 ). The 
author relaxes the two most significant assumptions of the CAPM to explain why the 
Security Market Line (SML) is flatter than expected by the typical investor3. When 
investors' opinions diverge and short sale constraints bind, stock market equilibria 
initially determined by homogeneous expectations can theoretically change 
(Goetzmann and Massa (2001))4• Accordingly, in Miller's world, one group of 
investors, the "optimists", have extremely positive opinions about the value of specific 
stocks. Harrison and Kreps (1978), suggest that such investors are confident they can 
resell the overpriced stock to even more optimistic ones hence providing a behavioral 
explanation as to why the former hold these stocks. Further, limits to arbitrage 
3 Although Miller admits that opinion divergence reflects uncertainty (as opposed to risk) in the context 
of Knight ( 1927), he posits that this is not always priced at a discount drawing from early evidence 
documenting less than expected variation of stock returns with systematic risk in some cases. 
4 The authors show that the dispersion of opinion, proxied by the heterogeneity of trade among investor 
classes, explains part of the returns not accounted for by standard asset pricing factors. 
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generated by constrained short sales lead to pessimistic investors being kept out of the 
market hence preventing equilibrating forces from keeping prices on fundamental 
grounds. Schleifer and Vishny (1997) and Chen et al (2000) provide theoretical models 
on the limited arbitrage trade-off that implicitly support the possibility that Miller's 
theory can be realistic. 
Figure 1: The role of Diversity of Opinion 
p 
SS of Stock 
DD With Homogeneous 
~ -------------- ~~~~~-
DO With Diverse 
Expectation 
Q 
The "premium hypothesis" generated a strand of theoretical literature in the 80's 
where its main building blocks were either supported or strongly challenged. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987) construct a model where in the presence of costly sort selling 
some investors cannot profitably act on their information set. However, their model 
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predicts that markets will not systematically overvalue short sale constrained securities 
as opposed to what implied by Miller. Jarrow (1980) also criticizes Miller's indirect 
implication that market wide short sale constraints would lead to pervasive overpricing 
of the entire market. In contrast, the general equilibrium model J arrow builds 
demonstrates that when sort constraints are widely prohibited across a market, the 
individual valuation effect on a specific firm is uncertain. 
Further, several models such as Williams (1977), Mayshar (1983), Merston (1987) 
and Varian (1985) and Epstein and Wang (1994) predict that investor disagreement 
should be priced at a discount as it reflects Knightian uncertainty and thus risk. 
According to these models the more investors disagree about the value of a stock the 
higher the future returns for this stock should be. Lastly, Hong and Stein (2003) built a 
theoretical model where stock prices aggregate all investors' valuations in an unbiased 
way and are thus not affected by divergence of opinion. Nevertheless, the majority of 
the above mentioned models either ignores short sale constraints or are based on the 
rather strong assumption that effective and timely arbitrage takes place within markets. 
2.3 Measures of Investor Disagreement and Empirical Findings 
The debate that has been raised from the controversial theoretical predictions also 
holds when considering the nature of the empirical findings. There are three strands of 
empirical investigations that attempt to test the predictions sourcing from Miller's 
theory. The first strand tests one side of the theory and attempts to shed light on the 
effect of short sale constraints on equity returns. Along these lines, Figlewski (1981) 
19 
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provides support for the overvaluation hypothesis by usmg the percentage of 
outstanding stock held short (short interest) as a proxy for short sale supply. 
Nevertheless, Figlewski's finding that more intensively sorted firms under-perform 
less severely sorted is not statistically significant in most cases. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) interpret the level of stock held short relative to shares outstanding 
in a different way. The authors produce a model where the level of observed short 
interest reflects greater negative information among pessimists that are deteriorated by 
short sale restrictions. Further, Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai et al (2002) 
find that severely shorted NYSE and NASDAQ firms respectively, experience 
economically and statistically significant underperformance. Nevertheless, Brent, 
Morse and Stice (1990) and Figlewski and Web (1993) find no relation between the 
percentage of outstanding stock held short and future returns. 
Later work indicated that short sellers (i.e. the pessimists in Miller's hypothesis) 
face various fees or costs when selling short a security. Jones and Lamont (2002) use 
the interest rate earned on the proceeds when selling borrowed stock as a proxy of the 
cost of selling short. They find strong support of the overvaluation hypothesis as their 
results reflect that costly to short NYSE firms under-perform in the long run. Along 
these lines, D 'Avolio (2002) and Duffie et al (2002) find that short sale fees in the US 
are high and hence limits to arbitrage are likely to be strict hence generating low 
returns for costly to short firms. Along similar lines Bris et al (2006) uncover a 
positive association between negative skewness of world markets' returns and short 
sale restrictions. Further, Chen et al (2002) argue that such restrictions become higher 
when institutional ownership is low. Their results imply that breadth of institutional 
20 
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ownership is a reliable predictor of the cross section of stock returns and thus support 
the notion that severely short constrained stocks will experience negative abnormal 
returns, as they will be overpriced in the short run. Additionally, Nagel (2003) argue 
that when institutional ownership is low, stock loan supply tends to be sparse, and 
short-sale constraints are thus more likely to bind. The author presents evidence that 
overpricing of costly-to-short low book-to-market (B/M) stocks generates a substantial 
part of the book-to-market effect in stock returns5• Lastly, Asquith, Pathak and Ritter 
(2005) employ a moderate research design where they simultaneously examine both 
the level of shorting demand (i.e. the level of short interest) and shorting supply (i.e. 
Institutional ownership) for NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stocks. They find that more 
severely short constrained stocks under-perform in the long-run and thus provide 
support for the overvaluation hypothesis. 
The second strand of empirical work tests the other dimension of Miller's verbal 
model, namely the possibility that high disagreement among investors will result in 
short run overpricing and subsequent low returns. Diether, Malloy and Sherbrina 
(2002) test the overvaluation hypothesis using analysts forecast dispersion as a proxy 
for investor disagreement6. They report that stocks subject to high dispersion under-
perform stocks subject to low dispersion by a surprisingly large margin, after 
5 As stated by D' Avolio (2002), stocks that have low institutional ownership are most likely to become 
costly to short, because the supply of stock loans to short-sellers originates primarily from institutional 
portfolios. 
6 Diether et al (2002) suggest that investors believe and follow analysts and thus the degree of analyst 
disagreement will greatly reflect investors actual disagreement. For relevant literature on using analysts' 
forecasts proxies to capture investors beliefs in empirical research see for instance: Abarbanell, Lanen 
and Verrecchia (1995). 
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controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum effects. DMS results are 
consistent with the notion that opinion difference is priced at a premium according to 
Miller. This prediction is also supported by Park (2001) and Bokhyeon and Park 
(2001) deriving a negative relationship between dispersion in analysts forecasts and 
stock returns at intermediate horizons (25 to 44 months). In contrast, Cragg and 
Malkiel (1968, 1982), Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978), and Harris (1986) 
provide some evidence in favor of a positive association between stock returns· and 
dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts. Accordingly, Doukas et al (2004a), suggest 
that value stocks are subject to more analyst forecast dispersion and this alone 
confirms that disagreement is related to uncertainty and should therefore be priced at a 
discount. Their findings are based on a diversity measure that is free of the analysts' 
uncertainty bias. 
Nevertheless the reliability of analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy capturing 
opinion dispersion has been recently questioned. Johnson (2004) offers a simple 
explanation for DMSs puzzle based on the interpretation of dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts as a proxy for unpriced information risk arising when asset values are 
unobservable. Note that analyst forecast dispersion may fail to use as much 
information about investors' opinions as is actually available and as Scherbrina (2004) 
documents investors do not necessarily believe and follow analysts. In addition, as 
Garfinkel (2004) argues that opinion should be expressed by putting wealth at risk and 
analysts' wealth may actually benefit rather than suffer from false opinion expressions. 
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Given the unreliability of analyst forecast dispersion as a measure of opinion 
differentials many authors argue that alternatives should be examined that are tied 
specifically to investor behavior. Some present theoretical models correlating belief 
dispersion with asset time series volatility and trading volume (Jones, Kaul and Lipson 
1994). These include Shalen (1993) and Harris and Raviv (1993). Chen et al (1999), 
and Garfinkel (2004) have developed alternative proxies for differences of opinion 
such as unexplained trading volume/turnover (~Vol), bid ask spread and limit orders 
and find support for the premium hypothesis. Finally, Wu (2004) test a proxy of 
investor disagreement based on Tauchen and Pitts' (1983) Mixture of Distribution 
hypothesis and establish that high divergence of opinion leads to upward biased stock 
prices and subsequent low stock returns. 
The final strand of empirical literature investigates both Miller's overpricing 
conditions in a two dimensional framework. Boehme et al (2006) use alternative 
opinion divergence proxies (i.e. idiosyncratic volatility and turnover) and conclude that 
premiums occur only among small, more difficult to short and lacking exchange traded 
options stocks. In this way they provide evidence both in favour of Miller (1977) and 
Varian (1985) who suggest that divergence of opinion is priced at a discount or a 
premium respectively depending on the level of short sale constraints. Furthermore, 
Doukas et al (2004b) use analyst forecast dispersion as a measure of opinion 
divergence and find that this is priced at a discount even when short constraints as 
measured by three different proxies7 are present. Lastly, Nagel (2005) proves that short 
7 The tree different proxies used are the size (SIZE), institutional ownership (10), a short-sale costs 
index (SSCI), and relative short interest (RSI). There results are robust when controlling for different 
time intervals, optimism in analysts' forecasts, and herding in analysts' behavior. 
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sale constraints as measured by the extent of institutional ownership are the driving 
force behind most common asset pricing anomalies. The author's results implicitly 
suggest that high divergence of opinion lead to low subsequent return only in 
portfolios where institutional ownership is low. This study reflects the superiority of 
short sale constraints as a key condition for overvaluation. 
2.4 Divergence of Opinion and Event Studies 
Recently, empirical research on the issue has turned its focus towards examining 
the relation between opinion dispersion and stock returns based on an event study 
context. The important advantage related to this research design is that researchers are 
able to isolate disagreement effects specific to a corporate decision such as Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs ), Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs ), and Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A). The original "premium hypothesis" expressed by Miller (1977) 
and advanced by the same author in 2000 suggests that greater divergence of opinion 
or uncertainty about an IPO can generate short-run overvaluation and subsequent long-
run underperformance. Todd, Loughram, Suchanek, and Yan (2001) examined this 
relation and found that the well-documented underperformance of IPOs is due to the 
high disagreement among investors immediately after the offerings. They use three 
opening day proxies for the divergence of opinion about an IPO, namely the 
percentage opening bid-ask spread, the time of the first trade, and the flipping ratio. 
Further, Diether (2004) attributes SEOs long run underperformance to temporary 
overpricing immediately after the issuance. The author suggests that equity offerings 
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have a high probability of being subject to severe short sale constraints and finds 
accordingly that shorting demand for these stocks is initially elevated. Results based 
on opinion divergence proxies used (i.e. volume turnover, dispersion in analysts 
forecasts and changes in mutual fund ownership) indicate that high volumes of these 
variables lead to significant negative abnormal returns after issuance of additional 
stock. The main conclusion drawn from this study is that, according to Miller, the 
combination of binding short sale restrictions and investor disagreement can explain 
the well-documented underperformance ofSEOs8• 
Along similar lines, Moeller et al (2004) suggest that bidding firms, for which 
opinion disagreement is high, that use stock financing as method of payment when 
buying public targets, experience significant loss immediately after a merger. They 
attribute this downward drift to the increase in the supply of shares in the market 
associated with equity payments (figure 2). On this issue, Baker et al (2006)9 argue 
that when analyst forecast dispersion is wide, returns should be lower for mergers 
where target investors are less likely to be "sleepy", that is for acquisitions involving 
stock swaps. It is essential to note here that Miller argues that one necessary condition 
for overpricing is that the existing supply has been absorbed by the minority of 
potential investors. When however the supply of existing shares increases we would 
naturally expect that potential buyers (i.e. pessimists) that were originally restricted by 
short sale restrictions are now able to "jump in the bandwagon" and buy shares in 
8 For evidence of long run SEO underperformance refer to Loughran and Ritter (1995), Mitchel and 
Stafford (2000) and Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000). 
9 They investigate the relationship between merger returns and diversity of opinion by using a sample of 
stock swaps. 
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Figure 2: The role of diversity of opinion: Acquisitions involving stock issuance. 
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advantageous prices. This will result in temporary price pressure (Mitchel and Stafford 
(2004)) after the issuance of new stock resulting in long run underperformance. 
Accordingly, Diether (2004) showed that higher dispersion of opinion is associated 
with lower long-term returns following corporate actions such as equity issues and 
mergers paid for with equity. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
It appears that the majority of empirical findings until now provide support to 
Miller's premium hypothesis and that studies have now turned their focus towards 
examining whether the two components related to this theory can in practice determine 
post managerial decision performance. Along these lines, given the findings and 
arguments presented above, it would be of crucial importance to examine thoroughly 
the relation between divergence of opinion and short selling constraints and long 
and/or short run gains from acquisitions. 
According to my conjecture these variables that are believed to convey important 
information about the degree of overpricing of stocks and the persistence of this 
overpricing can help identify overpriced acquirers prior to acquisition announcements. 
If, for instance, a negative relationship between these variables and acquisition 
performance exists this can help explain several stock return patters related to 
acquisitions and significantly add to our knowledge about what factors play a role in 
shaping those patterns. To my knowledge this is a first attempt to shed light on this 
issue. The specific hypotheses examined in this thesis and the importance in examining 
the relationships described above are outlined in detail in each of chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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• A large part of the material from this chapter has been published in the European Financial 
Management Journal. 
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3.1 Introduction 
As explained in the introduction and literature review section the main aim of 
this thesis is to examine whether the two components of Miller's theory can have a 
direct impact on gains from acquisitions. A large number of studies on long-run post 
takeover stock performance have disturbingly documented persistent negative 
abnormal returns to bidding firms acquiring listed targets and offer several reasons 
have to explain this pattern. This chapter examines whether short sale constraints 
qualify as a potential source for this long-run underperformance. The motivation 
behind such investigation stems from Miller's (1977) argument; when negative 
information is not initially impounded into prices, because pessimistic investors are 
kept out of the market due to restricted short sales, stocks can be overvalued. 
Accordingly, the majority of studies that examine the relation between short sale 
constraints and equity returns conclude that more short constrained stocks yield lower 
returns in the long run. In the same way, acquiring firms subject to binding short 
constraints can initially be overvalued as optimistic investors tend to drive their stock 
price to higher than fundamental grounds. This overpricing will manifest itself through 
more pronounced long-run underperformance. It is thus possible that the well 
documented negative abnormal returns following acquisitions can be to a large extent 
attributed to acquirers subject to binding short constraints. The fact that shorting 
acquiring firms is relatively costly [Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002)], suggests that 
examining the valuation effects of short sale constraints within a corporate takeover 
framework is essential. 
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Recent evidence suggests that institutional ownership is a good measure of short 
sale constraints' severity. D' Avolio (2002) and Jones and Lamont (2002) posit that 
stock loan supply is limited, short sale fees are high and hence limits to arbitrage strict 
when institutional ownership is low. It is therefore easier to short stocks subject to 
high ownership. Given Chen, Hong and Stein's (2002) argument that short interest 
may well be an insufficient and problematic proxy for short sale constraints, it appears 
that institutional ownership may be the best available path to capture their severity. In 
a corporate takeover framework, it can thus be expected that the extent of institutional 
presence in acquirers reflects the severity of short sale constraints for these stocks and 
thus conveys important information about the degree of their short-run overpricing. In 
other words, low ownership levels in acquiring firms renders short-selling more 
difficult, thereby leading overpriced equity to remain that way for longer than it 
should. 
My findings point to an economically and statistically significant role of 
institutional block-ownership (henceforth BO) in determining acquirers' post takeover 
stock returns. Specifically, they document that acquirers subject to low BO 
underperform those subject to high BO by a significantly large margin of 0.8% a 
month for a three-year post acquisition event window. Negative post-takeover 
abnormal return is more significant for acquirers subject to low or non-persistent BO 
than for their high or persistent BO counterparts. Such significant return differentials 
corroborate my hypotheses that BOis a major determinant of acquirers' post takeover 
stock performance. Further, my results are robust after accounting for a range of 
characteristics such as the method of payment, firm size, and book-to-market ratio. 
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This study therefore contributes to the existing literature by showing that 
institutional ownership may help us understand one of the major puzzles in corporate 
finance, i.e., the long-run post takeover underperformance puzzle. My findings 
implicitly suggest that institutions can enhance arbitrage through facilitating short sales 
and therefore preserve efficiency in the takeover markets. They are therefore in line 
with Nagel's (2005) conclusion that short sale constraints (as measured by the degree 
of institutional ownership) can help explain various cross sectional stock return 
anomalies. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on 
long run post acquisition stock performance, lays a theoretical ground for the role of 
short sale constraints in determining post acquisition stock returns and presents the 
main testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and methodological 
procedures used in my empirical investigation. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Concluding remarks are provided in section 3.5. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Determinants of Long Run Post Acquisition Performance 
3.2.1.1 Post Acquisition Performance in general 
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In contrast to the central prediction of the efficient market hypothesis, a great 
majority of studies that examine long-run post takeover stock performance has 
disturbingly documented significant and persistent negative abnormal returns up to 
five years following mergers. 10 Along these lines, it has been extensively documented 
that the magnitude of long-term negative drift in acquiring firm stock prices offsets in 
some cases the positive short-run stock price reaction 11 documented (Andrade et.al 
2001), indicating a strong need to explain such long-run underperfonilance. 
Note that the long run underperformance puzzle is by no means a universal 
phenomenon and is mainly relevant to acquiring firms buying listed targets. Very few 
studies have examined the long run performance of acquiring firms buying private 
targets and in most cases these studies do not find evidence in support of the 
underperformance hypothesis. Moeller Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) for instance 
report on average zero abnormal returns for bidders acquiring unlisted targets for three 
years after the announcement. Given that my study investigates an alternative 
explanation for the long run underperformance puzzle i concentrate on acquisitions of 
listed targets, both when reviewing the literature and conducting my tests. 
10 For US empirical evidence: see for example: Asquith (1983), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loderer and Martin 
(1992), Anderson and Mandelker (1993), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). For UK evidence, see for example: Firth (1979), Franks and Harris (1989), 
Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997) and Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao 
(2005). There are, however, other studies [e.g., Bradley and Jarrell (1988), and Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991)] that do not find significant long run underperformance. 
11 For review of the literature on short run gains from acquisitions see Chapter 3. 
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In the US, Malatesta (1983), Asquith (1983) and Magenheim and Muller (1988), 
among others, reported significant negative abnormal returns in the year following 
acquisition announcements. On the other hand, Malatesta (1983) found that in general 
negative abnormal returns to acquiring firms are statistically insignificant in the year 
following the merger announcement. However, the author reports significant negative 
abnormal returns for bidders in mergers occurring after 1970 and for bidders with 
smaller equity value. 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) use a nearly exhaustive sample of US 
acquisitions and find significant 5-year post share price underperformance of 10% 
following US mergers after adjusting for firm size and shifts in beta over time. They 
hypothesise that stock prices adjust to corporate signals slowly but subsequently 
conclude that such hypothesis is not supported in their sample. Further, Andre et al. 
(2004) examine the long-term performance of 267 Canadian mergers and acquisitions 
that take place between 1980 and 2000 and find that Canadian acquirers significantly 
underperform over the three-year post-event period irrespective of the calendar-time 
approach used. Their result are robust to the inclusion or not of overlapping cases. 
They also find that both the extrapolation and the method of payment hypotheses can 
explain their results, that is, glamour acquirers and equity-financed deals drive the 
documented underperformance. 
Other US studies have however failed to find any evidence in support of the 
underperformance hypothesis. Langetieg (1978) and Franks et al. (1991), for example, 
use multifactor benchmarks and report insignificant negative performance over a three-
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year period after acquisitions. They thus conclude that previous findings of poor 
performance after acquisitions can be attributed to benchmark portfolio errors rather 
than mispricing at the time of the takeover. This seems to imply that the negative post-
acquisition performance documented is more a statistical artifact rather than a result of 
market inefficiency. Further, Agrawal et al. (1992) admit that their results are period 
specific and, hence, cannot be generalised. Consistent with Franks et al. (1991), 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) reported that the five-year abnormal return for their entire 
sample is insignificantly different from zero. Lastly, Loderer and Martin (1992) also 
reported that the five-year post acquisition performance is positive but insignificantly 
different from zero. 
In the UK, Firth (1980) examines post acquisition performance for a sample of 
acquisitions over the period 1969-1975 and reports that bidding firms experience 
negative abnormal returns. Barnes (1984) examines all mergers undertaken by 
companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1974-1976 and reports 
significant share price decreases for acquirers in the long term. Furthermore, Franks 
and Harris (1989) used a comprehensive sample for a thirty-year period (1955-1985) 
and found that bidders earn negative post-merger abnormal returns of about 13% two 
years after the merger. Nevertheless, they report a significantly positive abnormal 
return (of about 4%) when they use the CAPM instead of the market model as a 
benchmark. Limmack (1991) reports that on average, over the 24 months after the 
announcement, acquirers' shareholders experience significantly negative abnormal 
returns. 
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Further, Gregory (1997) examines domestic takeovers for the period 1984-1992 and 
found that, irrespective of the benchmark used, the two-year post-acquisition returns is, 
on average, significantly negative. Hence, the author suggested (p. 998) that 'the 
contribution of this paper has been to show that the post-takeover performance of UK 
companies is unambiguously negative in the longer term'. Gregory (1997) notes that 
the underperformance for acquiring companies in the UK seems to be more 
pronounced than for the US. Limmack (1997, p. 1006) points out that 'his conclusion 
is perhaps a little premature' since there remain at least three possible explanations for 
the results obtained in this and other studies, which are '(i) the market is inefficient and 
takeovers are not, on average, in bidding shareholders' interest (ii) results are time and 
sample specific and (iii) the models or methods selected for control may not be 
appropriate for the purpose and that there are other as yet unspecified but more 
appropriate control models or methods'. 
Contrary to these studies documenting significantly negative abnormal returns but 
consistent with Franks et al. ( 1977), Dodds and Quek ( 1985) examines post acquisition 
performance of acquirers over a rather short period, 1974-1976, and found that they 
earn positive abnormal returns. However, they observed that the positive abnormal 
returns earned only lasted until the 25th month with acquirers experiencing negative 
abnormal returns thereafter. 
In a recent UK study, Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao (2006) examined takeovers in the 
1990s. They found that over a three-year period acquirers earn a positive but 
insignificantly different from zero abnormal return. However, they reported 
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significantly negative one-year CAR and one and two-year BHAR abnormal returns. 
They repeated the three-year performance examination after eliminating the 
overlapping acquiring firms but found the results to be of the same nature although it is 
clear that overlapping stock returns inflates the conventional t-test statistic. Hence they 
conclude that in general, there is no statistically significant three-year post-takeover 
underperformance. 
It becomes obvious that the long run underperformance of acquiring firms after 
acquisitions is by no means a universal phenomenon and cannot be generalized. 
Several authors have suggested that the negative performance detected is driven by 
several acquirer and deal specific characteristics. Accordingly, method of payment and 
book-to-market effects and slow adjustment of prices to information associated with 
takeovers have been the most prevailing explanations for this puzzle. 12 Agrawal and 
Jaffe (1999), in a broad assessment ofthe literature, identify method ofpayment, mode 
of acquisition and performance extrapolation as potential explanations of such 
underperformance. In the subsequent sections I therefore review evidence on long run 
performance of acquiring firms based on such characteristics. 
3.2.1.2 Method of Payment 
The method of payment, according to existing literature, is one of the most 
important determinants of post acquisition performance. Acquiring firms need to 
12 For extensive discussions on such explanations, see for example, Travlos (1987), Huang and Walking 
(1987), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loughran and Vijh 
(1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Hong (2006). 
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specify the method they will use to pay for the target firm irrespective of whether the 
merger is friendly or hostile. The most common methods are cash, stock, and a 
combination ofboth (mixed). Cash stems either from retained earnings or debt issued 
for the purpose of financing the acquisition. Stock on the other hand involves 
exchanging stock of the acquiring firm to receive shares of the target firm. According 
to Fishman ((1989), p 41): 'A key difference between a cash offer and a (risky) 
securities' offer is that a security's value depends on the profitability of the acquisition, 
while the value of cash does not'. In a perfect market world of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) with certainty, no transaction costs and no-taxes, one would not expect the 
method of payment to have an effect on shareholder wealth. However, in reality this is 
not the case. 13 It is widely accepted that the mode of payment provides an important 
signal about the perceived value of synergy which can in tum explain the long-run 
post-acquisition performance ofbidders. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the premise of 
information asymmetry raises the proposition that managers with private information 
that their firm's shares are overvalued offer these shares in takeover bids. Outside 
investors, recognizing the adverse selection problem, consequently revise their 
estimate of the offer's value downwards. The target's shareholders also demand a 
higher premium in share-based bids as they are forced to share part of the risk that the 
stock is overvalued (Hansen 1987). This uncertainty (asymmetry) is likely to rise as 
the targets' assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder (Faccio and Masulis 
13 See DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Fishman (1989) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
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(2005)) As a result it is expected that acquiring firms paying with stock to acquire 
listed firms will underperform in both the short and long run. 
For mergers involving private companies, using stock as medium of payment, the 
story is diametrically opposed to what described above due to the ownership structure 
of private companies. The concentrated ownership in private companies makes the 
creation of large shareholders possible through mergers. If the acquisition is paid using 
the acquirer's shares, and it creates a large shareholder who can effectively monitor the 
management's decisions, the acquirer's stock price should not fall afterwards. 
Similarly, according to the information hypothesis, if the favourable private 
information of acquiring firms' stocks can be conveyed to the market by the private 
target's managers' acceptance of blocks of shares, we should not expect any long-run 
underperformance for acquirers. If the short-run positive bidder abnormal returns are 
driven by any factors related with long-run fundamental value, we would observe the 
continuous upward drift in acquirer's stock value if the market underreacts. Over the 
long run, the blockholder and information stories predict no downward drift in 
acquiring firms' stock value unless the market overreacts around announcement dates. 
The evidence below therefore concentrates again on acquiring firms buying listed 
targets. 
Accordingly, Laughran and Vijh (1997) suggest that the significance and sign of 
abnormal returns for acquiring firms in the US depends mainly on the method of 
payment (and mode of acquisition) and among other findings also report -24.2% 
abnormal returns for firms that choose stock financing and 18.5% for cash mergers 
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during the 5-year post-event period under examination. This latter explanation is 
consistent with bidders paying with stock underperforming relative to those paying 
with cash as they signal that their stock is overpriced 14• Martin (1996) and Loughran 
and Vijh (1997) however, argue that the form of payment is partly endogenous to the 
mode of acquisition (mergers/tender offers), which may be the real driving force 
behind the results (see also Faccio and Masulis (2005)). 
Further, Martin (1996) reports that while acquiring firm size is not related to the 
method of payment, both the acquirer's and the target's investment opportunities are 
determinants of the form of financing. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, Franks 
and Harris (1989) observed that in the UK and US larger bid premia are associated 
with equity and that acquirers making cash offers have better post-merger performance 
than those using equity. Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao (2006) found that mixed financing 
offers are the best performing while stock offers are the worst ones although in the 
majority of cases their results are not statistically significant. 
It becomes obvious that there is a strong tendency of acquirers (buying listed 
targets) paying with stock underperforming relative to others paying with cash and 
therefore one should control for method of payment when examining post acquisition 
abnormal returns. 
14 On the contrary, Dong et.al (2006) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find no evidence of poor returns 
following acquisitions paid for with equity. 
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3.2.1.3 Mode of Acquisition and Book-to-Market ratio 
Several researchers differentiate their findings in terms of the mode of acquisition 
due to their differing effect on the post-takeover performance of acquirers and have 
reached a consensus that acquirers under-perform after mergers but not necessarily 
after tender offers. In mergers, managers of the two sides agree in a friendly 
environment about the acquisition and on the offer price. It may be the case that two 
CEOs have incentives on conducting a merger and thus agree on a price that may not 
be on the best interest of the acquirer's shareholders. On the other hand, tender offers 
involve a more hostile situation between the two sides' management where bidders 
attempt to acquirer the target by placing an offer that has to be accepted by target's 
shareholders. In tender offers it is normally the case that target's management have not 
been acting in the best interest of their shareholders and thus companies that become 
takeover targets in this case, although financially healthy firms, are characterized by 
low Return on Equity (ROE) and stock price underperformance relative to other 
companies in the same sector. This points out to tender offers yielding a better price 
for bidding firms than mergers. 
Along these lines, Loughran and Vijh (1997) found post-acquisition returns depend 
on the mode of acquisition. They observed that on average, mergers generate 
significantly negative post-acquisition returns (-15.9%) but marginally significantly 
positive abnormal returns (43%) for tender offers. This implies that although mergers 
are usually friendly to the target managers, on average they are not in shareholders' 
best interest while tender offers, which are typically hostile to the target managers, 
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seem to benefit shareholders. The evidence suggests that the disciplining of target 
managers in tender offers may affect shareholder gains from acquisitions. 
Some other researchers argue that size and B/M value proxy for the risk involved 
and hence determine to an extent acquirers long run share price performance. 
Consistent with Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) used a size and 
book-to-market based benchmark proposed by Fama and French (1992) and found that 
bidders in mergers underperform while acquirers in tender offers overperform (small 
but statistically significantly positive) the benchmark in the three-year post-acquisition 
period. In line with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Agrawal et al. (1992) observed no 
evidence of unusual performance for tender offers (small and insignificantly different 
from zero) but found that acquiring firms in mergers earn a significantly negative 
abnormal return of -13.85% in the three-year post-event interval. 
Lakonishock et.al. (1994) argue that differential returns of "value" and "growth" 
stocks are not related to risk but instead on investors overestimation of future 
performance by extrapolating from past performance. Doukas et.al. (2002) however, 
finds no evidence of such extrapolation. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argued that the 
long-term under-performance of acquirers is not uniform across firms and that this is 
primarily caused by the poor post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market 
'glamour' acquirers (significantly negative -17%). Although Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003) reported the same pattern for the UK, they found, in contrast to the US study, 
stronger support for the method of payment hypothesis than for the extrapolation 
hypothesis. They further argued that, in spite of 'glamour' acquirers enjoying 
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significantly higher announcement returns than 'value' acquirers, they have a much 
lower three-year post-acquisition return irrespective of the method of payment. In 
addition, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) observed that either when market-to-book-
value ratio or price-earning ratio is used as a proxy for glamour/value status, they both 
lead to similar results. 
It becomes obvious that one needs to control for the aforementioned deal and 
acquirer specific characteristics when assessing acquirers' long term performance. On 
the methodological ground, many authors argue that the observed underperformance is 
merely the result of a flawed test of abnormal returns generating spurious findings. 15 
According to Andrade et.al (200 1) any inferences drawn from models used to capture 
long run abnormal returns may be misleading since none provides an accurate 
description of abnormal returns. The contradicting nature of the evidence may also to 
an extent attributed to the variation of the estimation method used. We rarely observe 
testing for various explanations by different authors by using the same methodologies 
and samples. Hence any comparisons between results may be misleading. In the light 
of such contradicting evidence, the resolution of such efficient-market anomaly still 
remains a challenge to the profession. Given that most explanations on why mergers 
fail focus on the large premiums paid by acquirers and on overvaluation of acquiring 
firm's stock i explore an alternative avenue explicitly related to such issues. 
15 See, for example, Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999), Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
42 
Chapter 3: Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: The Case of Corporate Takeovers 
3.2.2 Short Selling Constraints and Post Acquisition Performance 
3.2.2.1 Miller's Hypothesis and the role of Short Selling Constraints 
As reflected in figure 1, chapter 2, the vertical supply curve plays a major role in 
Miller's model. As it is usually the case investors will never have exactly the same 
expectations about the future growth prospects of a firm and thus the demand curve for 
a stock will be downward sloping. This will tend to lead the price of a stock to higher 
than fundamental grounds only when arbitrage is for some reason limited. Only when 
there is no extra supply in the market and pessimistic investors can't create extra 
supply by selling short will prices be set by optimistic investors. It becomes therefore 
obvious that the short sale constraints' condition oils the wheels of overvaluation. As a 
result, a main strand of empirical investigation that attempts to test the predictions 
sourcing from Miller's theory concentrates solely at the effect of short sale constraints 
on equity returns. These studies have been extensively reviewed in Chapter 2. 
3.2.2.2 Institutional Ownership, Short Sale Constraints and Market Anomalies 
Given that binding short constraints can lead to stocks being overpriced then short 
selling can be considered as a main ally of market efficiency. The UK Financial 
Services Authority (2002) emphasizes that the main role of short selling is to support 
market efficiency through accelerating price corrections in overvalued securities. 
Loughran and Marietta-Westberg (2005) posit that several frictions may inhibit short 
selling. The availability of shares for shorting is evidently one of the most important 
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impediments. Accordingly, Gopalan (2003) constructs a model where institutional 
holding is a main determinant of the actual severity of short sale constraints and as 
mentioned in the previous section Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), D 'Avolio (2002) and 
Jones and Lamont (2002) argue that there is a strong negative relation between 
institutional ownership and short sale constraint severity. Institutional Ownership is 
therefore perhaps the most accurate proxy used to measure the severity of short selling 
constraints. 
Along these lines Nagel (2005) investigates whether institutional ownership can 
help explain various cross sectional anomalies and therefore the degree of market 
efficiency. The author posits that short-sale constraints are most likely to bind among 
stocks with low institutional ownership. Because of institutional constraints, most 
professional investors simply never sell short and hence cannot trade against 
overpricing of stocks they do not own. Furthermore, stock loan supply tends to be 
sparse and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Using 
institutional ownership as a proxy, he finds that short-sale constraints help explain 
cross-sectional stock return anomalies. Specifically, holding size fixed, the under-
performance of stocks with high market-to-book, analyst forecast dispersion, turnover, 
or volatility is most pronounced among stocks with low institutional ownership. 
Ownership by passive investors with large stock lending programs partly mitigates this 
under-performance, indicating some impact of stock loan supply. Lastly, prices of 
stocks with low institutional ownership also underreact to bad cash-flow news and 
overreact to good cash-flow news, consistent with the idea that short-sale constraints 
hold negative opinions off the market for these stocks. 
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A similar argument has been put forward by Phalippou (2006). This paper shows 
that the stocks with lowest institutional ownership, which comprise only 7% of the 
stock market capitalization, exhibit a significant value premium. In addition, it is 
shown that a decreasing relationship between institutional ownership and the value 
premium exists, even after accounting for both size and risk using various asset-pricing 
models. Even the linear relationship between BE/ME and future returns is exclusive to 
low-10 stocks. These results are at odds with the "rational" paradigm and suggest that 
the value premium is created by the tendency of some investors to misprice certain 
stocks that are, in addition, costly to arbitrage. The evidence provided reflect that the 
value premium, a well researched anomaly, can be mainly attributed to stocks more 
short sale constrained stocks that are not held by institutional investors. As a result, 
institutional ownership can help facilitate short selling and thus prevent market 
efficiency through weakening well documented market anomalies. 
3.2.2.3 Institutional Ownership trends 
Given the arguments above and that institutional ownership has been increasing 
through time among both developed and emerging capital markets we would expect to 
observe a gradual disappearance of market anomalies. Indeed, it is true that markets 
are becoming more efficient and many well documented anomalies are gradually 
fading out. The shareholdings and the trading activity of institutional investors have 
increased dramatically in the past several decades. In 1965, members of the Securities 
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Industries Association held 16% of U.S. equities; in 2001, they held 61% according to 
the Securities Industry Association Fact Book (2002). 
In the UK, institutions held £2,477bn of funds in 1999, nearly three times the 1990 
total, accounting for over 85% of the total funds under management. Insurance and 
pension schemes account for the bulk of UK institutional funds, although unit trusts 
and money market funds are also a growing market (IFSL 2001). Fund managers 
invest funds on behalf of institutions. Their primary task is to invest the flow of cash 
from pension contributions, insurance premiums and personal savers in portfolios of 
financial assets that will best meet clients' needs. Nearly 60% of such funds are 
invested in equity, with 71% of pension funds allocated in domestic and foreign equity 
being the highest rate relative to all other industrial countries (IFSL 2001). 
Furthermore, the Pension Act in 1995 has removed restrictions of investing in 
specific securities, enabling fund managers to allocate resources in owning large stakes 
in other firms. As a result, almost 50 per cent of all ordinary shares listed on the 
London Stock Exchange in 2001 were owned by domestic institutional shareholders 
(National Statistics, UK). Table 1 below shows government figures for the distribution 
of ownership of ordinary shares in UK listed companies as at 31 December 2001. The 
table illustrates that institutional investors, primarily insurance companies and pension 
funds collectively own 50% of UK shares and therefore have significant power to 
influence the companies in which they invest. In comparison, UK individuals only own 
14.8% of UK shares directly. 
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T bl 3 1 0 d. a e . : r mary Sh 0 are h. UKL. dC wners tp- 1ste . (31 D 2001) ompames ec 
% of total equity owned £billion 
UK Institutional Investors 
Insurance Companies 20.0% £310.6 
Pension Funds 16.1% £250.0 
Unit & Investment Trusts 4.0% £62.5 
Other Financials 9.9% £153.2 
Sub Total 50.0% £776.3 
UK Individual Investors 14.8% £229.9 
Overseas Investors 31.9% £496.0 
Other Investors 3.3% £51.9 
Total 100.0% £1554.0 
Source: National Statistics UK 
3.2.2.4 Hypothesis Development 
Given the negative relation between institutional ownership and the severity of 
short constraints and the predominance of institutions in the stock market, surprisingly 
the 'efficiency role' of institutional ownership has been scarcely examined within 
corporate takeovers. Along these lines, short sale constraints, as proxied for by 
institutional ownership, can theoretically determine post acquisition performance of 
acquiring firms. The fact that shorting acquiring firms is relatively costly [Geczy, 
Musto, and Reed (2002)], suggests that examining the valuation effects of short sale 
constraints within a corporate takeover framework is essential. To my knowledge this 
is the first attempt to shed light on this hypothesis. 
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In the case of a public takeover, the relative size of the target to the bidder is 
usually large and thus uncertainty about the future growth prospects of the restructured 
firm is relatively high. The mean relative size of the target to the acquirer market value 
in my sample is 41%, implying that acquisitions do in fact introduce a large degree of 
uncertainty or divergence of value opinions16• A sample of relatively large public 
acquisitions can capture what Miller (1977) refers to as a situation of high opinion 
dispersion. Laughran and Westberg (2005) find a negative relation between divergence 
of opinion around extreme events (IPOs and SEOs) and post issue stock performance. 
Further, Diether (2005) finds that that diversity of opinion is negatively associated 
with post event performance. The author concludes however that finds that long-run 
post equity issue underperformance is attributed to short-run overvaluation due to 
severe short constraints. 
It is therefore possible that short sale constraints actually oil the wheels of 
mispricing. This argument is partly supported by Boehme et al (2006) who suggest 
premiums or discounts, in a situation of high uncertainty, depend on the presence of 
short sale constraints. Furthermore, Gopalan (2003) derives a model in which short 
constraints bind with opinion dispersion among other factors, hence suggesting that the 
two notions are usually correlated. I argue that the unusually high uncertainty (i.e. 
investor disagreement) about acquiring firms (buying large, listed targets) at days 
surrounding takeovers is an unambiguous fact, and this alone could help us generate a 
16 Miller (1977) and Doukas, Chansog, and Pantzalis (2004) explain why wide opinion dispersion 
implies great uncertainty. 
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reliable test of Miller's joint hypothesis of overpricing by using only the short sale 
constraint proxy (i.e. the IO). 
As a result, acquirers can become overpriced if they are subject to severe short sale 
constraints that eventually oil the wheels of short run mispricing. Given that large 
institutional stakes are associated with superior lending capacity, short sale ease for 
acquiring firms' equity should be more pronounced as concentrated institutional 
ownership in those firms increases. After the· completion of a takeover, uncertainty 
continuously diminishes as some first results for acquirers become public. 
Accordingly, long-run underperformance of acquiring firms should be more 
pronounced in segments where blockholder ownership (BO) is inferior (i.e., higher 
level of short sale constraints) both in terms of the extent and persistence. 
Given the discussion above I form the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
The extent of block-holder institutional ownership determines acquirers' long-run 
post takeover stock returns since it reflects the level of short sale constraints for 
acquiring firms' equity that in turn explains the degree of short-run overpricing. 
Hypothesis 2 
The persistence of block-holder ownership also determines acquirers' long-run post 
takeover stock returns as it reflects the time horizon within which short sales may be 
effectively practiced. 
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This latter hypothesis accounts for the persistence of the short sale constraint 
during the three-year post takeover event window under examination and hence for the 
speed of adjustment of stock prices to equilibrium. If BO in some acquirers lasts for 
the entire examination period then arbitrage is expected to be more effective for these 
stocks. 
In particular I investigate: 
(i) Whether acquirers subject to High-IO (at the event year) outperform ones 
with Low-BO, and 
(ii) Whether acqmrers subject to Extensive-BO and/or Persistent-BO 
outperform their peers that are subject to Moderate-BO and/or Non-
Persistent BO respectively. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Hemscott's Blockholder Ownership Database 
The Companies Act (1985) (sections 198 and 199) requires that if an institutional 
holding reaches or exceeds 3% of the company's market value it must be declared. 
Hemscott Plc (a London Stock Exchange listed data company), the only source of 
historical institutional ownership data for the UK reports only block-holders' 
ownership, i.e. greater or equal to 3%. Hemscott collects RNA announcements that 
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include data on block-holder ownership, which are received daily via their live feed 
from the LSE, or via the latest Annual Report. The database consists of 67,416 
company-holding observations. This covers 2,091 dead and alive LSE firms and 7,210 
domestic institutional investors over the period 1993-2001. The database reports 
among other fields (appendix 1): company name and ISIN code (the name and ISIN 
code of the company for which shareholdings are reported, shareholder name and ID, 
name of umbrella organisation that holds the stock, holding date, current holding and 
current percentage holding. The database reports holdings by insurance companies, 
pension funds, unit and investment trusts and other financial companies. Shareholdings 
in each company are classified by the umbrella organisation as the shareholder's name 
may include subsidiaries, trusts etc. of the umbrella organisations. 
Data are collected on an annual basis for the period 1993 to 2001. For each year (in 
the 1993-1998 period) I sum up all block-holdings by institutions in each acquiring 
firm to obtain the overall amount of BO. I calculate average annual ownership in each 
acquirer using Hemscott's current percentage BO in the 'major shareholdings' 
database. I ensure ownership data are reported before the takeover effective dates in 
order to realistically reflect institutional presence around the takeover. This was 
achieved by allowing some takeover observations with effective dates near the start of 
year to match with BO data in the mid or end of the previous year. Consequently, 
when referring to BO at the event year, in some cases this may have been shaped by 
BOat the previous year. Low BO acquirers, although in Hemscott's ownership reports, 
are not subject to any greater or equal to 3% institutional holdings at the event year. 
51 
Chapter 3: Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: The Case of Corporate Takeovers 
Acquiring firms are sorted into SO portfolios (Figure 2) as follows: i) High-SO 
(Low-SO) acquirers are subject to at least (less than) 3% overall SO at the event year. 
The High-SO portfolio is subsequently subdivided in two different ways in order to 
capture the extent and persistence of SO. ii) Extensive-SO (Moderate-SO) acquirers 
are subject to at least (less than) 10% overall SO at the event year. 17 Further, iii) 
acquirers in the Persistent-SO (Non-Persistent-SO) portfolio are subject to more than 
3% overall SO for at least (at most) three-years (two-years) following the event. 
Figure 2 below provides details on the sub-portfolios based on block-holder ownership 
examined. 
Figure 3 : Block-holder Ownership Portfolios (sub-samples) 
Portfolio 2 
(Low BO, <3% holding at t) 
Portfolio 1 
( 164 Acquirers) 
Portfolio 4 
(Extensive BO, =I 0% at t) 
Portfolio 3 Portfolio 5 
(High B0,=3% holding at t) (Moderate BO, <10% at t) 
Portfolio 6 
(Persistent BO, =3% at t, t+l,t+2,t+3) 
Portfolio 7 
(Non-Persistent BO, =3% at t, (t+ l,t+2)) 
17 10% is the median BO for all acquirers in the High-BO sample. 
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3.3.2 Sample Selection 
I download a sample of UK successful takeovers for the period 1993-1998 18 and all 
related information relevant to each transaction from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database. The following criteria are used in the selection of the final 
sample: 
Both the acquiring and the target firm are listed in the London Stock Exchange. 
Transactions where the acquirer and/or target firm are financial or/and utility 
firms are excluded. 
Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), firms with a negative equity book 
value, although relatively rare, are excluded from the analysis. 
Bidding firms with no price, market value or/and book to market data available 
from Thomson Financial Datastream are also omitted. 
The transaction value is above 1 million dollars 
Acquirers' monthly stock prices, size (market value), and book-to-market ratios are 
obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream and these are matched with Hemscott 
data using the unique ISIN code for each company. 164 UK acquiring firms are finally 
selected from the intersection of the three databases; a rather small sample but still 
18 This is due to examining 3-year post acquisition performance. 
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sufficient if we consider that the examination period is only six years (1993-1998) as 
the UK ownership data (from Hemscott) are not available prior to 1993. 19 
3.3.3 Sample Statistics 
Table 2 reports the sample statistics. It is evident that in each year the number of 
public acquisitions is similar and averages to 27 with 33 being the highest in 1995 and 
22 the lowest in 1996. It is hence unlikely that my results are subject to more weight 
being given to specific trends in takeovers occurring at any particular year. The fact 
that for all years the mean size of acquirers is significantly higher than its 
corresponding median reflects that some very large firms have been involved in public 
takeovers during my sample period. Finally, the mode of payment data shows that 
stock financing is the least common payment method. 
InstitUtional holding statistics per year for the period under examination (1993-1998) 
along with the allocation of the 164 acquirers in sub-samples formed on the basis of 
BO are reported in Table 3. We observe that takeover activity in the Low-BO sample 
varies each year and is concentrated mainly in the first two years ( 1993 and 1994). On 
the other hand, takeover activity in the High-BO sample is mainly concentrated in the 
last two years (1997 and 1998). Such pattern reflects a significant increase in 
institutional funds invested in UK acquirers during the last decade. The observation 
that in 1999, UK institutions held £2,477 billion of assets, nearly three times the 1990 
19 Note that only a small number of 'public', relatively large deals (above I million dollars) take place 
during this period in the UK. 
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total (IFSL 2001), confirms this pattern and suggests that my sample is also 
representative of the general institutional investment activity throughout the UK. In 
addition, it also reflects the necessity to study thoroughly the role of institutions in 
corporate takeovers in the last decade where BO is more intense than prior to the 
1990s. Table 2 also reveals that the number of acquirers with Persistent and Extensive 
BO have both been increasing through time. The gradual increase of BO in UK 
acquirers during my sample period is represented diagrammatically in Figure 3. 
3.3.4 Methodology 
The entire sample is initially split into the High-BO and Low-BO subsamples to 
examine the overall role of BO in determining acquiring firms' post takeover stock 
returns. The High-BO sample is subdivided in two different ways in order to capture 
the effects of both extent and persistence of BO on acquirers' stock returns. I then 
calculate long-run post takeover abnormal returns for each of the sub-samples 
identified. 
When post takeover share price data are downloaded, returns are computed as 
changes in the natural log of monthly average stock prices, i.e with Su denoting the 
price of stock i in month t, ru = ln(~J . The datatype RI (Total Return Index) from 
sil-l 
Datastream is used when downloading monthly price data to incorporate dividends 
into the calculation of returns. 
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Researchers apply various approaches to measure abnormal returns for event firms. 
It is evident that each of these approaches solves several methodological problems on 
the one hand but creates different problems on the other. The cumulative approach that 
sums the abnormal return in each month (i.e CARs), or takes the average of the 
monthly abnormal returns (i.e AARs) is to an extent advocated by Fama (1998) as 
asset pricing models commonly assure that normally distributed returns and normality 
is a better approximation for shorter horizons than longer ones. Ritter (1991) postulates 
that whether to use CARs or BHARs (Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns) depends on the 
research question we would like to address. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) for instance posit that a test of the null hypothesis that an-
month CAR is zero is equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that a mean monthly 
abnormal return of a sample firm during the event year is equal to zero; it is not a test 
of the null hypothesis that that the mean annual abnormal return is equal to zero. To 
test the later hypothesis Barber and Lyon suggest using the BHAR approach. The cross 
correlation of long term BHARs is a major problem encountered and among the 
solutions proposed is the elaborate scheme (to adjust for the cross-correlation) 
introduced by Brav (2000). Fama (1998) however suggests that the number of return 
covariances to be estimated (to provide a full solution to the problem) is greater than 
the number of time series observations casting doubt on the robustness of the results 
generated by using these methodologies. 
The "rolling portfolio approach" (or calendar time methodology as more commonly 
known), originally used by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974), advocated by Fama 
56 
Chapter 3: Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: The Case of Corporate Takeovers 
(1998) and later applied by Laughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) Ikenberry, Lakonishok and V ermaelen (2000), and 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002)20 to mitigate the problem of cross sectional dependence of 
stock returns is used for the purpose of this examination. Since the time series 
variation of the monthly abnormal return on the portfolio already captures the effects 
of the correlation of returns across event stocks missed by the equilibrium model used, 
the problem of the cross sectional dependence of abnormal returns is solved. 
However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) strongly oppose the calendar time approach 
and argue that it is the least powerful test of market efficiency as it weights each month 
equally. But usually there will be more events in some months than others due to firms 
picking periods of misvaluation to announce corporate events such as takeovers. 
According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), due to the number of firms being different 
for each month heteroscedastic residuals are likely to be present when regressing 
calendar time average portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate against the factors 
of an asset pricing model. Hence, when performing the regressions report 
heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics so as to realistically assess the validity of my 
results. 
For each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all qualifying takeovers 
during the last three years. On the first month only takeovers with effective date on this 
20 Mitchel and Stafford (2000) find empirical evidence that BHAR methodology is likely to produce 
downward biased standard errors and consequently overstated t-statistics. They also suggest that 
calendar time returns are less subject to the bad model problem, a finding also supported by Boehme and 
Sorescu (2002). 
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particular month are included21 • Each month I rebalance my portfolio to include all 
acquirers that have just completed an event and to disregard all the ones that have just 
completed 36 months in my calendar approach. Equal weighted and value weighted 
returns are used to average the performance of individual returns in my sample. Fama 
(1998) favours value weighted returns as all common asset pricing models have 
systematic problems in explaining the average returns of small stocks. Nevertheless, 
Laughran and Ritter (2000) prove by using simulation and sensitivity analysis that that 
value weighted returns tend to underestimate abnormal returns to managerial choice 
variables such as takeovers. In general, value and equally weighted returns address 
different research questions. Value weighted returns indicate whether an investor 
holding the value weighted portfolio of event firm will earn abnormal returns while 
equal-weighted returns reflect whether on average, event firms experience abnormal 
returns. We are interested in both questions and hence use both approaches (as 
complementary) to calculate monthly AARs. 
I then estimate the following three-factor regression model originally used by 
Farna (1993) but using the approximation scheme of Dimson et al. (2003) to account 
for UK size and BV/MV peculiarities22: 
21 Price data for each acquirer are downloaded starting from the effective month of the takeover in each 
case. Consequently the returns data generated for each acquirer are available from the month following 
the effective month and for 36 subsequent months i.e t+ 1 to t+ 36). This approach is preferable in my 
case as we are more interested in whether slow information diffusion generates overpricing and 
subsequent long-run underperformance. Any short run wealth effect is not captured as it addresses a 
rather different research question. 
22 Dimson (2003) uses different breakpoints to those of Fama (1993) to construct size and Book-to-
Market portfolios mainly due to size and value being negatively correlated in the UK and large firms 
(small firms) being concentrated in the low (high) BE/ME quartile. 
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RP1 -Rfl =aP +fJP(Rmt -Rfl)+sPSMB1 +hPHML1 +ept' where RP1 is the return of 
calendar time portfolio of takeover firms in month t and R Ji is the monthly UK 
Treasury bill. The market factor Rm1 - R fl is the return on a value weighted market 
index minus the risk free rate each month. Size factor is the average return on three 
small cap portfolios, minus the average return on three large-cap portfolios. Finally 
HML factor is the differential average return on two high book-to market-portfolios 
and two low book-to-market-portfolios. The intercept may then be interpreted as the 
mean monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across all months. Note that the 
intercept (alpha) in this regression is the mean monthly abnormal return for each 
portfolio over the estimation period. For robustness i also estimate the CAPM 
intercepts that are however not reported in my empirical discussion for brevity. Note 
though that when focusing on CAPM alphas the results more strongly support my 
hypotheses. 
The above procedure is repeated for all my samples. To an extent, any statistically 
and economically important differentials in abnormal returns between the paired-
samples are driven by the differentials in BO. I use zero investment portfolios to assess 
return differentials between paired samples to ensure that the actual observed 
differentials are realistic. Finally, i control for method of payment, size, and/or book-
to-market characteristics. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
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Table 4 reports estimates of monthly average abnormal returns (i.e., the intercept 
alpha) for the calendar time portfolios formed on the basis of BO in acquiring firms 
using the Fama-French 3-factor model. For the full sample, i find a negative (-1 %) 
and highly significant (t-stat: -4.58) alpha when equal-weighted portfolio returns are 
used. For the value-weighted calendar portfolio the negative abnormal return declines 
( -0.57%) but is still statistically significant (t-stat: -5.16). This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that have documented significant negative post takeover 
abnormal returns when listed targets are involved. 
As defined earlier, the entire sample is divided into High-BO and Low-BO 
subsamples. For the Low-BO sample, negative abnormal returns are economically and 
statistically significant for both equal (-1.71% significant at the 1% level) and value 
weighted ( -0.62% significant at the 1% level) calendar portfolios. The large equally 
weighted negative abnormal return reflects to a great extent that size plays a significant 
role in addition to BO in determining the amount of shortable shares or shorting costs 
and thus stock performance. This is consistent with previous findings on the relation 
between size, institutional ownership and equity returns such as Chen et al (2002), 
Nagel (2005) and Boehme et al (2006). Overall, acquirers in the Low-BO sample 
underperform the benchmark in the long run regardless of the weighting scheme. Note 
that alphas in this case imply a -62% three-year abnormal return under equal weighting 
and -22% under value weighting that are substantially more negative than in any other 
sub-samples subsequently examined. 
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For acquirers in the High-BO sample the picture is clearly different. Abnormal 
returns remain negative but their economical significance is weaker relative to the 
Low-BO sample for both equal- and value-weighted calendar portfolio returns. On an 
equal-weighted basis alpha (-0.86%) is 50% smaller than that in the Low-BO sample 
and statistically significant (t-stat: -4.78) while on a value-weighted basis alpha (-
0.51 %) also declines by 17%. Overall, even though inferences from equal-weighted 
returns may be considered as more reliable in a small sample, still the High-BO sample 
significantly outperforms the Low-BO one by a statistically and economically 
important margin regardless of the weighting scheme applied. Note that the High 
minus Low BO monthly percentage differential from a zero-investment portfolio 
(Table 5) is a statistically significant 0.8% when equally weighted (0.22% when value 
weighted). This finding to a great extent demonstrates the importance of high BO in 
alleviating short-run overpricing. 
The High-BO sample is divided into two: Moderate-BO (acquirers with 3-10% 
BO) and Extensive-BO (acquirers with more than 10% BO). Table 3 presents the 
results for these two subsamples. Under both equal- and value-weighting schemes, the 
Extensive-BO sample's alphas are statistically insignificant -0.58% (t-stat: -1.34) and-
0.28% (t-stat: -1.64) respectively. On the other hand, alphas for the Moderate-BO 
sample are statistically significant under both weighting schemes (-0.89% with t-stat -
4.26 when equal weighting and -0.51% with t stat -4.43 when value weighting). The 
equal-weighted monthly return differential (Table 5) of Extensive minus Moderate BO 
is 0.27% (0.18% when value weighting) and even though statistically insignificant, is 
still sufficient in order to eliminate overpricing for the extensive BO sample (Table 4). 
61 
Chapter 3: Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: The Case of Corporate Takeovers 
Such results further strengthen my argument regarding the significant role of SO in 
corporate takeovers, which predicts that not only large but also extensive ownership (at 
the event year) contributes in more effectively eliminating short-run overpncmg 
through facilitating short sales, thus leading to better performance. 
I finally split the High-SO sample into two other subsamples in order to examine 
the significance of the persistence or duration of SO (i.e., the time-window during 
which short sales are likely to be constrained) and further enrich my evidence. Table 4 
reports the results for both the Non-Persistent and the Persistent-SO samples. Clearly, 
negative abnormal returns decline in economic and statistical terms when moving from 
the former sample to the latter for equally weighted alphas. In this case alphas are 
respectively -0.87% (t-stat: -3 .96) and -0.62% (t-stat: -1.45) for the two subsamples, 
which indicates that persistently held acquirers outperform the non-persistently held 
ones. When value-weighted returns are considered however, no significant difference 
in abnormal returns between the Persistent-SO sample (-0.45% with t-stat -2.21) and 
the Non-Persistent (-0.38% with t-stat -5.85) is detected. On average, Non-Persistently 
held acquirers underperform Persistently held ones and thus long term concentrated 
institutional presence can lead to persistently less constrained short sales that 
effectively deteriorate any short-run overpricing of acquirers surrounding the takeover 
event. 
Table 5 reports actual percentage differentials in alphas as well as abnormal returns 
of zero-investment portfolios of each paired subsample. The latter alphas are obtained 
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by regressing mean calendar portfolio return differentials on the Fama-French three 
factors. Results demonstrate that investors experience less loss when investing in 
acquirers subject to High rather than Low BO. In addition, investing in acquirers 
subject to Extensive rather than simply High BO, results in even less loss. The 0.25% 
equal-weighted differential in alphas (0.26% for the zero-investment portfolio) 
between persistent and non-persistent BO acquirers confirms the prediction of the 
second hypothesis. The 0. 73% Extensive minus Low BO and the 1% Persistent minus 
Low BO (both statistically significant at the 1% level) equal-weighted zero-investment 
portfolio alphas demonstrate that both the extent and the persistence of BO can play a 
vital role in eliminating overpricing. 
Note that despite such differentials, abnormal returns still remain negative and 
significant for the High BO portfolio. However, bearing in mind that the High BO 
sample includes a large number of acquirers that exhibit Non-Extensive BO (i.e. less 
than 10%) and given that the Low BO sample can in practice include acquirers subject 
to high overall institutional ownership disguised into smaller than 3% block holdings, 
it would be in this case more reasonable to place more weight on return differentials 
between more extreme portfolios; that is between the Low and the Extensive, 
Persistent BO portfolios. We observe for instance that negative abnormal returns 
decline substantially and become statistically insignificant in the Extensive BO 
portfolio. Given that shorting acquirers is generally costly according to Geczy, Musto 
and Reed (2002), it is reasonable that elimination of the short sale constraint effect is 
more pronounced among extreme BO portfolios. This argument is consistent with 
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Nagel (2005) who finds that certain anomalies disappear only m the highest 
institutional ownership portfolios he examines. 
The statistical and/or economic differentials in alphas obtained could possibly be 
driven by the majority of acquirers in some subsamples being tiled towards specific 
firm/deal characteristics (for instance method of payment, size, and book-to-market 
ratio) identified as having systematic impact on bidders' performance. Table 6 can 
help resolve to an extent such concerns as it presents abnormal returns and number of 
acquirers on the two dimensional space of BO and such characteristics. Abnormal 
returns decay by approximately 50% as we move from the High to the Low BO 
portfolios irrespective of method of payment, size and market-to-book ratio of the 
acquiring firms. Note that within the sample of small acquirers for which short selling 
is naturally more constrained the High minus Low BO zero-investment portfolio yields 
a statistically significant difference of 1.45% per month. The positive High minus Low 
BO abnormal return differential is large although small firms are mainly concentrated 
in the High-BO sample rather than the Low BO one.23 
Further, negative abnormal returns decay considerably and become statistically 
insignificant in all but one case as we move from the Moderate to the Extensive BO 
samples. This result confirms my previous findings that in portfolios where 
concentrated ownership is extensive, long run negative abnormal returns to acquiring 
23 Since small acquiring firms in general underperform large ones in my sample then we should expect 
more negative abnormal returns with higher concentration of small acquirers (i.e., for the High-BO 
group). 
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firms engagmg m public acquisitions disappear. Lastly, Persistent mmus Non-
Persistent differentials are positive and statistically significant in three out of six cases. 
However, where negative alphas are obtained from zero-investment portfolios these 
are statistically insignificant and thus do not affect my main conclusions. Again here 
within the sample of small acquirers the Persistent minus Non-Persistent BO zero-
investment portfolio yields a statistically significant difference of 0.92% per month 
reflecting that the persistence of ownership plays an important role in facilitating 
effective arbitrage in small stocks. Further, the positive Persistent minus Non-
Persistent BO abnormal return differential (Table 5) is positive although small firms 
are mainly concentrated in the Persistent-BO sample. Interestingly, underperformance 
declines substantially in most cases in economic and statistical terms as the extent and 
persistence of BO increase for high book-to-market acquirers and non-cash payments. 
Overall results in table 6 reflect that, on average, long run post takeover 
underperformance decays in economic and statistical terms as the extent and 
persistence of institutional block-holder ownership increase, after accounting for the 
size, book-to-market and method of payment effects. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the level of short sale constraints (as proxied for by 
institutional block-holders' ownership) plays a major role in determining post takeover 
stock performance. Overall, the Low-BO, Moderate-BO and Non-Persistent-BO 
acquirer portfolios underperform their High-BO, Extensive-BO and Persistent-BO 
peers in the long run. The significant return differentials between the paired portfolios 
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show that BO, both in terms of extent and persistence, plays a pivotal role in 
explaining post takeover abnormal returns. My findings therefore suggest that the 
widely documented post-merger underperformance puzzle could largely be attributed 
to less effective arbitrage in the case where acquirers exhibit low and/or non-persistent 
institutional investment rather than to size, book-to-market, and method of payment 
effects. 
My evidence reveals that negative abnormal returns decay in statistical and/or 
economic terms as the extent and persistence of BO increases, which thus suggests that 
BO is indeed a key factor in explaining the degree of acquirers' overpricing. This 
result is consistent with the continuously growing literature postulating that short sale 
constraints can induce short-run overpricing and hence lead to long-run negative 
abnormal returns as efficiency takes its course. The presence of institutions is therefore 
vital in ensuring the efficiency of the takeover market since extensive BO significantly 
deteriorates short-run overpricing and thus eliminates the chances for post takeover 
return reversals. The latter statement is consistent with Nagel (2005) who finds that 
short sale constraints drive most common cross sectional anomalies documented in the 
literature and Phalippou (2005) who suggests that the increasing significance of 
institutional investors can lead to gradual disappearance of certain stock anomalies. 
Accordingly, i hope this study forms the basis for more extensive future examinations 
on the valuation implications of institutional ownership as related to corporate 
takeovers or other events and on the general role of institutions in preservmg 
efficiency in financial markets through facilitating shorting opportunities. 
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Appendix 1: Major Institutional Shareholding's Database 
Details on fields provided by Hemscott pic 
EXTRHOLD.DBF 
11 long_desc 11 ,ncn, 36, 0 II name of the security 
11 ShrhldriD 11 I IICII I 6, 0 II shareholder ID 
11 off recno 11 I llcll I 6 1 0 II officer ID 
11 coy_id 11 ,ncn, 5, 0 II company ID 
11 COy_name 11 I IICII I 50, 0 II company name 
11 IssuerCode 11 I 11 C11 I 6, 0 II LSE Issuer Code 
11 ISIN 11 ,ncn, 12, 0 II ISIN of Prime security 
11 EPIC 11 ,ncn, 4, 0 II EPIC code of prime 
security 
11 Umbrella 11 ,ncn, 30, 0 II umbrella name (alpha 
oriented) 
11 hldr abb 11 I IICII I 30, 0 II shareholder abbreviated 
name 
11 hldr name 11 ,ncn, 60, 0 II full shareholder name 
11 hldr desc 11 I llcll I 40, 0 II additional eg 11 (with 
-
spouse) 11 
11 hldr cat 11 I IICII I 1, 0 II Type of shareholder where 
II M=major (ie over 3%) 
II D=director 
11 hldng_type 11 , 11 C11 , 1, 0 II Type of shareholding where 
II B=beneficial 
II F=family 
II I=incentive 
II N=non-beneficial 
II holding 
11 Current 11 I IlLII I 1, 0 II current holding indicator 
11 hold date" ,non, 8, 0 II conf date of current 
-
holding 
"curr hold" ,nN", 11, 0 II current share holding 
11 CUrr_pcent 11 I 11 N11 I 10, 6 II current percentage holding 
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Fig. 3.2: Block-holder Ownership in UK Acquiring Firms (1993-1998) 
High BO Vs LowBO Acquirers 
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Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics: Size, Book to Market Ratio, and Method of Payment. 
The full sample consists of 164 UK public domestic mergers with a deal value of one million dollars or more. Size 
is the market value of the acquirer one month prior to the event reported in million pounds. B/M is the book to 
market value of the acquirer one month prior to the event. There are three methods of payment: pure cash, pure 
stock, and mixed. The mixed payment subset consists of all mergers where the payment method is neither pure 
cash nor pure stock. The table reports number of acquirers, mean and median size and book-to-market ratios, and 
the percentage of deals under different methods of payment for each calendar year. 
Size (£m) B/M Method of Payment 
Years Acquirers Mean Median Mean Median Cash Stock Mixed ~%} ~%} ~%} 
1993 24 2126 423 0.44 0.32 37.5 12.5 50 
1994 27 2647 471 0.33 0.30 37 14.8 48.2 
1995 33 2472 237 0.42 0.42 30 6.6 63.4 
1996 22 4276 491 0.29 0.19 45.5 22.7 22.8 
1997 29 1082 256 0.43 0.39 31 27.6 41.4 
1998 29 688 103 0.72 0.71 44.8 17.2 48 
All 164 2131 318 0.44 0.34 37.8 19.7 43.3 
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Table 3. 3: Block-holder ownership statistics and allocation of acquirers in sub-samples 
BO data are collected manually on an annual basis from a database provided by Hemscott for the period 1993-1998. For each year we sum up all block-holdings (i.e. 
institutional holdings greater than 3%) by institutions in each acquiring firm to obtain the overall amount ofBO. The table presents year-by-year acquirers' allocation 
(for the full sample of 164 acquirers) in Block-Ownership (BO) sub-samples. The full sample is divided into BO sub-samples in three different ways. First, the entire 
sample is split into the Low BO (i.e., 80<3% at year t, the merger completion year) and High BO (i.e., 802::3% at year t) sub-samples. Low BO acquirers, although in 
Hemscott's share ownership reports, are not subject to any greater or equal to 3% institutional holdings at the event year. Second, the High BO group is divided into 
two sub-samples, one with acquirers subject to block-holding of3-10% (i.e., the Moderate BO group) at year t and one with acquirers subject to block-holding greater 
than 10% at year t (i.e., the Extensive BO group). Finally, the High 80 sample is divided into two alternative sub-samples. One with acquirers subject to institutional 
holding of;::3% for a period of at most 2 years following the event year (i.e., the Non-Persistent BO sample), and one with acquirers subject to institutional holding of 
2::3% for at least 3 years following the event (i.e., the Persistent 80 sample). 
Year Acquirers LowBO High 80 
<3% at year t 2::3% at year t 
1993 24 19 5 
1994 27 12 I5 
1995 33 7 26 
1996 22 7 15 
1997 29 8 2I 
1998 29 0 29 
Overall 164 53 111 
Moderate BO 
3-10% at year t 
4 
8 
15 
7 
6 
I4 
54 
69 
Extensive 80 
2::10% at year t 
7 
11 
8 
15 
15 
57 
Non-Persistent 
BO 
2::3% at year(s) t, 
(t+1, t+2) 
4 
7 
18 
6 
16 
I I 
62 
Persistent BO 
2::3% at years t, 
t+1, t+2, t+3 
8 
8 
9 
5 
18 
49 
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Table 3. 4: Calendar Time Portfolio Monthly Average Returns in Excess of the CAPM and Fama and French 3-Factor Model 
The table presents OLS estimates of monthly abnormal returns (alphas) to takeover samples fori) all 164 acquirers in the full sample; ii) the Low BO (i.e., <3% block-
holding at year t, the merger completion year); iii) the High BO (i.e., ~3% block-holding at year t; iv) the Moderate BO (i.e., 3-10% holding at year t); v) the Extensive 
BO (i.e., ~10% holding at year t); vi) the Non-Persistent BO (i.e., ~3% holding for at most 2 years and vii) the Persistent BO (i.e., ~3% holding for at least 3 years). 
Calendar-time portfolio regressions were performed for each of the seven samples formed on the basis of percentage BO. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the effective 
month of the takeover and remain for 36 months. Calendar portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed a takeover and to disregard 
the ones that have just fulfilled 36 months. The monthly abnormal returns are intercepts ap in the CAPM model and the Fama and French three-factor model, 
respectively: RP1 - R11 = aP + [JP(Rmt- Rft) + eP1 and RP1 - Rfl = aP + fJP(Rmt- Rp) + s PSMB 1 + hPHML 1 + eP1 
Where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, SMB is the difference in returns of value weighted portfolios of 
small firms and big firms during month t, HML is the return differential of value weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market ratio firms in month t, ~P' sP and 
hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets below 
each estimate. N is the number of acquiJ·ers in each sample af!<l Cal. Months is the number of calendar months for each calendar portfolio regression. 
High . Non-Persistent . All Low 80 80 Moderate BO ExtensiVe BO BO Persastent 80 
CAPMa EW -0.62 -1.53 -0.51 -0.61 -0.27 -0.45 -0.41 
[- 1.78]c [-3.05]" [ -1.49] [ -1.93]c [0.50] [-l.l4] [ -0.82] 
vw -0.55 -0.60 -0.48 -0.47 -0.23 -0.33 -0.44 
[ -5.59]" [-5.16]" [-4.22]" [-3.89]" [ -1.42] [-4.0 l]" [-2.08]b 
FFa EW -1.02 -1.71 -0.86 -0.89 -0.58 -0.87 -0.62 
[-4.58] 8 [3.73]" [-4.78]" [ -4.26]" [-1.34] [-3.96]8 [-1.45] 
vw -0.57 -0.62 -0.51 -0.51 -0.28 -0.39 -0.45 
[-5.16]" [ -5.03] 8 [-4.70]" -4.43 [-1.64] [-5.80] 3 [-2.20]b 
N 164 53 Ill 54 57 62 49 
Cal. 105 94 105 105 98 103 100 Months 
a,b,c indicate significance at the 1,5, 10 percent level for two-tailed t-tests. 
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Table 3. 5: Zero-Investment Portfolio and Economic Differentials between Calendar Time 
Portfolio Monthly Average Returns in Excess of the Fama and French 3-Factor Model 
The table presents zero-investment portfolio and economic percentage differentials between OLS 
estimates of monthly abnormal returns (alphas) to takeover samples involving: i) the Low BO (i.e., <3% 
block-holding at year t, the merger completion year); ii) the High BO (i.e., 0:::3% block-holding at year t; 
iii) the Moderate BO (i.e., 3-10% holding at year t; iv) the Extensive BO (i.e., 0:::10% holding at year t); 
v) the Non-Persistent BO (i.e., 0:::3% holding for at most 2 years following the event) and vi) the 
Persistent BO (i.e., 0:::3% holding for at least 3 years following the event). Hedge portfolios' (i.e. zero-
investment portfolios', ZIP) mean calendar time portfolio return differentials are regressed on the FF 3-
Factor model. The regression procedure is identical to that described in table 3. Economic Differentials 
are the differences between the actual alphas obtained in table 3. Both, economic differentials between 
actual alphas and hedge portfolios' alphas are reported on both equal- (EW) and value-weighted (VW) 
basis. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics in brackets under zero-investment 
portfolios' estimates are obtained from a one-tail t-test. 
High Extensive Persistent Extensive Persistent 
Low Moderate Non Low Low Persistent 
EW FF a 0.80 0.27 0.26 0.73 1.00 
ZIP [2.01]b [0.55] [0.51] [1.51t [2.02]b 
FF actual 0.85 0.31 0.25 1.13 1.09 
differential 
vw FF a 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.36 0.34 
ZIP [1.65t [1.00] [0.1 0] [I. 78]b [1.70]b 
FF actual 0.11 0.23 -0.07 0.34 0.17 
differential 
a,b,c indicate significance at the 1,5 ,10 percent level for one-tail t-test. 
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Table 3. 6: Sorts on Blockholder Ownership, Mode of Payment, Size and Book-to-Market value of the acquiring firm. 
The table presents OLS estimates of monthly abnormal returns (alphas) in the 2-dimensional space ofBb samples and method of payment, size and book-to-market 
(B/M) ofthe acquiring firm. The regression procedure is identical to that described in table 3. All164 acquirers are firstly sorted according to method of payment, size 
and book-to-market ratio. Acquirers paying with pure cash are in the cash payments' sample while acquirers paying with pure stock, any combination of cash and stock 
or other (as classified by SDC) mode of payment are in the non-cash sample. Each size (small and large) and book-to-market (high and low) groups of the entire 
sample represesent 50% of that sample. Acquiring firms are also ranked individually into BO samples as in table 3. The table also reports zero investment portfolio 
alphas between paired BO portfolios. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics in parentheses under individual BO portfolios and zero-investment 
portfolios' estimates are obtained from two-tail t-tests and one-tail t-tests respectively. The number of firms involved in each regression is reported in brackets below 
the t-statistic . 
.............._ 
High Moderate Extensive Extensive Non-Persistent Persistent Persistent LowBO High BO - 80 80 - 80 80 -Low Moderate Non-Persistent 
Cash Payments -1.67" -0.70" 0.86c -0.81
3 
-0.37 0.44 -0.37 -0.99b -0.60 (-2.66) ( -2.92) ( -3.07) (-1.03) (-1.39) (-2.01) 
[20] [43] (1.40) [24] [20] (1.03) [25] [17] (-1.04) 
Non-Cash Payments -1.63
3 
-0.87" 0.73c -0.97" -0.66 0.37 -1.36" -0.32 1.02b ( -3.83) (-2.83) (-3.30) (-1.19) ( -5.25) (-0.61) 
[19] [46] (1.52) [19] [26] (0.59) [22] [25] (1. 78) 
Small Size -2.31
8 
-0.863 1.45b -0.85b -0.71 0.20 -1.32
3 
-0.41 0.92c (-2.75) (-2.78) (1.77) ( -2.59) ( -1.22) (0.29) (-3.93) (-0.82) ( 1.45) [19] [63] [31] [32] [26] [37] 
Large Size -1.29" -0.82" 0.38 -1.35" -0.48 0.90b -0.63b 
-1.15c 
-0.46 (-3.14) (-3.08) ( -3.69) (-1.38) ( -2.37) ( -1.80) 
[34] [48] (0.96) [23] [25] ( 1.76) [36] [12] (-0.70) 
High B/M -1.70
3 
-1.26" 0.35 -1.78" -0.47 1.24b -1.60
8 
-0.50 1.11 b ( -3.03) (-4.77) (-5.12) ( -0.92) (-4.89) (-0.95) 
[20] [62] (0.75) [28] [34] ( 1.98) [35] [27] ( 1.70) 
Low B/M -1.71
8 
-0.28 1.53" 0.08 -0.88c -0.68 0.10 -0.75c -0.52 (-2.72) (-0.99) (2.45) (0.27) (-1.92) (-1.12) (0.23) (-1.81) ( -1.06) [33] [49] [26] [23] [27] [22] 
a,b,c indicate significance at the 1,5 ,10 percent level. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 I investigate the relation between the level of short selling constraints the 
acquiring firm is subject to and post-acquisition performance. The distinct role that 
divergence of opinion among investors may have in shaping this performance was not 
examined. Along these lines, the standard asset pricing theory assumes that all investors 
have identical estimates of expected return on all securities. In reality however, the 
existence of informational asymmetries and the tendency of investors to assess information 
in different ways renders the assumption of homogenous expectations among all investors 
unlikely to hold outside the Sharpe-Lintner's world. The divergence of opinion premium 
hypothesis as developed by Miller (1977) and Harison and Kreps (1978) predicts that in 
case investors disagree about the value of a stock, its price will be initially set by optimistic 
investors when short sale constraints that deteriorate the creation of new supply are present. 
The downward sloping demand curve generated in this case creates an upward bias in stock 
prices that is corrected through time as more information arrives. 
As a result, a growing body of recent empirical work emerged that is concentrated on 
the relation between divergence of opinion among investors and stock returns. Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002) for example show that, in the cross section, high opinion 
dispersion leads to low future returns, thereby providing support to the 'premium 
hypothesis'. In this chapter, I investigate the relation between divergence of opinion about 
the value of acquiring firms in the pre-acquisition period and post-acquisition stock returns. 
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The voluminous literature on post-acquisition return determinants does not consider the 
effect of opinion divergence about the value of the acquirer. In a recent paper, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2006) show that investor disagreement about the acquirer can 
largely explain short-run gains to acquisitions. The authors find that high dispersion 
acquirers bidding for listed targets experience significant announcement losses when paying 
with stock. They argue that this is due to an increase in the bidders' float caused by the 
equity issues involved and the negative signals conveyed by such type of announcements. 
The divergence of opinion premium hypothesis implies that opinion divergence can have a 
long-term effect in the price of an acquirer in case negative opinions about its value cannot 
be initially revealed. The existence of short selling constraints for example can deteriorate 
the creation of new supply and thereby prevent pessimistic beliefs from being reflected in 
stock prices. Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) show that borrowing acquirers for shorting 
purposes is costly. Given the fact that a large number of acquirers in my sample engage in 
frequent acquisitions and are relatively small,24 high shorting costs for these stocks are 
expected to persist, therefore leading to slow adjustment of prices back to fundamentals in 
case these are initially overvalued. 
Further, Moeller et al. (2006) show that the bidder's float is only likely to significantly 
increase as a result of an acquisition of a public target financed with stock. Accordingly, the 
supply of shares of the bidder remains to a large extent unchanged in all other cases. Given 
that acquisitions should, in general, reflect value-increasing projects, the arrival of 
24 More than 50% of acquirers in my sample engage in more than one acquisition within a 1-year period. In 
addition the average market value of an acquirer in my sample is three times less that the average market value 
of all UK public firms during the sample period mainly due to the prevalence of acquisitions of small, private 
targets in the UK. 
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acquisition related news should indicate that the existing supply has been absorbed by the 
minority of potential investors. As a result, pessimistic beliefs should be largely constrained 
around acquisition announcements involving private targets, given that the supply of shares 
remains unchanged. In this case, initial overpricing of high dispersion acquirers should 
persist through time, given the existence. of short selling constraints, manifesting itself 
through long-run underperformance of their stock. Acquisitions of private targets comprise 
approximately 90% of the UK sample which therefore. forms a relevant basis to investigate 
this hypothesis.25 
Given the discussion above, i conjecture that acquirers subject to high pre-event opinion 
divergence underperform, in the long-run, acquirers subject to low divergence.26 Further, 
we should expect that negative post-event abnormal returns to acquiring firms should be 
mainly concentrated in the high divergence of opinion (henceforth DIVOP) portfolios. 
Accordingly, the well documented long-run underperformance of acquirers buying public 
targets27 can be to a large extent driven by the high DIVOP subset. To my knowledge this is 
the first attempt to shed light on this issue. 
25 Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that 90% of UK (and Irish) acquisitions involve unlisted and subsidiary 
targets. The UK acquisition market mainly consists of transactions involving private or subsidiary targets 
(91.2% in my sample) that are rarely financed with pure equity payments. 
26 Along similar lines, Houge, Loughran, Suchanek and Yan (2001) and Diether (2006) find a negative relation 
between opinion dispersion among investors and long-run IPO and SEO performance respectively. 
27 For US evidence, see for example: Asquith (1983), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loderer and Martin (1992), Anderson 
and Mandelker (1993), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), and 
Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2004). For UK evidence, see for example: Firth (1979), Franks and Harris 
( 1989), Limmack (1991 ), Kennedy and Lim mack (1996), and Gregory (1997). 
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My task is twofold: to investigate whether such hypotheses are supported by the data 
and to do so by using DIVOP proxies that are tied specifically to investor behaviour. 
Several proxies capturing DIVOP such as analyst forecast dispersion may fail to use as 
much information about investors' opinions as is actually available. Specifically, Michaely 
and Womack (1999) and Scherbina (2004) cast doubts that the assumption that investors 
presumably believe and follow analysts is realistic. As Garfinkel (2005) points out, opinion 
should be expressed by putting wealth at risk and analysts' wealth may actually benefit 
rather than suffer from false opinion expressions. 
On the other hand, proxies such as idiosyncratic volatility or sigma (e.g., Dierkens 
( 1991 ), Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) and Moeller et al. (2006)) and the bid-ask 
spread (e.g., George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), Houge, Lougran, Suchanek and Yan 
(2001), and Garfinkel (2005)) have been argued as more appropriate measures of 
information asymmetries and opinion differences. Using such measures has the ultimate 
advantage that does not involve exclusion of small firms for which disagreement is naturally 
expected to be more significant. Further, data on these proxies are widely available for UK 
firms and this enables us to examine opinion dispersion effects among a near exhaustive 
sample of 4,641 bidders acquiring public, private and/or subsidiary targets. Importantly, 
while idiosyncratic volatility (sigma) mainly captures informational and thus belief 
asymmetry, bid-ask spread may also convey information about liquidity, trading costs and 
size. Sadka and Scherbina (2004) posit that one reason mispricing persists through time is 
due to the high trading costs associated with high opinion dispersion stocks. Further, stocks 
with high spreads are normally small stocks, subject to more severe short constraints. 
Frictions preventing the revelation of information into stock prices such as trading costs and 
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short constraints can generate persistent overpncmg. As a result, bid-ask spread may 
actually be more appropriate in capturing both the extent and persistence of overpricing and 
should be used as a complementary measure when examining valuation effects of opinion 
dispersion. 
My evidence reveals that UK acquirers subject to low DIVOP experience insignificant 
abnormal returns for 1- and 3-year post-event windows. On the other hand, the negative and 
significant abnormal return for acquirers subject to high DIVOP reaches -0.42% (-
0.78%) a month for the 1-year (3-year) window. The documented misvaluation persists 
within two-dimensional sorts of DIVOP and method of payment, acquiring firms' size, 
book-to-market value, target firms' inter/intra-industry or domestic/cross-border status. The 
negative association between DIVOP and post-event returns is robust irrespective of the 
proxy used and for all types of target (i.e., public, private, and subsidiary). Note that even 
the well documented underperformance of acquirers bidding for listed targets is limited to 
the high DIVOP subset. Such results point to a significant role of DIVOP in determining 
post-acquisition performance and suggest that acquirers subject to high pre-takeover 
investor disagreement are likely to be overpriced and subsequently underperform, 
irrespective of the information conveyed in the acquisition announcement. 
Given that the literature related to Miller's divergence of opinion theory and the issues 
related to post acquisition performance have been discussed in chapters 2 and 3 
respectively, the rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data 
and methodological procedures used in my empirical investigation. Section 4.3 presents and 
discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks are provided in section 4.4. 
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4.2 Data and Methodology 
I use a sample of UK acquisitions to examine the relation between DIVOP and long-run 
post-acquisition returns. I obtain all successful acquisitions from Thomson Financial 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) UK mergers and acquisitions database. The final sample 
meets the following criteria: 
- All acquisitions were announced in the period 1/1/1986 to 31112/2002. Transactions 
involving financial and/or utility firms are excluded from the sample. 
-All bidders are UK public firms while targets are either UK or foreign public, private or 
subsidiary firms. 
-Deal value is above 1 million US dollars28 and acquisitions involve more than 50% of 
target shares acquired. 
-The deal value represents at least 1% of acquirer' s market capitalisation one month prior to 
the acquisition announcement.29 This ensures that only economically significant deals are 
examined as relatively small transactions would only add noise to the analysis. 
-Price data for the acquirer is available from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
I identify 4,641 UK transactions that meet the aforementioned criteria. 
28 We employ a one-million US dollars cut-off point to avoid results being generated by very small deals. 
Similarly, studies like Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stutz (2004) in the 
US use a cut-off point of one million dollars. 
29 The same criterion is applied by Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1990). 
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I initially sort acquirers based on their pre-event levels of idiosyncratic volatility (the 
standard deviation in daily market adjusted residuals), average percentage daily bid-ask 
spread, and acquirer/deal characteristics. Sigma and bid-ask spread are measured over a 
100-day period preceding the acquisition announcement.30 Bid-Ask spread coverage for UK 
firms in Datastream is not as comprehensive as stock price coverage. 31 As a result when 
initially sorting with bid-ask spread my sample reduces to 3,747. Depending on the post-
event window examined i include in each.test acquirers that have return data for the 1- or 3-
year post-acquisition period. I examine long-run post-acquisition stock returns (1- and 3-
year) using calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPR) to account for the cross-sectional 
dependence of stock returns particularly due to the inclusion of frequent acquirers in the 
sample. 
Each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks with event 
participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 36 months.32 The 
portfolio is rebalanced every month to include acquirers that execute a transaction and 
· disregard the ones that have completed 12 or 36 months in the calendar approach. The 
average monthly abnormal return during each post-event period is the intercept (alpha) from 
the time-series regression of the calendar portfolio return over the market factor (the 
30 Boehme et al. (2006) use the same window when employing idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of opinion 
dispersion. 
31 Bid-ask spread data for most sample acquirers is available after 01/1990. 
32 Given that the UK market is overpopulated with acquisitions of private targets with relatively low target to-
bidder relative size the 1-year window may be more sufficient to capture post-acquisition performance. 
Further, Boehme et al. (2006) examine valuation effects of opinion dispersion for the US using a 1-year 
window. Nevertheless, we examine also a 3-year window to assess the variation in persistence of overpricing 
when measuring DIVOP using alternative proxies. 
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CAPM) or the Fama and French 3 factors. The SMB and HML factors are constructed as in 
Fama and French (1993). Zero-investment portfolio regressions are employed to measure 
return differentials between extreme sub-samples. 
Table 1 presents summary deal (Panel A) and acquirer specific (Panel B) statistics. It 
appears that the UK sample is overpopulated with acquisitions of private (55%) and 
subsidiary (36%) targets. Only a small fraction comprises of acquisitions involving public 
targets (9%) while pure equity financing is the least common way of financing (4.5%). I 
follow Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) and partition transactions by method of 
payment by considering pure cash and non-cash payments. Pure cash transactions account 
for 55.7% of all deals. Further, 31.5% of acquisitions involve foreign targets and 49.2% 
inter-industry targets. 
The transaction value, market value of the acquirer and the target-to-bidder relative size 
are significantly larger when public targets are involved. It appears that, on average, 
acquirers bidding for private targets are the smallest in the sample. As a result mean and 
median DIVOP as measured by sigma and bid-ask spread are considerably higher for this 
group of acquirers. This confirms that small, less liquid stocks are naturally subject to 
higher investor disagreement. While the average market value of a UK public firm over the 
sample period is about 1. 7 billion pounds, the average market value of acquirers in the 
sample is only 518 million pounds, mainly because acquirers buying private targets are 
relatively small. Geczy et al. (2002) find that borrowing acquirers for shorting purposes is 
costly especially if these are small capitalisation stocks and thus the average acquirer in the 
sample should be in general subject to binding short selling constraints. 
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The correlation between sigma and bid-ask spread is 38% suggesting that the 2 proxies 
are highly related. While the correlation between sigma and the log of acquirer size is only -
11%, the correlation between bid-ask spread and log of size is -56%. This reflects that the 
smallest acquirers are concentrated in the high bid-ask spread portfolio. Although, small, 
less liquid firms should naturally expected to be subject to high bid-ask spread and thus 
DIVOP, i need to ensure that my results are not merely driven by a size effect. Lastly, 
correlations between the DIVOP proxies and market-to-book value are relatively low (2. 7% 
for sigma and -5% for bid-ask spread). 
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Long-run Post-Acquisition Stock Returns 
Table 2 shows that UK acquirers earn negative post-acquisition returns irrespective of 
the event window (1- or 3-year) examined and the benchmark model used (FF 3-factor 
model or CAPM). Note that the intercept from the FF 3-factor model indicates that 
acquirers are subject to statistically insignificant average monthly abnormal return of -
0.11% for a 1-year post -acquisition window. When the CAPM is used abnormal return 
reaches -0.67% and is statistically significant. For the 3-year window alphas are negative(-
0.93% for the CAPM and -0.48% for the FF 3-factor model) and statistically significant. It 
appears that alpha always takes higher values when using the CAPM and that the size and 
book-to-market factors have substantial additional explanatory power. CAPM alphas that 
are used for robustness reasons and to a major extent confirm Fama-French alphas are 
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therefore not frequently reported in my discussion for brevity. Further, intercepts from 3-
year CTRPs are always higher reflecting that acquiring firms on average underperform the 
benchmark significantly for more extensive post-acquisition windows. One of the aims of 
this chapter is to investigate whether this underperformance can be attributed to acquirers 
subject to high DIVOP that become overpriced and subsequently underperform. 
I first examine whether common acquirer and deal characteristics reported in the 
literature can individually explain post-acquisition return for acquiring firms. Table 3 
reports abnormal returns (CAPM and FF alphas) sorted by acquirer's size and market-to-
book value. Panel A reports CAPM and FF alphas for 3 size groups (small, mid and large). 
Results based on the FF-3 factor model indicate that for the 1-year post-event window large 
acquirers underperform small by a statistically significant margin ( -0.29%). On the other 
hand, the picture is less clear for the 3-year post-event window where the large minus small 
(size) return differential is positive (0.18%) but statistically insignificant. In general, 
acquirer's size seems to explain post-acquisition performance only when looking at 1-year 
window results, although the 'large minus small' differential is insignificant when the 
CAPM is used. Since in this case small acquirers, on average, outperform large and given 
that the divergence of opinion premium hypothesis predicts that high DIVOP acquirers are 
expected to experience lower (rather than higher) returns, small firm concentration in the 
high DIVOP (and particularly bid-ask spread) subset is unlikely to contaminate the results. 
Panel B reports CAPM and FF alphas for 3 market-to-book groups (low, mid and high). 
Glamour acquirers underperform value firms irrespective of the post-event window and the 
benchmark used. Accordingly, Rau and Vermaelen ( 1998) find that value acquirers 
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outperform glamour acquirers in the long-run. The high minus low market-to-book value 
average monthly return differences are -0.44% and -0.34% for 1- and 3- year event 
windows respectively when the FF factors are used. Given that glamour firms are more 
likely to be overvalued, we can expect that overpricing is more pronounced for glamour 
acquirers that are simultaneously subject to high DIVOP. Subsequent underperformance 
should therefore be more pronounced for this group. I address this issue when sorting 
acquirers by market-to-book value and DIVOP in the next section. Further, the low 
correlation between the DIVOP proxies and market-to-book suggest that is highly unlikely 
that growth acquirers are concentrated in the high DIVOP group and thus drive the negative 
performance in this group. 
Since i include in the sample both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, i report in 
Table 4 (Panel A) long-run post-acquisition performance by domestic/cross-border status of 
the target. Differences in performance between acquirers engaging in cross-border and those 
engaging in domestic acquisitions are economically and statistically insignificant 
irrespective of the post-event window and the benchmark model used. This reflects that 
target origin is not individually important in explaining post-acquisition stock returns. Table 
4 (panel B) also reports abnormal returns by intra/inter-industry status of the target. It 
appears that acquirers engaging in inter-industry transactions underperform their peers 
bidding for intra-industry targets. However, the inter- minus intra-industry monthly return 
differential (-0.20%) is only significant for the 3-year event window and when using the FF-
3 factor model. 
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4.3.2. Divergence of opinion and Post-Acquisition Stock Returns 
In this section i test my main hypothesis and report results on the valuation effects of 
opinion dispersion. Acquirers are initially sorted in DIVOP portfolios (high, mid and low) 
as discussed earlier. Table 5, Panel A presents the results for sigma (idiosyncratic volatility) 
and Panel B for percentage average bid-ask spread, both measured over the 1 00 days 
preceding the acquisition announcement. Panel A reveals a strong negative relation between 
post-acquisition returns and DIVOP measured by sigma. The 1-year average monthly 
abnormal return measured using the FF-3 factor model (CAPM) decreases from 0.01% (-
0.24%) to -0.42% (-1.10%) as we move from the low to the high sigma portfolio. The high 
minus low zero-investment portfolio alphas are -0.42% and -0.96% when using FF and 
CAPM respectively. Statistically significant negative abnormal return is detected only in the 
high DIVOP portfolio, suggesting that acquirers subject to high pre-announcement investor 
disagreement become overpriced and subsequently underperform. 
Results for the 3-year post-event window confirm this pattern. FF (CAPM) alphas 
decrease from -0.14% (-0.33%) to -0.78% (-1.37%) from the low to the high sigma portfolio 
while statistically significant negative abnormal return is reported for the mid and high 
sigma groups. Results therefore strongly support my hypothesis that DIVOP as measured by 
sigma is priced at a premium around the announcement leading to long-run 
underperformance. The fact that high idiosyncratic volatility explains well post-acquisition 
performance is in line with recent evidence by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) that 
stocks subject to high past firm-level volatility have low future returns. 
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Further, the pattern remains when sorting acquirers in three groups of percentage average 
pre-announcement bid-ask spread (Panel B). The negative relation documented between 
bid-ask spread and post-acquisition returns is evident for both 1- and 3-year post-event 
windows. High minus low (bid-ask spread) zero-investment portfolio alphas are all negative 
and statistically significant irrespective of the window and benchmark used. These are -
0.44% and -0.34% for the 1- and 3-year post-event windows respectively when using the FF 
factors. Note that the intercept from the 3-factor regression is statistically significant for the 
high bid-ask group only for the 3-year window. This finding may be associated with more 
persistent overpricing for high bid-ask spread acquirers. Accordingly, if high bid-ask 
spread acquirers are subject to high DIVOP and high trading costs, overpricing for their 
stock can last for longer and a more extensive post-event window will be necessary to 
uncover underperformance?3 Alternatively, small acquirers performing better than large 
acquirers in the 1-year window (Table 3, for FF alpha) may be the reason for the less 
negative alpha in the case of the high bid-ask spread subset, given that size and bid-ask 
spread are negatively correlated. In general however, results for DIVOP as measured by 
bid-ask spread seem to corroborate results based on sigma. 
4.3.3. Two-dimensional Sorting Tests 
To ensure that results based on DIVOP reported in table 5 are not driven by any acquirer 
or deal specific characteristics i sort deals in the two dimensional space of DIVOP and such 
characteristics. All acquirers are initially ranked individually into 3 groups of DIVOP (low, 
medium and high), 2 payment method groups (cash and non-cash transactions), 2 groups 
33 Sadka and Scherbina (2004) argue that one reason mispricing persists through time is due to the high trading 
costs associated with high opinion dispersion stocks. 
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based on the size of the acquirer (small and large), 2 groups based on acquirer's market-to-
book value (low and high),34 2 groups based on whether the acquisition is cross-border or 
domestic and 2 groups based on whether the target firm is in the same or different industry 
to the target's (intra- or inter-industry respectively). I form mutually exclusive portfolios 
from the intersection of the above groups. The divergence of opinion premium hypothesis 
implies that overpriced acquirers should be located in the high DIVOP group and therefore 
only acquirers in this group should experience statistically significant underperformance in 
the long-run, irrespective of other deal and acquirer characteristics. Table 6 reports FF 3-
factor intercepts from calendar time regressions for high and low DIVOP sub-portfolios 
within the two dimensional space of DIVOP (measured by sigma in Panel A and bid-ask 
spread in panel B) and acquirer/deal specific characteristics. It also reports zero-investment 
portfolio intercepts that reflect return differentials between the high and low DIVOP sub-
groups in each case. 
Table 6 (Panel A) shows that high sigma acquirers underperform low sigma acquirers by 
an economically and statistically significant in most cases margin, irrespective of deal and 
acquirer characteristics. High minus low DIVOP return differentials are negative in all cases 
and statistically significant in 16 out of 22. The majority of negative and statistically 
significant differentials are however mainly detected when examining a 3-year post-event 
window. Negative abnormal returns are mainly concentrated in the high DIVOP subset (in 
all cases for the 3-year post-event window) while abnormal returns are statistically 
insignificant in 20 out of22 cases for the low DIVOP subset. 
34 The reason for employing 2 mutually exclusive sub-samples for size and book-to-market is to maintain a 
sufficient number of firms in each calendar time portfolio. 
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Further, non-cash financed deals seem to underperform cash deals and the DIVOP 
premium effect is present irrespective of the payment method used in the transaction. 
Underperformance for the high sigma group is more pronounced for small acquirers. The 
return differential between high and low acquirers within the small size category is -0.43% 
(-0.58%) for the 1-year (3-year) window, although small/high sigma acquirers are subject to 
statistically insignificant negative abnormal return. Given however that according to table 3, 
small acquirers perform better for the 1-year window, it appears that small size combined 
with high sigma leads to substantially lower returns. Since small firms are more likely to be 
subject to binding short selling constraints (Boehme et al. (2006)), overpricing of high 
sigma acquirers should be more pronounced for small acquirers. Still differentials between 
high and low sigma acquirers are also large within the large size segment. Lastly, the 
premium effect is to a great extent robust irrespective of the market-to-book value of the 
acquirer and the intra/inter-industry and cross-border/domestic status ofthe transaction. Yet, 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns in the high sigma subset for the 1-year 
window are only present for glamour acquirers, domestic and inter-industry acquisitions. 
Panel B, shows the results for subsets of DIVOP measured by bid-ask spread. Again 
here, high bid-ask spread acquirers underperform low bid-ask spread acquirers by an 
economically and statistically significant margin in the majority of cases and irrespective of 
other deal and acquirer characteristics. High minus low bid-ask return differentials are 
negative in all but one cases and statistically significant in 14 out of 22. As in the case of 
sigma, the majority of negative and statistically significant differentials are detected in the 
3-year post-event subset. Negative abnormal returns for high bid-ask acquirers are 
statistically significant mainly for the 3-year window while only in 2 cases this holds true 
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for the 1-year window. Such pattern may again reflect that high bid-ask spread acquirers are 
subject to more persistent overpricing that manifests itself through pronounced 
underperformance when using longer post-acquisition windows. 
The individual effects of deal and acquirer characteristics are less clear in the case of the 
bid-ask spread. While non-cash transactions underperform on average cash transactions for 
both low and high bid-ask spread subsets, large acquirers in the high bid-ask group clearly 
underperform small acquirers. The fact that high bid-ask spread acquirers are already 
relatively small firms may have generated this result. In general, the premium effect is to a 
great extent robust irrespective of method of payment, acquirer's size and market-to-book 
value and intra/inter-industry and cross-border/domestic status of the transaction. 
I further test the DIVOP hypothesis individually for bidders acquiring private, public or 
subsidiary targets to assess whether my results are induced by a specific type of target 
(Table 7). Results are supportive to my main hypothesis irrespective of the type of target. 
That is, intercepts from high minus low DIVOP zero-investement portfolio regressions are 
negative and economically significant in all but one case. On average, acquisitions of public 
targets result in negative abnormal returns (of -0.53% per month for a 1-year and -0.61% for 
a 3-year window) irrespective of the post-event window used to assess performance. This is 
consistent with previous studies documenting long-run underperformance of public 
acquisitions. However, this negative performance is clearly generated by the high DIVOP 
subset. Accordingly, high DIVOP acquirers buying listed targets lose on average over 
0.90% a month while low DIVOP acquirers are subject to statistically insignificant 
abnormal returns in the majority of cases. For acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets 
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low underperformance is again concentrated in the high DIVOP subsets while low DIVOP 
acquirers experience statistically insignificant abnormal returns. The high minus low 
DIVOP differentials are negative in all cases but more pronounced for the 3-year window. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Following a growing body of recent work studying the asset pricing implications of 
heterogeneous beliefs, this chapter examines the relation between divergence of opinion and 
post-acquisition stock returns. I show that the degree of pre-event diversity of opinion about 
the value of the acquiring firm explains to a large extent post-acquisition stock performance. 
Results point to a negative relation between pre-event divergence of opinion and post-
acquisition stock returns. While, negative long-run abnormal returns are mainly present 
when opinion dispersion is high, low dispersion acquirers are in the majority of cases 
subject to no abnormal returns. Results are robust to alternative opinion divergence 
measures used and after controlling for a range of deal/firm characteristics. Consistent with 
Miller (1977), my findings demonstrate that acquiring firms subject to high investor 
disagreement are overpriced around the acquisition announcement. Short-run overpricing 
for those firms is corrected gradually, thus generating post-acquisition underperformance. 
More interestingly, these results in general provide some notable implications. First, the 
significant abnormal returns detected in excess of the CAPM are only a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to reject both the CAPM and the market efficiency when opinion 
dispersion is high, since without homogeneity the assumptions of CAPM do not suffice to 
guarantee that the market portfolio is a mean-variance efficient portfolio, thereby violating 
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the equilibrium model. Second, the significant abnormal returns observed in excess of the 
Fama-French 3-factor model imply that the FF model does not fully capture all the 
valuation components given the presence of wide opinion diversity. Put together, i consider 
this work as one of the first attempts towards examining the impact of opinion dispersion in 
a corporate takeover context. I believe that this can form a good basis for future research on 
how divergence of opinion affects post-managerial decision performance. 
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Table 4. 1: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics (means and medians) for a sample of 4641 UK acquisitions. All transactions are by listed UK 
acquirers, take place in the period 1986-2002 and are downloaded from Thomson Financial SOC mergers and acquisitions database. The 
sample is restricted to deals above one million dollars and where the acquirer obtains more than 50 percent of target's shares as a result of 
the acquisition. Panel A reports deal specific statistics. The transaction value (TV) is from SOC and represents the total value in million 
pounds paid by the acquirer for each bid. Relative size of the target to the acquirer is the transaction value divided by the acquirer's 
market value (TV /MV). Days to completion measures the number of days between the announcement and the effective date. Cross-border 
are transactions where the target is not a UK firm. Inter-industry transactions involve targets with different 2-digit SIC code to that of the 
acquirer. Method of payment statistics are reported in percentages relative to each specific target type as well as the entire sample (in 
parentheses) where relevant. Cash offers include pure cash (100%) offers. Non-cash offers comprise all remaining offers. Panel B reports 
acquirer specific statistics. The market value of the acquirer is reported in million pounds. Market-to-book value is the market value of 
equity of the acquirer divided by its book value one month prior to the acquisition. Divergence of opinion is measured by i) Sigma 
(idiosyncratic volatility), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals for the acquirer over the period (t-100, t-5), where tis 
the acquisition announcement day and ii) Percentage average daily Bid-Ask spread for the acquirer over the period (t-100, t-5). Bid-Ask 
spread data are only available for the period 1990-2002. 
Target T;n~e 
All Public Private Subsidiary 
(n=4641} (n=406} (n=2567} (n=l668} 
Panel A: Deal Statistics mean median mean mean mean median mean median 
Trimsaction Value (TV) 57.41 7.00 342.44 42.84 17.16 5.00 50.09 8.71 
Relative Size (TV/ MV) 0.18 0.06 0.41 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.06 
Days to Completion 28.30 0.00 82.25 63.00 21.00 0.00 26.45 0.00 
Percentage of Cross-Border 31.52 27.34 33.31 29.79 Transactions 
Percentage of Inter-Industry 49.28 54.19 48.27 49.64 Transactions 
Percentage of pure 55.74 49.75 45.65 72.72 Cash Transactions 
(percentage of entire sample) (4.35) (25.25) (26.14) 
Percentage of Non-Cash 44.26 50.25 54.35 27.28 Transactions 
(percentage of entire sample) ( 4.40) (30.06) (9.80) 
Panel B: Acquirer Statistics 
Market Value 518.41 101.91 1321.50 237.93 294.98 80.76 666.78 129.35 
Market-to-Book Value 3.99 2.11 3.95 2.01 4.25 2.24 3.61 1.89 
Opinion Dispersion (Sigma) 0.019 O.Dl5 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.016 O.Dl8 0.015 
Opinion Dispersion (Bid-Ask Spread) 0.033 0.027 0.027 O.Dl5 0.036 0.025 0.030 0.022 
Percentage of Sample with Bid-Ask Spread 80.74 81.77 78.92 83.27 Data 
92 
Chapter 4: Divergence of Opinion and Post Acquisition Performance 
Table 4. 2: Post-acquisition Performance. 
The table reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms for 
i) a period of 12 months (1 year) and ii) a period of36 months (3 years). Each calendar month, a portfolio is 
formed by including all stocks with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 
36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed an event. CAPM 
and Fama and French 3-factor intercepts (alphas) are estimated by the following calendar time portfolio 
regressions: 
Rpt -Rft =aP +fJP(Rmt -Rft)+ept 
Rpt -Rft =aP +fJP(Rmt -Rft)+sPSMB1 +hPHML+eP1 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, Rmt is the value-
weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms 
during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in 
month t, j3p, sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted t-statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. a, band c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent 
level respectively based on two tail t-tests. Cal. Months is the number of calendar months and N is the sample size 
involved in portfolio regression. 
Post-Acquisition Performance 
1-Year 3-Year 
all!ha Adj. R2 all!ha Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.67. 66% -0.93. 68% 
(-2.73) (-3.90) 
FFa -0.11 88% -0.48. 88% 
(-0.70) (-3.03) 
Cal. Months 216 216 
n 4641 4090 
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Table 4. 3: Post-Acquisition Performance by Acquirer's Size and Book-to-Market Value 
The table reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms for 
i) a period of 12 months (1 year) and ii) a period of 36 months (3 years). Each calendar month, a portfolio is 
formed by including all stocks with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 
36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed an event. Estimates 
are sorted by i) acquirer's market value (Panel A) measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement 
and ii) acquirer's book-to-market value (Panel B) measured by the market value of equity of the acquirer 
divided by its book value one month prior to the announcement. CAPM and Fama and French 3-factor 
intercepts (alphas) are estimated by the following calendar time portfolio regressions: 
RP, -Rft =aP +fJP(Rm, -Rft)+eP, 
RP, -Rft =aP +f3P(Rm, -Rft)+sPSMB, +hPHML+eP, 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, Rmt is the value-
weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms 
during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in 
month t, j3p, sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted t-statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. Large minus Small and High minus Low differences and 
corresponding t-statistics are from zero investment portfolio alphas for CAPM and FF-3 factor regressions. a, b and c 
indicate significance at the I, 5, 10 percent level respectively based on two tail t-tests except for zero-investment portfolio 
regressions where one-tail t-tests are used. Cal. Months is the number of calendar months and n is the sample size involved 
in each portfolio. 
Panel A: Long-Run Performance b~ Acguirer's Market Value 
1 Year 
Small Mid Large Large-Small 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.61 b 49% -0.67 b 60% -0.74 a 75% -0.20 
(-2.05) (-2.39) (-3.23) ( -0.90) 
FF a 0.01 87% -0.10 82% -0.24 83% -0.29 c 
(0.04) (-0.49) (-l.l8) (-1.49) 
Cal. Months 210 215 215 210 
n 1547 1547 1547 
3 Years 
Small Mid Large Large 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 Adj.R2 
CAPMa -0.98 a 53% -0.95a 64% -0.83 a 74% O.o7 
(-3.50) (-3.59) (-3.53) (0.31) 
FFa -0.59 a 86% -0.52 a 84% -0.37 c 83% 0.18 
(-3.52) (-2. 70) (-1. 75) (0.88) 
Cal. Months 210 216 215 210 
n 1351 1409 1330 
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Panel B: Long-Run Performance by Acquirer's Market-to-Book Value 
1 Year 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj.R2 Adj.R2 Adj.R2 
CAPMa -0.12 60% -0.90 a 66% -1.06 a 60% -0.94 a 
(-0.47) (-3.59) (-3.38) (-3.77) 
FFa 0.19 83% -0.33 c 84% -0.20 81% -0.44 b 
( 1.08) (-1.82) (-0.84) (-1.74) 
Cal. Months 216 212 207 207 
n 1547 1547 1547 
3 Years 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj.R2 Adj. R2 Adj.R2 
CAPMa -0.53 b 63% -0.95 a 66% -1.42 a 64% -0.88 a 
(-2.19) (-3.72) (-4.67) (-3.65) 
FFa -0.39 b 81% -0.44 b 83% -0.70 a 86% -0.34 c 
(-2.10) (-2.23) (-3.37) (-1.42) 
Cal. Months 216 212 207 207 
n 1309 1373 1408 
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Table 4. 4: Post-Acquisition Performance by the Target Origin and Industry of Target and Acquirer 
The table reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms for i) a period of 
12 months (I year) and ii) a period of 36 months (3 years). Each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks 
with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each 
month to include firms that have just completed an event. Estimates are sorted by i) domestic and cross-border deals (Panel 
A) and ii) by intra- and inter-industry deals (Panel B). Domestic (Cross-border) are transactions where the target is (not) a 
UK firm. Intra- (Inter-) industry transactions involve targets with the same (different) 2-digit SIC code to that of the acquirer. 
CAPM and Fama and French 3-factor intercepts (alphas) are estimated by the following calendar time portfolio regressions: 
R pi - R fi = a P + f3 P (Rm1 - R fi ) + e pi 
RP1 -Rft =ap +fJP(Rmt -Rft)+sPSMB1 +hPHML+eP1 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-hill during month t, Rmt is the value-
weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms 
during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, 
~p, sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-
statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. CB (cross-border) minus Dom (domestic) and Inter- minus Intra-
industry differences and corresponding t-statistics are from zero investment portfolio alphas for CAPM and FF-3 factor 
regressions. a, band c indicate significance at the I, 5, 10 percent level respectively based on two tail t-tests except for zero-
investment portfolio regressions where one-tail t-tests are used. Cal. Months is the number of calendar months and n is the 
sample size involved in each portfolio 
Panel A: Long-Run Performance by Target Origin 
1 Year 
Domestic 
Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.65 a 64% 
(-2.67) 
FFa -0.12 88% 
( -0. 77) 
Cal. Months 216 
n 1463 
3 Years 
Domestic 
Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.88 a 67% 
(-3.78) 
FFa -0.52 a 88% 
(-3.41) 
Cal. Months 216 
n 2803 
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Cross Border 
-0.71 a 
(-2.60) 
-0.11 
(-0.51) 
215 
3178 
Cross Border 
-1.04 a 
(-3.77) 
-0.44 b 
(-2.06) 
215 
1287 
Adj. R2 
66% 
82% 
Adj. R2 
67% 
83% 
CB-Dom 
-0.09 
(-0.54) 
-0.01 
( -0.03) 
215 
CB-Dom 
-0.18 
(-1.19) 
O.o7 
(0.42) 
215 
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Panel B: Long-Run Performance b~ lndust~ of Target and Acguirer 
I Year 
Intra Inter Inter-Intra 
Adj.R2 Adj.R2 
CAPMa -0.59 b 66% -0.72 a 64% -0.09 
(-2.37) (-2.83) (-0.66) 
FFa -0.01 87% -0.18 86% -0.14 
(-0.06) (-1.02) ( -0.90) 
Cal. Months 216 212 212 
n 2354 2287 
3 Years 
Intra Inter Inter-Intra 
Adj.R2 Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.83 a 68% -1.02 a 66% -0.14 
(-3.49) (-4.05) (-1.21) 
FFa -0.36 b 88% -0.60a 85% -0.20 c 
(-2.24) (-3.35) (-1.60) 
Cal. Months 216 212 212 
n 2024 2066 
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Table 4. 5: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) 
The table reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms fori) a period 
of 12 months (I year) and ii) a period of 36 months (3 years). Each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all 
stocks with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced 
each month to include firms that have just completed an event. Estimates are sorted by divergence of opinion (DIVOP) 
groups (High, Mid and Low). Acquirers are originally classified into the three groups each representing one third of the 
entire sample. DIVOP is measured by i) Sigma (Panel A), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals 
(Sigma) over the period (t-100, t-5) where t is the announcement day and ii) Percentage average daily Bid-Ask spread 
(Panel B) for the acquirer over the period (t-100, t-5). CAPM and Fama and French 3-factor intercepts (alphas) are 
estimated by the following calendar time portfolio regressions: 
R pi - R fi =a P + f3 P ( Rm1 - R fi) + e pi 
RP1 -Rfi =aP +f3P(Rm1 -Rfi)+sPSMB1 +hPHML+eP1 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, Rmt is the value-
weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms 
during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in 
month t, pp, sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted t-statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. High minus Low differences and corresponding t-
statistics are from zero investment portfolio alphas for CAPM and FF-3 factor regressions. a, band c indicate significance 
at the I, 5, 10 percent level respectively based on two tail t-tests except for zero-investment portfolio regressions where 
one-tail t-tests are used. Cal. Months is the number of calendar months and n is the sample size involved in each portfolio. 
Panel A: Long-Run Performance by DIVOP (Sigma) 
1 Year 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.24 62% -0.40 61% -1.10 a 60% -0.96 a 
(-1.08) (-1.61) (-3.35) (-3.26) 
FFa 0.01 75% -0.14 81% -0.42 < 81% -0.42 c 
(0.03) (-0.75) (-1.72) (-1.40) 
Cal. Months 209 215 210 203 
n 1547 1547 1547 
3 Years 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 Adj. R2 
CAPMa -0.33 63% -0.63 b 64% -1.37a 63% -1.03 a 
( -1.42) (-2.55) (-4.44) (-3.93) 
FFa -0.14 77% -0.46 b 83% -0.78 a 85% -0.65 a 
(-0.70) (-2.48) (-3.70) (-2.47) 
Cal. Months 216 215 210 210 
n 1528 1388 1174 
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Panel B: Long-Run Performance by DIVOP (Bid-Ask Spread) 
1 Year 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj. R2 Adj.R2 Adj. R2 
CAPM a -0.18 76% -0.28 65% -1.01" 45% -0.81. 
( -0.94) ( -1.07) (-3.04) (-2.90) 
FF a 0.06 83% 0.09 83% -0.30 78% -0.34 c 
(0.34) (0.48) (-1.31) (-1.36) 
Cal. Months 203 203 202 202 
n 1249 1249 1249 
3 Years 
Low Mid High High-Low 
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 Adj.R2 
CAPM a -0.34 c 77% -0.54 b 66% -1.07" 51% -0.71. 
(-1.67) (-2.18) (-3.57) (-3.24) 
FF a -0.09 84% -0.23 84% -0.55. 82% -0.44 b 
( -0.48) (-1.22) (-2.78) (-2.25) 
Cal. Months 203 203 202 202 
n 1130 1103 996 
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Table 4. 6: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) and Deai/Acquirer Characteristics. 
The table reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms fori) a period of 12 months (I year) and ii) a period of 36 months (3 years). Each 
calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to 
include firms that have just completed an event. Estimates are sorted by divergence of opinion (DIVOP) groups (High and Low) based on the original (High, Mid and Low) classification in 
table 5. DIVOP is measured by i) Sigma (Panel A), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals (Sigma) over the period (t-100, t-5) where t is the announcement day and ii) 
Percentage average daily Bid-Ask spread (Panel B) for the acquirer over the period (t-100, t-5). Acquirers are simultaneously sorted by deal/acquirer characteristics. Cash offers include pure 
cash (I 00%) offers. Non-cash offers comprise all remaining offers. Size is the market value of the acquirer one month preceding the acquisition announcement and acquirers are originally 
sorted in two size groups on a 50-50 basis. M/B is the acquirer's market-to-book value one month prior to the announcement and acquirers are originally sorted in two M/B groups on a 50-50 
basis. Domestic (Cross-border) are transactions where the target is (not) a UK firm. Inter- (Intra-) industry transactions involve targets with different (same) 2-digit SIC code to that of the 
acquirer. Fama and French 3-factor intercepts (alphas) are estimated by the following calendar time portfolio regression: 
RP, -Rfl = ap + f3p(R,.,, -Rfl)+sPSMB, +hPHML +ep, 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, Rmt is the value-weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of 
value-weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, ~p, sp and 
hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. High minus Low 
differences and corresponding t-statistics are from zero investment portfolio alphas for FF -3 factor regressions. a, b and c indicate significance at the I, 5, I 0 percent level respectively based 
on two tail t-tests exceEt for zero-investment Eortfolio regressions where one-tail t-tests are used. CM is the number of calendar months and n is the samEie size involved in each Eortfolio. 
Panel A: 'DIVOP b Si rna 
High DIVOP Low DIVOP High-Low 
1 Year N CM 3 Years N CM 1 Year N CM 3 Years N CM 1 Year 3 Years 
ALL -0.42 c 1547 210 -0.78 a 1174 210 0.01 1547 209 -0.14 1528 216 -0.42 c -0.65 a 
(-1.72) (-3.70) (0.03) ( -0. 70) (-1.40) (-2.47) 
Cash -0.15 757 210 -0.57a 592 210 -0.11 915 209 -0.05 903 216 -0.02 -0.54 b 
( -0.61) (-2.69) ( -0.4 7) (-0.21) ( -0.08) (-2.16) 
Non-Cash -0.42 790 202 -0.84. 582 202 0.19 632 197 -0.34 c 625 203 -0.55 c -0.44 c 
(-1.36) (-3.18) (0.85) (-1.91) (-1.46) (-1.46) 
Small Size -0.31 873 210 -0.81. 677 210 0.24 709 196 -0.17 704 205 -0.43 c -0.58 b 
(-1.24) (-3.71) (0.97) (-0. 79) (-1.31) (-2.04) 
Large Size -0.39 674 205 -0.65 b 497 205 -0.12 838 209 -0.13 824 216 -0.23 -0.52 b 
(-1.05) (-2.33) ( -0.53) (-0.60) ( -0.57) (-1.68) 
Low MIB -0.27 784 210 -0.73a 559 210 0.23 717 209 -0.30 706 215 -0.55 b -0.48b 
(-0.96) (-3.12) ( 1.0 I) (-1.44) (-1.66) (-1.82) 
High M!B -0.64 c 763 207 -0.79 a 615 207 -0.22 830 198 -0.15 822 205 -0.30 -0.64 b 
(-1.83) (-2.79) (-0.96) (-0.60) ( -0. 75) (-1.86) 
Cross-Border -0.28 523 207 -0.62 b 398 207 -0.21 480 200 0.13 474 209 -0.01 -0.72 b 
( -0.72) (-2.27) (-0.81) (0.4 7) (-0.02) (-2.03) 
Domestic -0.47< 1024 210 -0.86 a 776 210 0.11 1067 209 -0.32 c 1054 215 -0.58 b -0.55 b 
(-1.71) (-3.89) (0.53) (-1. 73) (-1. 79) (-2.13) 
Inter-Industry -0.52 c 721 210 -0.80" 567 210 -0.14 858 205 -0.16 851 212 -0.38 -0.63 b 
(-1.82) (-3.36) (0.58) (-0.67) ( -1.07) (-2.08) 
Intra-Industry -0.20 826 205 -0.63 8 607 205 0.19 689 209 -0.04 677 214 -0.40 -0.62 b 
( -0. 73) (-2.67) (0.89) (-0.18) (-1.14) (-2.07) 
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High DIVOP LowDIVOP High-Low 
1 Year N CM 3 Years N CM 1 Year N CM 3 Years N CM 1 Year 3 Years 
ALL -0.29 1249 202 -0.55. 996 202 0.06 1249 203 -0.09 1130 203 -0.34 < -0.44b 
(-1.31) (-2.78) (0.34) ( -0.48) (-1.36) (-2.25) 
Cash -0.26 584 192 -0.38 < 489 193 0.20 785 203 0.07 703 203 -0.37 < -0.35 b 
(-1.06) (-1.65) (0.95) (0.36) (-1.41) (-1.65) 
Non-Cash -0.25 665 202 -0.72 a 507 202 -0.18 464 202 -0.39 < 427 202 -0.08 -0.32 < 
(-0.94) (-3.14) (-0.83) (-1.85) (-0.25) (-1.58) 
Small Size -0.20 1051 202 -0.58 a 851 202 0.11 105 181 0.41 96 197 -0.27 -0.93. 
(-0.87) (-2.92) (0.28) ( 1.21) ( -0.63) (-2.63) 
Large Size -0.72 < 197 192 -0.70 b 145 193 0.04 1144 202 -0.14 1034 202 -0.76 b -0.54 < 
(-1.71) (-1.98) (0.18) ( ~o. 75) (-1.80) (-1.50) 
LowM/B -0.18 807 202 -0.44 < 644 202 0.13 480 203 0.06 413 203 -0.29 -0.47 b 
(-0.69) (-1.92) (0.53) (0.24) ( -0.94) (-1.90) 
High M/B -0.42 442 201 -0.66 b 351 201 -0.03 769 202 -0.21 717 202 -0.43 -0.49 b 
(-1.18) (-2.38) (-0.47) ( -1.05) (-1.23) (-1.74) 
Cross-Border 0.11 251 191 -0.28 200 193 -0.14 533 203 -0.04 476 203 0.23 -0.22 
(0.28) ( -1.00) (0.60) (-0.17) (0.55) (-0.74) 
Domestic -0.42 < 997 202 -0.66 8 796 202 0.21 716 202 -0.11 654 202 -0.63. -0.55 a 
0 (-1.86) (-3.25) ( 1.1 0) (-0.57) (-2.46) (-2.51) Inter-Industry -0.35 612 202 -0.52 b 518 202 0.03 622 202 -0.14 574 202 -0.38 -0.37 < (-1.36) (-2.38) (0.14) (-0.62) (-1.21) (-1.57) Intra-Industry -0.22 637 201 -0.56 b 478 201 0.05 627 203 -0.04 556 203 -0.20 -0.46 b 
( -0. 76) (-2.31) (0.25) (-0.24) (-0.69) (-1.98) 
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Table 4. 7: Post-Acquisition Performance by Divergence of Opinion (DIVOP) and Target Type. 
The table reports monthly estimates or' calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (alphas) to acquiring firms fori) a period of 12 months (I year) and ii) a period of 36 months (3 years). Each calendar 
month, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks with event participation (i.e. acquisition announcement) during the past 12 or 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that 
have just completed an event. Estimates are sorted by divergence of opinion (DIVOP) groups (High and Low) based on the original (High, Mid and Low) classification in table 5. DIVOP is measured by 
i) Sigma (Panel A), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals (Sigma) over the period (t-100, t-5) where tis the announcement day and ii) Percentage average daily Bid-Ask spread (Panel 
B) for the acquirer over the period (t-100, t-5). Acquirers are simultaneously sorted by target type (public, private or subsidiary). Fama and French 3-factor intercepts (alphas) are estimated by the 
following calendar time portfolio regression: 
Rpt -Rft =aP +f3P(Rmt -Rfi)+sPSMB1 +hPHML+ept 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the return on a one-month T-bill during month t, Rmt is the value-weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value-weighted 
portfolios of small firms and big firms during month t, HML is the return differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, ~p, sl'_. and hp are regression 
parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics appear in parentheses below each parameter. High minus Low differences and corresponding t-statistics 
are from zero-investment portfolio alphas for FF-3 factor regressions. a, band c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively based on two tail t-tests except for zero investment portfolio 
regressions where one-tail t-tests are used. 
All Sigma Bid-Ask Spread 
High Sigma Low Sigma High-Low High Bid-Ask Low Bid-Ask High-Low 
Type of 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years I Year 3 Years 
Target 
Public -0.53 b -0.61 a -0.92 -0.99a -0.17 -0.37 -0.76 -0.52 -2.10. -0.94 b -0.25 -0.41 b -1.83 a -0.47 
(-2.42) (-3.01) (-1.61) (-2.85) ( -0.50) (-1.47) (-1.03) (-1.18) (-3.24) (-2.33) (-1.15) (-1.97) (-2.81) (-1.17) 
Private -0.17 -0.56 a -0.63 < -0.82 a -0.18 -0.25 -0.45 -0.59b -0.23 -0.53 b O.Q7 -0.14 -0.29 -0.39b 
(-0.95) (-3.36) (-1.95) (-3.56) (-0.79) (-1.21) ( -1.17) (-2.07) ( -0.86) (-2.48) (0.27) ( -0.67) (-0.93) (-1.68) 
Subsidiary O.Q3 -0.35 < -0.18 -0.49 b 0.32 -0.03 -0.38 -0.41 < -0.16 -0.66 a 0.23 0.11 -0.27 -0.65 a 
(0.19) (-1.90) (-0.66) (-2.16) (0.98) (-0.14) (-0.93) (-1.51) (-0.56) (-2.72) ( 1.1 0) (0.53) ( -0.86) (-2.82) 
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5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that there exists a negative and statistically significant relation 
between the degree of pre-event divergence of opinion among investors about the price of 
an acquirer and post acquisition stock returns. This relation can be largely explained by 
Miller's "premium hypothesis" and is in complete agreement with more general 
examinations such as Chen, Hong, and Stein's (2001) showing that negative asymmetries in 
stock returns are more likely when investor disagreement is high as the latter initially 
induces short run overpricing. This chapter takes a step further and examines whether Belief 
Asymmetry (henceforth BA) can also determine acquisition performance around the 
announcement of an acquisition and thus looks at the short run effects of BA rather than the 
long run. 
Accordingly, it appears that corporate events such as acquisition announcements provide 
suitable test grounds to examine whether BA generates systematic valuation effects35 as 
they convey information about the value of firms involved. Investors respond to this 
information revelation and it is reasonable that their reaction depends on the nature of the 
announcement. According to the divergence of opinion 'premium hypothesis' high BA 
about the value of an acquirer prior to an announcement indicates that there exist many 
investors with higher than fundamental beliefs about its value. If the nature of the 
35 Some recent papers use corporate events to examine Miller's hypothesis. Houge, Loughran, Suchanek and 
Yan (2001) find a negative relation between IPOs long run performance and investor disagreement. Diether 
(2004) and Moeller et al (2005) argue that equity issues related to SEOs or acquisitions implemented entirely 
with equity will result in lower returns when belief asymmetry is high. Moreover Loughran and Westberg 
(2005) find a strong negative relation between IPOs and SEOs long run performance and divergence of 
opinion. 
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acquisition announcement conveys positive information about the value of the acquirer it 
will tend to develop further such optimistic beliefs. As a result, it is highly likely that 
optimistic investors overreact to such favourable information and tend to drive prices away 
from fundamental grounds. 36 
I argue that acquisitions of private targets form a relevant basis for the investigation of 
this hypothesis. First, such type of acquisitions is in the majority of cases implemented 
directly at the announcement leading to an instantaneous revelation of investors' beliefs. 
This feature generates an appropriate basis to capture the bulk of investors' degree of 
reaction following acquisition announcements. Second, it has been shown that acquisitions 
of unlisted targets result in positive announcement gains for acquirers. 37 Along these lines, 
several studies argue that there is limited competition for private targets and thus favour that 
acquirers buy undervalued targets because the bargaining power of managers is high 
(limited competition hypothesis). In addition, it is highly likely that acquisitions of smaller, 
less known targets, for which information available to investors is scarce, will be mainly 
motivated by maximising potential synergies (managerial motive hypothesis).38 These 
hypotheses explicitly suggest that such type of acquisitions convey on average 'good news' 
about the value of the acquirer.39 Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) argue that the 
36 Harison and Kreps ( 1978) and Sheinkman and Xiong (2003) argue in the presence of short sale constraints, 
overconfident and thus optimistic investors will pay a premium because of their expectation to resell at even 
higher prices. 
37 See for example DaSilva Rosa eta! (2001 ), Ang and Kohers (2001 ), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), 
Draper and Paudyal (2006) and Conn et a! (2005). 
38 For explanations on these two hypotheses see for example Chang (1998), Rosa, Limmack and Woodliff 
(2004) and Draper and Paudyal (2006). 
39 The information hypothesis (Chang, 1998) implies that only acquisitions of unlisted targets paid for entirely 
with equity convey positive news to the market about the value of acquiring firms. However, several studies, 
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larger the uncertainty about the value of a firm, then good news must be perceived as even 
better news by investors. As a result, in the presence of high BA, optimistic investors are 
likely to overreact to acquisition announcements of private targets and pay a premium to 
buy into the acquiring firm. I use a UK acquisition sample which forms a relevant basis for 
this investigation as it is overpopulated by acquisitions of private targets. 40 In this way i am 
able to draw fruitful conclusions for the behaviour of an entire acquisition market despite 
concentrating only on acquisitions of unlisted targets. 
It is vital to note that if a friction is present that prevents the immediate revelation of 
negative opinions, by preventing the creation of new supply, overpricing should be 
particularly pronounced around the announcement and persist through time.41 Additional 
supply of shares can in practice be created either through short selling or issuing new 
equity. Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) suggest that it is more costly to short acquiring 
firms, especially if these are small capitalisation stocks. I report that acquirers engaging in 
acquisitions of unlisted targets that constitute over 90% of the UK sample are on average 
much smaller than those biding for listed firms. Accordingly, the average market value of 
an acquirer in my sample (£466mil) is approximately two times less than the average 
market value of all UK listed firms during the sample period. As a result, short selling is 
including this, report persistent positive abnormal returns earned by acquirers announcing acquisitions of 
unlisted targets irrespective of the payment method used. These results must reflect that in general investors 
perceive announcements involving acquisitions of unlisted targets favorably. 
40 Moeller et al (2005) find that approximately 47% of US acquisitions in their sample involve listed targets 
and 53% private. In contrast, Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that 90% of UK (and Irish) acquisitions 
involve private and subsidiary targets. 
41 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Chen, Hong and Stein (200 I) explain why arbitrage can be in practice 
limited. 
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likely to be on average constrained for UK acquirers. Such binding short-sale constraint can 
prevent effective arbitrage around the acquisition announcement. 
Further, it is highly unlikely that acquisitions of private targets will increase the bidder's 
float even if these are financed with equity (Moeller et al, 2005). On the other hand, since 
almost half of the acquisition transactions involving listed targets are financed with equity, 
they are expected to increase the supply of shares of the bidder after the acquisition 
therefore allowing for pessimistic views to be instantaneously revealed. Given that such 
type of acquisitions reflect that the bidder's equity is already overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 
1984 ), any existing overpricing generated by optimistic investors preceding the 
announcement is likely to be instantaneously eliminated. Lastly, acquirers bidding for listed 
targets normally experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement and such 
empirical observation can per se discourage optimistic beliefs and prevent overpricing 
around the announcement. 
The main prediction arising from the above arguments is that acquirers subject to high 
pre-announcement BA that buy private targets should earn larger positive (negative) 
abnormal returns in the short (long) run than low BA acquirers. Even if high BA acquirers 
are already overpriced before the announcement42, its favourable nature is expected to 
generate further overvaluation instantaneously. In fact, since already overvalued acquirers 
have done well in the past, good news in this case can be perceived as even better news, 
particularly by optimistic investors. 
42 BA is measured at the pre-announcement period and therefore it is highly likely that high BA acquirers are 
already overvalued preceding the announcement. 
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Consistent with my predictions, i find that positive abnormal returns to acquirers 
increase with pre-announcement BA about their value. The announcement abnormal return 
differential between high and low BA acquirers is 1.2% for a near exhaustive sample that 
includes 3528 economically significant UK deals taking place within the period 1985 to 
2004. This difference becomes 1.5% when concentrating on acquirers bidding for private 
targets that ultimately drive the differential for the entire sample. The positive relation 
documented remains significant irrespective of the choice of the measure used to capture 
BA (analyst forecast dispersion or idiosyncratic volatility) and after accounting for other 
firm and deal characteristics, some of which are explicitly related with BA. These include 
the size, prior performance, age and market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, the relative size of 
the target to the bidder, the method of payment used in the transaction and industry 
diversification effects. 
In the long-run, acqmrers subject to high BA experience significant losses twelve 
months after the announcement ( -0.39% a month). The abnormal return differential between 
high and low BA acquirers is a statistically significant -0.7% per month. Such findings 
reflect that high BA about the value of firms that engage in acquisitions conveying positive 
information causes their price to overshoot in the short run. Optimistic investors' 
overreaction to 'good news' is a potential source for the observed overpricing that, as 
predicted by Miller, leads to relatively worse performance in the long run. 
This study contributes both to the value ambiguity and acquisition literature in three 
important ways. First, it suggests that high BA over-valuation effects are likely to develop 
~ when positive information is released, leading to optimistic views being dominant in the 
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market. Second, it extends prior literature on the causes of positive abnormal returns earned 
around the acquisition announcement by acquiring firms bidding for private targets. It 
appears that there is a strong positive relation between the magnitude of these gains and the 
degree of BA about the value of the acquiring firm at the pre-announcement period. Third, 
the factthat this misvaluation is only corrected through time suggests that the revelation of 
negative opinions in a situation of high investor disagreement is largely restricted around 
acquisition announcements. 
Since the hypotheses and aims of this study have been extensively explained above, the 
rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature related to short 
run gains from acquisitions. Section 5.3 reviews the data and methodological procedures 
used for the purpose of this investigation. Section 5.4 presents the empirical findings and 
section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Short Run Gains to Acquisitions 
5.2.1.1 Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Public Targets 
One of the most extensively researched, but at the same time argumentative, areas in 
finance has been whether mergers create value for the shareholders of the bidder and target 
firms. Both US and UK studies conclude that shareholders of target firms receive 
economically large and statistically significant wealth gains. However, reported returns to 
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bidder firm shareholders are quite ambiguous, since either small positive, negative (the 
largest body in the literature) or zero returns have been recorded. 
In their widely cited survey of share price performance around takeover bids, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) review the evidence on returns to acquiring firms over the immediate bid 
announcement period and draw the conclusion that bidders' shareholders do not lose from 
acquisitions. Subsequent studies document considerable divergence in announcement period 
returns that is systematically associated with method of payment, as predicted by Carleton 
et al. (1983). 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) examined data on returns to shareholders of acquiring 
companies for a sequence of decades. For the 1960s, they obtained quite similar results to 
Jensen and Ruback (1983). For a window of 15 days [-10, +5], the excess returns to 
successful bidders in tender offers were 4.4%. When the window was extended to 20 days 
following the event date, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) rose to 4.95% and were 
statistically highly significant. For the 70s, the excess returns dropped to approximately 2%, 
while for the 80s they became negative (approximately 1% ), but were not statistically 
significant. 
In another US study, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) documented similar results for 
tender offers. They reported that for subperiods approximating the 1960s, the excess returns 
to acquiring firms were slightly over 4% and in general the abnormal returns to acquiring 
firms for the total period 1963 to 1984 were positive and significant. 
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The first major study of UK acquisitions by Firth (1980) examines bidders in 434 
successful bids and 129 unsuccessful bids over the period from 1969 to 1975. It uses a 
market model with parameters estimated using pre-event data, and finds that bidding firms 
experienced statistically significant negative residuals (-6.3% for the announcement month). 
Limmack (1991) examines the post-acquisition performance of acquirers in 448 successful 
and 81 unsuccessful bids announced during 1977-1986, where abnormal performance is 
measured relative to the market index (a market model using London Business School 
(LBS) beta and alpha values is applied). He finds that CARs for completed bids for the 
period from the beginning of the bid month to the end of the completion month are an 
insignificant -0.2% for bidders. 
A very interesting study was presented by Higson and Elliott (1993), who used the 
simple Dimson and Marsh (1986) size-decile control method (performance was measured 
by a 'zero-one' market adjusted model) to consider size effects. The study covers 726 
acquisitions between 1974 and 1990 and concludes to announcement returns of -4.4% (-
3.90% on a 'zero-one' basis). Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) investigate 
announcement period returns associated with 429 UK bidders over the period 1980-1990. 
Overall, they find significant CARs of -4.04% over the period [-20, +40] days around the 
bid announcement date. Gregory (1997) presents a rather exhaustive work on returns (six 
models are used: CAPM, Dimson and Marsh Risk and Size Adjustment (DM), Simple Size 
control portfolio (SS), Multi-Index model (SML), Value-Weighted Multi-Index Model and 
Fama-French three-factor model). His sample has a maximum of 452 acquisitions for 
models which do not require market capitalization, and a minimum of 403 (for the Dimson-
Marsh, 1986, size and risk control model). In all cases, announcement returns are 
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significantly negative varying from -0.30% to -0.71%. Similarly, Holland Kyriazis (1997) 
display significantly negative average residuals for the announcement month ( -1.7%) for a 
sample of 178 bids covering the period 1979-1989. On the other hand, Higson and Elliott 
(1998) find positive bidders' announcement returns (0.43%), by using a sample of 30 
successful takeovers during the period 1975 to 1990. In addition, Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003) use a sample of 519 acquirers over a 1983-1995 period. The study applies the Buy-
and-Hold Average Residuals (BHARs) model, using four different benchmark models, and 
concludes that the whole sample of acquirers experiences statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns of about -1.4%. Finally, in the most recent UK M&A study, Draper and 
Paudyal (2005) report that acquirers of listed targets do not experience any substantial 
change in their share price around the announcement of bids; they either break even or 
suffer a small loss, depending on the excess return metric. 
5.2.1.2. Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Private Targets 
There is very little evidence on shareholders' wealth effects when the target is a private 
company and also the impact of its relationship with the method of payment used in the 
transaction. 
Chang (1998) examines the announcement returns (two-day window) of bidding firms 
acquiring 281 privately held targets during the period from 1991 to 1998 and compares 
them to bidder returns for 255 public targets from 1981 to 1988. The main findings are the 
positive abnormal returns (2.64%) in stock offers (in contrast to the results in which the 
target is publicly traded) and also the zero abnormal returns when the method of payment is 
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cash, consistent with the studies of Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). One 
explanation, given by Chang (1998), for the above results is the information hypothesis. 
Although the bidding firm's managers disclose private information to the shareholders, in 
the case of a private target, its shareholders appear to be extremely careful in the evaluation 
of information and their final decision, because they will end up holding a large amount of 
bidding stock. 
One way to avoid the "double lemons" impasse is through the exchange of information 
among bidders and targets that reduces their joint information asymmetry. As a 
consequence, the acceptance of a stock offer conveys to the market favourable information 
on the prospects of a bidding firm and a signal that the deal is expected to create value 
(positive NPV of bidders) or, more weakly, that the bidder's shares are not overvalued. 
Furthermore, in general, the positive performance of bidders when the acquired firms are 
private is supported by the limited competition hypothesis. If the market is competitive, the 
acquisition will be a zero NPV project (no abnormal returns for acquisitions with cash). 
However, if competition is limited then positive returns are exhibited for bidders because 
the likelihood of underpayment is high. Finally, Chang (1998) suggests the monitoring 
hypothesis. By using stock as a means of payment, acquirers tend to create outside 
blockholders because the targets are owned by a small group of shareholders. These can 
increase the firm's value because they can serve as effective monitors of managerial 
performance or facilitate takeovers.43 More specifically, he finds 4.96% and 1.77% 
announcement abnormal returns if a new blockholder is formed or not respectively. Large 
1
' 
43 On the other hand, increase in managerial ownership can decrease firm value if it allows managerial 
entrenchment or makes takeovers more costly. 
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blockholders can be created for public firms as well, however, in fact these firms have less 
concentrated ownership44 and therefore higher agency conflicts than private firms. 
Hansen and Lott ( 1996) also examine the announcement returns to bidders acquiring 
both public and private targets. They show that bidders earn on average 2% higher returns 
when they acquire a private firm. The explanation they offer, in tum, for this result is that 
since investors are diversified the aim of the manager of a firm is not to maximize 
shareholder value but, instead, to maximize the value ofthe shareholder's portfolio. Hence, 
when a publicly traded firm acquires a public target, diversified shareholders will be 
indifferent to the way the gains from the acquisitions are divided, assuming they hold stock 
in both firms, a condition which is unlikely to be met for private firms. However, the 
opposite will happen in the case of a private target, since the bidder's shareholders will 
capture part of the gains of the acquisition, assuming the bid is value increasing. 
Da Silva Rosa et al. (2001) document more or less similar results (signalling 
implications of the method of payment are likely to differ across bids for public and private 
targets) in their research concerning a sample of private and public Australian bids. Cash 
based bids generate a significantly positive return of 3.26%, but share bids earn an 
insignificant average return of 1.65%. In addition, in both cases the excess returns to bidders 
. of private targets are significantly higher than the excess returns to bidders of public targets. 
44 However, this differential may to some extent be offset if we take notice that the relative size of public 
targets is generally larger than the private target's one. Therefore they either hold a larger ownership stake in 
the bidder, or private managers may not be interested in becoming effective monitors, since they may use the 
takeover activity as an exit strategy. In addition, private deals are almost all completed, while the public deals 
may not be completed. 
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Da Silva Rosa et al. (200 1) argue that it is likely that the level of competition in the market 
for corporate control is lower for private targets and this can also be expected to affect 
acquiring firms' returns from acquisitions. Auction-style takeovers (which are mainly 
accompanied by decreasing returns for acquiring firms) is a common phenomenon in public 
targets since there is no cost for obtaining information and more is known about the target. 
On the other hand, privately held firms are not obliged to release relevant valuable 
information to the public. Therefore the higher cost of obtaining information on privately 
held firms is very likely to be associated with higher returns for the acquiring firms since 
they capture a greater proportion of the expected gains, particularly if there are only few 
firms with whom the target may reap synergistic gains. 
Ang and Kohers (200 1) use a sample of 7,070 US acquisitions from 1988 to June 1992 
and document substantial gains for bidders regardless of the method of payment (positive 
and statistically significant for both cash and stock). Two main interpretations are provided: 
First, it appears, as already discussed above, that private firms have concentrated ownership 
which enables them to have lower agency conflicts, while public firms generally have more 
dispersed ownership. Second, bidders avoid the public pressure from outside investors and 
therefore they have the opportunity to avoid hubris-motivated takeovers. This gives them 
the 'privilege' to stop any negotiations without incurring high 'prestige' costs. In addition, 
the nature of bidding private targets 'auto-protects' the acquiring company by the managers' 
empire building incentives, since in most cases such acquisitions do not offer them the 
prestige they pursue. 
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5.2.1.3. Returns to Bidding Firms acquiring Subsidiary Targets 
To my knowledge, there are three papers in the literature that examine bidding returns 
when the target is a subsidiary firm and which at the same time take notice of the method of 
payment. Fuller et al. (2002) use a sample of 539 US bidders that make many acquisitions 
(3135) within a three-year period. They provide evidence that acquiring firms exhibit 
significantly positive returns (2.75%) when purchasing subsidiary firms, and these returns 
become higher (3.23%) when stock is used as a method of payment. Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2004) also find positive and significant abnormal returns for acquisitions of 
subsidiary targets. According to Fuller et al. (2002), one reason why a firm sells a 
subsidiary is to gain from increased focus, and therefore diversified firms might accept a 
relatively lower price for an asset sale than a non-diversified firm. However, there is poor 
evidence that diversified parents will sell subsidiaries at a discount relative to non-
diversified parents. 
In addition, Faccio and Masulis (2005) posjt that when a subsidiary acquisition takes 
place cash is preferred as a method of payment. Bidders are likely to prefer cash, given the 
illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often-impending 
retirement of a controlling shareholder manager. Similarly, corporations selling subsidiaries 
are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire to restructure towards their 
core competency. Consequently, there is strong preference for cash consideration in order to 
realize these financial or asset restructuring goals and also due to the fact that bidders are 
frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or to reduce their tax 
burden. 
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5.2.L4. Method of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions 
5.2.1.4.1. In general 
Fishman (1989), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), Brown and Ryngaert (1991) 
document higher returns for cash offers than stock offers at the bid announcement. Travlos 
(1987), among others, by using a sample of US public targets, finds negative returns 
because of stock financing regardless of the outcome of the bid (successfuVunsuccessful) 
and positive returns for cash offers. His results are also independent of the type of takeover 
(merger, tender offer). In sum, generally the stock (or mixed) offer reflects negative 
information about the bidder, whereas zero returns are displayed for cash offers. Therefore, 
it seems that a crucial issue concerning the determinants of acquiring firms' returns is the 
means of payment that is used at the acquisition. 
5.2.1.4.2. Determinants of Method of Payment 
5.2.1.4.2.1. Asymmetric Information Hypothesis 
Bidding companies pay the shareholders of the target firms using a variety of means. 
Common practices include payment in cash, exchange of shares, and a combination of both 
(shareholders may be given a choice). The most common argument for the choice of cash or 
stock, as the method of payment, is the information asymmetry-signaling hypothesis that 
arises. In the absence of full information regarding the value of a merger (for example, the 
estimated value of potential benefits to be achieved through synergy) the mode of payment 
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conveys a signal to investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Leland and Pyle (1977) argue 
that the premise of information asymmetry raises the proposition that managers with private 
information that their firm's shares are overvalued offer these shares in takeover bids. 
Outside investors, recognizing the adverse selection problem, consequently revise their 
estimate of the offer's value downwards. The target's shareholders also demand a higher 
premium to compensate for the 'lemons' problem in share-based bids, and therefore this 
seems a plausible explanation for the negative share price performance of bidders when they 
use stock in takeovers. 
Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) enrich the asymmetric information hypothesis by 
considering the case where the target firm's managers are better informed about their firm's 
value. Hansen (1987) posits that when bidders and targets have private information, then a 
'double lemons' problem is set up, since bidders do not offer stock when they believe their 
shares are undervalued and targets only accept cash when their share value (based on their 
private information) is less than the offer. In other words, the double lemon problem sources 
from both bidders' and targets' managers recognizing the adverse selection bias in the 
other's decision. Hansen's (1987) model addresses the issue of uncertainty in target 
valuation, and therefore in this case a stock offer is suggested as it has 'a contingency 
pricing effect'. In such a case, targets are forced to share part of the risk that the stock is 
overvalued.45 In any case, Hansen's (1987) model predicts that cash offers always send a 
credible signal that the bidder's shares are undervalued and also they should be selected 
when there is high uncertainty on their own firm's value, while a stock offer should be made 
45 In cash offers the bidder bears the entire cost of overpayment (Eckbo et. a!., 1990). 
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when there is high uncertainty on the target's value.46 This uncertainty (asymmetry) is likely 
to rise as the targets' assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder (Faccio and Masulis 
(2005)). 
In Fishman's (1989) analysis, bidding firms decide between cash and share offers on the 
basis of their private information about the value of the merger. Bidders who estimate a 
high value make high preemptive cash bids to deter potential competing bidders, assuming 
that the bidder's expected pay off is decreasing in the initial bidder's valuation of the target. 
However, targets with private information about their own value make cash exchange risky 
for the bidders because of the adverse selection problem. In sum, a cash offer ha.~ the 
advantage of preempting potential competing bidders, while the advantage of a share offer 
is that it induces the target to make an efficient accept/reject decision and thereby reveal its 
private information about expected future cash flows. Fishman (1989) predicts that an initial 
bidder's expected pay off is higher if cash is offered rather than shares. Similarly, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) argue that bidders whose private information is more 
favourable regarding either their own pre-merger values or the synergy use cash and this 
explains why bidders' prices react more favourably to cash rather than stock offers. 
5.2.1.4.2.2. Relative Size Proposition 
Numerous studies have also been launched with regard to the impact of relative size of 
target-to-bidder on payment methods. According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), the return of 
bidders depends on the relative size of targets. The main findings are: i) the larger the 
46 Berkovitcb·and Narayanan (1990) and ·Eckbo etal. (1990) show that higher valued bidders will use cash or a 
higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the market. 
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relative size of targets to bidders, the higher the CAR will be (Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989) and Kang, (1993)). This is linked to the suggestion made by Loderer 
and Martin (1990) who claim that large firms seem to pay too much for their targets and 
large bids seem to be overpriced on average- facts that deteriorate the share price 
performance. Ang and Kohers (200 1) proceed to a further analysis concerning relative size, 
supporting first that the relative size of target to bidder is critical to the bidder's 
performance, and second that the acquiring return when bidding for a public target is 
significantly smaller than the return when bidding for a private target. ii) The larger the size 
of the target firm, the more likely the acquirer is to use share financing in M&A deals 
(Myers and Majluf (1984) and DeAngelo et al. (1984)). Grullon, Michaely and Swary 
( 1997) examine 146 mergers during the period 1981-1990 to explore the determinants of 
payment methods by testing the capital position of the merged companies, the relative size 
of targets, and the return on equity of both parties. They find that share exchange is more 
likely to be used in mergers where targets have a high capital adequacy relative to the 
bidders as indicated by the higher ratio of share-to-cash, which is equal to 2.12%. 
5.2.1.4.2.3. Managerial Ownership Proposition 
The choice of financing alternatives in corporate acquisitions must be related to the 
managerial ownership fraction of both parties (acquirer and target). It is often viewed that 
the greater the management's share of the acquiring or target firm, the more likely cash 
financing is adopted. One explanation of this strategy in M&A deals is that the managers of 
both parties offer (or accept) cash as the medium of exchange in order not to dilute their 
already existing control after the acquisition. Stulz (1988) examines the relationship 
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between the choice of payment methods and the managerial ownership of acquiring firms. 
His study shows that the larger the fraction of the ownership held by the acquiring firm, the 
less likely an acquisition is financed by using a share exchange. Under such a circumstance, 
the management of the bidder is reluctant to offer shares in order to avoid diluting their 
original control after the acquisition. 
Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) use a sample of 209 US acquisitions during the years 
1981-1983 and document negative returns for bidders that use stock financing, as a means 
of exchange, and have low managerial ownership. They find that in cash fmancing deals the 
top five officers and directors of the firm hold about 11% of the company's shares, while in 
share financing, less than 7% are held by them. This result indicates that managers with 
relatively higher shareholdings in their firms prefer financing acquisitions with the use of 
cash to share, because, as Amihud et al. (1990) point out, they do not want to increase the 
risk oflosing control after the acquisitions.47 However, given the above argument, the use of 
stock may signal to investors that the acquisition is not value decreasing. 
Finally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that cash is the method of payment that should 
be preferred when preserving control is important for bidders, especially under 
circumstances where continued corporate control is threatened. The corporate control 
incentives to choose cash are likely to be strongest when a target's share ownership is 
concentrated. On the other hand, stock financing would have better effects if the shareholder 
has supermajority voting rights because, in this case, it would not have the opportunity to 
threaten the continued control of shareholder. 
47 The same view is analyzed by Martin ( 1996). 
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5.2.1.4.2.4. Taxation Implication Proposition 
It is well known that any capital gains must be realised immediately for tax purposes 
due to higher depreciation tax shields (Carleton et al. (1983)). Therefore, a cash offer in 
M&As could, in theory, bring about higher premiums when compared with a share 
exchange. In other words, due to the existence of different tax treatments, the acquirer must 
pay a higher acquisition price in the case of the cash offer to offset the tax burden of the 
target shareholders, while many stock exchanges will be treated as tax-free transactions. 
This proposition has long been addressed and confirmed by earlier studies. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) link their study to the relationship between the tax 
status and payment methods. They find that targets' returns are higher when financed by 
cash (33.54% by cash versus 17.47% by stock) and contribute this result to the taxation 
implication theory. They conclude that the fact of the substantially higher returns to target 
shareholders when financed by a cash offer indicates that acquirers need to pay the 
additional tax burden for the targets under such a circumstance. In this respect, a share 
exchange will defer the tax consequences until the share is eventually sold. If this is 
valuable, they may accept a discounted price and therefore, due to the lower price, bidders 
will perform higher returns under a stock offer. 
According to Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988), however, there seems to be no clear 
evidence showing that the capital gain taxes are the main concern of the acquisition 
financing when cash is used in this circumstance. As they show, cash financing in the period 
1965-1969 declines (with a percentage of 18.6%) when compared with that of the previous 
period 1960-1964 (29.2%). However, this trend was reversed from 1975 to 1979 with the 
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proportion of cash financing rising to 33.6%. Consequently, this empirical evidence does 
not show a strong linkage between the capital gain tax and the use of cash as the medium of 
exchange. 
5.2.1.4.2.5. The Growth Opportunity Proposition 
Glamour acquirers are those firms that are highly valued as a result of their prior stock 
market performance. Their stocks receive premium ratings in the form of low B/M value. In 
contrast, firms with high B/M value ratings are undervalued, but they may have the 
potential for subsequent value gains (high growth opportunities). In other words, glamour 
stocks are high growth firms and value stocks are low growth firms. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) suggest that glamour acquirers outperform value acquirers after merger, irrespective 
of the payment method used.48 In some ways the market fails to understand that past 
managerial performance is not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, at least in 
the case of acquisitions.49 This result is in contrast to their findings for the long-run 
performance of bidding firms. They also report a significant tendency of glamour acquirers 
to finance their acquisitions with their own stock50 and this tendency is stronger in mergers 
than in tender offers. 
48 The main argument here is the extrapolation hypothesis that explains the differential performance of 
glamour and value acquirers. Acquirers commanding a high market rating due to their recent performance and 
expected future performance (glamour acquirers) may act out of overconfidence or hubris in making 
acquisitions. The stocks of such companies may also be overvalued and although the managers may be aware 
of such overvaluation, the stock market may be not. 
49 However, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find, by using a sample of UK public firms, that overall value 
acquirers outperform glamour acquirers at bid announcement. 
z 
5° Consistent with the information asymmetry argument, glamour acquirers tend to have high past share price 
returns, while the opposite is true for value acquirers. Hence, it seems plausible for glamour acquirers to use 
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Taking the above into consideration, the alternatives for payment methods used in M&A 
deals depend, to some extent, upon the acquiring firm's growth opportunities. Martin (1996) 
uses a sample of 846 US acquisitions for the period 1979-1988 and finds, in contrast to Rau 
and V ermaelen (1998), that acquiring firms with greater growth opportunities (value 
acquirers) are more likely to use share exchange in acquisitions. A possible interpretation of 
this result is that acquiring firms would need more cash (if available) under such a 
circumstance to satisfy their growth opportunities, while they would also aim to mitigate the 
possibilities of overpayment (especially when the target's B/M value is also high). 
5.2.1.4.2.6. Joint Method of Payment 
The form of cash-share combination has most commonly been used in the UK rather 
than in the US. The literature provides ambiguous results with regards to the empirical 
evidence from acquiring firms' abnormal returns when they select to use both cash and 
stock as the method of payment. For example, Eckbo et al. (1990) find significantly positive 
abnormal returns for mixed offers, which are also higher than for either all stock or all cash 
bids. On the other hand, Travlos (1987) and Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find 
negative excess returns for combined cash/stock offers. 
According to Eckbo et al. (1990) it appears that there is a relation between mixed 
payment and the bidder's private information about its value and the value ofthe synergy, 
as well as that only mixed payments contain signalling information and synergy revaluation 
components. As they suggest, two-sided information asymmetries between the bidder and 
their 'overvalued' equity as a method of payment and value acquirers to use cash for the opposite reasons. 
This view is also supported by Dong et al. (2006). 
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the target firms can lead to an optimal mix of cash and stock as payment in the transaction, 
while the value of the bidder's residual claim increases with the size of cash offer. 
Blackburn et al. (1997) argue that the joint method of exchange functions as a viable 
mechanism for overcoming the information asymmetry dilemmas (pure cash or stock). In 
addition, the combination of cash with stock payment may represent the only instance in 
which both signaling and re-evaluations exist. 
5.2.2 Conclusion 
It has become obvious from the discussion above that several factors affect or determine 
short run gains to acquiring firms announcing acquisitions. As explained in the introduction 
of this chapter the main aim is to examine whether belief asymmetry plays a significant role 
in determining such short run gains. The literature related to this issue is extensively 
explained in the introduction of this chapter as well as in chapter 2. While trying to uncover 
whether a relation between belief asymmetry and gains from acquisitions exists i control for 
a series of characteristics identified in the literature and mentioned in part 5 .2.1 above. 
5.3. Data and Methodology 
I use a UK sample of successful, domestic acquisition announcements to examine the 
relation between BA and gains from acquisitions both in the short and long run. All data on 
acquisition announcements are from Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
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UK mergers and acquisitions database but exclude all transactions where financial and/or 
utility firms are involved. The final sample meets the following criteria: 
- Acquisitions were announced during the period from Ill /1985 to 31112/2004 and 
acquiring firms are not involved in other announcements within the 5-day abnormal return 
window examined. 
- Acquiring firms are listed in the London Stock Exchange while targets are UK public, 
private or subsidiary firms. All subsidiary targets are not listed firms. 
-Deal value is equal to or greater than $1 million and acquisitions involve more than 50% of 
shares acquired. 
- The deal value corresponds to at least 1% of the market value of the acquiring firm. 
-Data required for the acquirer is available from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
I collect a sample of 3528 acquisition announcements that satisfy the above criteria. I 
subsequently measure pre-announcement belief asymmetry about the value of the acquirer 
involved in each announcement. 
Recent papers argue that idiosyncratic volatility (or sigma) can proxy for asymmetric 
beliefs (Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001, Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu, 2006 and Moeller et 
... ..,_ . 
al. 2005) or value uncertainty (Pastor artd Veronesi, 2003). This BA measure is not only tied 
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directly with investors' behavior but also has the ultimate advantage that does not involve 
exclusion of relatively small stocks due to poor analyst coverage. 51 Thus, it allows us to 
study a near exhaustive sample of 3528 UK acquisition announcements. Idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma) is calculated as the standard deviation of market adjusted residuals of the 
daily stock returns measured during the period (t-205, t-6) where t is the acquisition 
announcement day. 52 
I also examine a sub-set of 1608 firms for which analyst forecast dispersion data from 
IIB/E/S is available. I measure dispersion in analyst earnings' forecasts about the acquiring 
firm (DISP) as the standard deviation of all one-year ahead earnings per share forecasts one 
month prior to the announcement. It is thus required that at least two analysts follow the 
firm around this period. 
Table 1 provides information on deal and acquirer characteristics for the full sample of 
acquisitions and the sub-sample with analyst forecast data. It appears that the UK market is 
overpopulated by acquisitions of private targets (91.5%), with only 8.5% involving 
acquisitions of listed targets. 54% of the deals are financed with pure cash while only 5.5% 
of the transactions are paid for entirely with equity. 53 The mixed/other payments subset (i.e. 
neither pure cash, nor pure stock) comprises more than 40% ofthe UK sample. The average 
51 Moeller et al's (2005) sample dramatically reduces by 70% due to the analyst forecasts' requirement. Pastor 
and Versonesi (2003) and Boehme et al (2005) argue that the use of analyst forecast dispersion involves 
exclusion of relatively small stocks; a particularly significant category, given that investor disagreement/value 
uncertainty is naturally expected to be high for these stocks. 
52 Dierkens (1991) uses the same event window to capture the degree of pre-event information asymmetry. 
53 Similarly, Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that only 5.9 percent of UK M&A deals are financed with pure 
equity payments. 
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market value of all acquirers (£466mil) is approximately two times less than the average 
market value of all FTSE All-Share firms during the sample period, therefore reflecting that 
the majority of UK acquisitions are undertaken by relatively small firms. Further, the 
prevalence of acquisitions of private targets (91.5%) has an important effect. For more than 
70% of the deals the announcement date is also the effective date of the acquisition. It is 
reasonable that this immediate implementation of acquisitions leads to high volume of 
belief disclosure related to information conveyed by the announcement. Such feature forms 
a coherent basis to capture investors' reaction to positive news about the value of acquiring 
firms. The statistics reported above do not significantly differ for the subset with analyst 
forecast information (Table 1-Panel B). 
Table 2 presents summary statistics sorted by pre-announcement BA (measured by 
Sigma in Panel A and DISP in panel B) and type of target. Acquirers are originally 
classified into three BA groups (low, mid and high) each corresponding to one third of 
sample. Statistics for each deal/acquirer characteristic are reported within each of the three 
BA groups and high minus low differences of means and medians are calculated in order to 
provide a clear picture about the determinants of Sigma and DISP. I focus more on medians 
as these are less susceptible to biases generated by outliers. The size of the acquirer appears 
to be negatively related with Sigma. This is consistent with the view that BA is naturally 
higher for small stocks, as information about their fundamental value is scarce. 54 The 
correlation between the logarithm of acquirer's size and Sigma however is -0.19 suggesting 
that the latter by no means proxies merely for size. The size effect is not present when 
acquirers are sorted into BA portfolios based on DISP (Table 2, Panel B). Accordingly, the 
54 See for example Diether et al (2002). 
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correlation between the logarithm of acquirer's size and DISP is only -0.08 reflecting that 
DISP is less susceptible to the size effect. 
Moreover, there appears to be a strong positive relation between the relative size of the 
target to the acquirer and belief asymmetry about the acquirer, irrespective of the target type 
involved and the proxy used to capture BA. For panel A, this relation may be due to the size 
effect reported earlier (i.e. smaller firms being subject to higher Sigma), given the negative 
correlation (-0.22) between the size ofthe acquirer and the transaction relative size. 
The market-to-book value means reflect that glamour firms are subject to higher Sigma. 
Moeller et al (2005) argue that firms with high market-to-book are subject to high 
information asymmetries because a large part of their value comes from intangible assets. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) develop a model where uncertainty about a firm's average 
profitability increases the firm's market-to-book ratio as well as its idiosyncratic return 
volatility. On the other hand, Doukas, Chansog, and Pantzalis (2004) show that value firms 
are subject to higher analyst dispersion which is supported by the market-to-book medians 
in panel B. Lastly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) also argue that firm age and idiosyncratic 
volatility are negatively related and interpret this as evidence that newly listed firms are 
subject to higher value uncertainty. My statistics provide strong support to this observation. 
I subsequently account for all characteristics that appear to be related to BA in the cross 
sectional regressions to ensure that my results are due to BA rather than any confounding 
effects generated by such characteristics. 
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Since 30% of the acquiring firms in the sample engage in frequent acquisitions within 
200 days, previous announcements will be included in the estimation period rendering 
market parameter estimation to an extent biased. I thus follow Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) and report short run abnormal returns using a modified market model: 
Where Ri is the return on firm i and Rm is the value weighted market index return. I then 
estimate CARs for the five-day period (-2, +2) around the announcement date. Note that 
market parameter estimation in the spirit of Brown and Warner (1985) yields very similar 
results that i do not report for brevity. 
For the long-run analysis i estimate 12-month abnormal returns using calendar time 
portfolio regressions (CTPRs) to account for the cross-sectional dependence of stock 
returns.55 The decision to examine one-year abnormal returns is mainly motivated by the 
small median target-to-bidder relative size (7%) of the acquisitions comprising the UK 
sample. Given the existence of multiple acquirers, this implies that, we would not able to 
identify isolated economic effects from examining the performance of relatively small 
mergers over more extensive post acquisition windows. Further, this is in line with Boehme 
et al (2006) who use a one-year period to examine valuation effects of opinion dispersion. 
Accordingly, each calendar month, a portfolio is formed by including all stocks with event 
participation during the past 12 months. The portfolio is rebalanced every month to include 
acquirers that announce a transaction in the previous month and disregard the ones that have 
completed 12 months in the calendar approach. The average monthly abnormal return 
55 For detailed explanation on the CTPR see for example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000). 
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during the post-event period is the intercept (alpha) from the time-series regression of the 
portfolio return over the market factor or the Fama and French 3 factors for the UK. Zero 
investment portfolio regressions are employed to measure abnormal return differentials 
between the high and low BA portfolios. 
5.4. Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Gains from Acquisitions of Private Targets 
My main hypothesis is based on the assumption that acquisitions of private targets (as 
opposed to acquisitions of listed targets) convey on average 'good news' about the value of 
acquiring firms. If such acquisitions earn systematically positive abnormal returns 
irrespective of the payment method used, then this assumption would indeed be realistic. 
Table 3 presents abnormal returns to acquiring firms sorted by target type and method of 
payment. UK acquirers in general earn abnormal gains of 0.92% (significant at the 1% 
level) on the 5-day window around the announcement. Acquisitions of private targets yield 
1.16% abnormal returns with stock transactions (2.01%) outperforming cash (0.87%) and 
mixed/other (1.49%) respectively. These, results are in line with the majority of studies for 
similar event windows56 and suggest that acquisitions of private targets must convey on 
average positive information to investors about the value of the acquiring firm. The opposite 
is evident for acquisition announcements of public targets that result on average in negative 
gains of -1.67%. Abnormal return differentials between acquisitions involving private and 
56 Chang (1998), DaSilva Rosa et al (2001), Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller et al (2002), Draper and Paudyal 
:" (2004) and Conn et al (2005) document positive and significant abnormal returns for acquisitions of private 
(and/or subsidiary) targets. 
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public targets are in all cases positive and average to 2.83%. It appears that only 
acquisitions of private targets systematically lead to positive abnormal returns for acquiring 
firms. As a result, related announcements are likely to attract more optimistic investors and 
further develop previously optimistic beliefs about the value of the acquirer. I therefore 
' 
subsequently examine valuation effects ofBA for acquisitions of private targets. 
5.4.2 Belief Asymmetry and Short-Run Gains from Acquisitions 
Table 4 reports market adjusted returns over the 5-day announcement window sorted 
simultaneously by pre-event BA (in panel A measured by Sigma and panel B by DISP), 
target type and method of payment. Positive abnormal returns increase systematically with 
the level of Sigma irrespective of payment method. For the entire sample, firms in the low 
(high) BA portfolio experience statistically significant abnormal gains of 0.35% (1.51 %). 
The high minus low differential (1.16%) is statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
private targets this difference reaches 1.48%. When further differentiating the results on the 
basis of method of payment, the difference is 1.02% and 1.85% for pure cash and 
mixed/other payments respectively. When equity payments are considered this reaches 
2.34% but is statistically insignificant. The pattern evident here reflects that, on average, 
pre-announcement BA about the value of the acquiring fin:ri is positively related with 
abnormal returns at the announcement. In other words, the more intense the disagreement 
between investors about the value of a firm, the higher the abnormal increase in value when 
this firm announces an acquisition. 
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Moeller et al (2005) obtain similar results for their entire sample when using analyst 
forecast dispersion as a proxy of BA. For acquisitions of private targets however, they only 
report findings for stock offers that represent the minority of this sub-sample. Their results 
in this case are qualitatively similar with mine in that a positive but statistically insignificant 
relation is present between BA ·and short run gains to acquiring firms. The authors also 
report a negative relation between analyst forecast dispersion and short-run gains to equity 
offers for public targets. This relation is positive but insignificant for cash (equity) offers to 
public (private) targets. It is thus likely that the positive and significant difference between 
high and low dispersion acquirers (0.8%) for their entire sample is driven by the missing 
category of acquisitions of private targets involving cash and mixed/other offers. As they 
concentrate on the combined effects of an increase in the supply of shares and opinion 
divergence, these payment method categories are rationally not the main interest of their 
study but are highly relevant to my investigation. Note that Moeller et al (2005) interpret the 
positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock financed acquisitions of unlisted 
targets as evidence in support of asymmetric information models. They accordingly argue 
that the more the value uncertainty about a stock, then good news will be interpreted as even 
better news by investors. 
Table 4, Panel B reports results for acquirers sorted on DISP. While high minus low 
DISP differentials are lower, still remain positive and significant irrespective of target type 
and method of payment. For the entire sample this differential is 0.75% and for acquisition 
of private targets is 0.82%. Importantly, in three out of five cases the positive return earned 
by low BA acquirers is statistically insignificant. These results clearly confirm that pre-
event BA is priced at a premium around the acquisition announcement. 
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5.4.3 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
In this section i perform multivariate tests on the determinants of returns to acquiring 
firms. In this way i investigate whether the return differentials detected (table 4) are merely 
the result of other announcement return determinants identified in the literature rather than 
my measures of belief asymmetry. Table 5 reports regression results where the dependent 
variable is the 5-day CAR to acquiring firms. The control variables have been identified as 
determinants of short-run returns to acquiring firms and/or have been directly associated 
with value ambiguity. Panel A reports regression results for the entire sample and panel B 
for the subset with DISP data available. As in the univariate analysis, regressions (1) and (4) 
show a strong positive relation between BA as measured by Sigma and DISP respectively 
and announcement returns with the coefficient of BA in both cases being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
It has been argued that belief asymmetry is naturally higher for small stocks due to the 
scarcity of information about their value. Moeller et al (2004) find that acquisitions by small 
firms gain higher abnormal returns. Given that the correlation between sigma and log(size) 
is -0.19 it is possible that high Sigma acquirers earn higher returns simply because they are 
smaller firms. Regression (2) shows that although the CAR and acquirer's size are 
negatively related the coefficient of Sigma remains positive and significant when adding 
log(size) in addition to Sigma as a control variable. It is hence unlikely that high Sigma 
acquirers perform better merely due to their small size. The introduction of log( size) as an 
explanatory variable also leaves the coefficient ofDISP unchanged in regression (6). 
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The size of the target has also been identified as a short run return determinant with 
large transactions yielding larger abnormal returns to acquiring firms. I thus follow Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins (1983) and include it as a control variable in the cross sectional 
regressions. The relative size can be further associated with the degree of investor reaction 
to an acquisition announcement. The larger the target size the more the original structure of 
the latter firm changes as a result of an acquisition and thus the higher the uncertainty about 
the future of the combined entity. In Table 2 i report a positive relation between relative size 
and BA that may reflect that high BA acquirers gain more due to engaging in larger 
acquisitions. However, the coefficient of relative size is statistically insignificant in all 
regression specifications but (3). 
Further, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that glamour acquirers perform worse in the 
long run than value acquirers, which is consistent with the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis. Along these lines, Lang et al (1989), Servaes (1991), and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) find that in the short run glamour bidders earn higher returns than value 
ones. To the extent that acquirers with high (low) market-to-book value are subject to high 
Sigma (DISP) as shown in Table 2, they should experience higher (lower) abnormal returns 
in the short run. In regressions (3) and (6) however i find no statistically significant relation 
between market-to-book value and returns to acquiring firms. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) develop a model where uncertainty about a firm's 
profitability is especially large for newly listed firms. As reported in Table 2 acquirers 
~ subject to high pre-announcement BA about their value tend to be younger finns. To the 
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extent that high uncertainty can introduce sizeable BA about the value of a firm, we expect 
younger firms to earn higher returns in the short run. In regressions (3) and ( 6) i add a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm was listed within the past year. The 
coefficient of the variable however is statistically insignificant in all specifications. 
It is possible that acquirers' past performance is an important determinant of gains they 
earn at the acquisition announcement. According to my conjecture, a firm that experiences 
superior performance at the pre-announcement period is expected to attract more optimistic 
investors when announcing a value increasing acquisition and thus experience relatively 
larger gains. The positive relation documented between announcement return and past 
performance is statistically significant at the 1% level in regression (3). Adding this control 
variable however does not exert an influence on the coefficient of Sigma. Note that, the 
coefficient of acquirer's past performance is statistically insignificant m regression (6) 
performed only for the subset with analyst information available. 
Chang ( 1998) finds that acquisitions of private firms financed entirely with equity earn 
higher returns than others paid for with cash. In Table 3 i confirm this result. If acquisitions 
of private targets paid for with equity convey more positive news to the market about the 
value of acquiring firms57 then we expect high BA combined with equity payments to 
generate the highest short run abnormal returns. Table 4 confirms this prediction but the 
differential between high and low BA is not statistically significant. I add a binary variable 
57 The information hypothesis posits that although the bidding firm's managers disclose private information to 
the shareholders, in the case of a private target, its shareholders appear to be extremely careful in the 
evaluation of information and their final decision, because they will end up holding a large amount of bidding 
stock. 
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that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition was financed entirely with equity. This has a 
positive yet statistically insignificant coefficient in regressions (3) and (6) when the target is 
private. The negative and significant coefficient of this dummy in the same regressions for 
all acquisitions is merely due to the fact that bidders buying listed targets with stock 
experience significant negative abnormal returns. The dummy 'cash' that takes the value of 
1 if the payment method is pure cash has a statistically insignificant coefficient in all 
specifications. 
Finally, i introduce a dummy variable to examine the role of diversifying acquisitions in 
determining announcement window abnormal returns. The coefficient of a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer and the target are in the same industry (i.e. the 
same 2-digit SIC) is negative but statistically insignificant in regression specifications (3) 
and (6). 
Importantly, although the coefficient of Sigma declines when adding all control 
variables it still remains statistically significant at the 1% level. Such results point to a 
relatively important role of sigma as a measure of BA in determining announcement 
window returns and corroborate the positive relationship between the two. Note that the 
coefficient of Sigma takes its highest value in specifications (5) and (6) where the analyst 
forecast availability requirement is imposed indicating that its role in determining 
announcement returns is robust when examining different samples. Further, DISP also 
remains positive and statistically significant irrespective of what control variables are added 
in the regressions. Sigma and DISP appear to be complementary significant in explaining 
137 
Chapter 5: Belief Asymmetry and Gains from Acquisitions 
short run gains to acquisitions as they both have a positive and significant coefficient when 
they are simultaneously introduced in regressions (5) and (6). 
Results, up until now, constitute a first indication that high BA about the value of an 
acquirer prior to an acquisition announcement that conveys positive news, results in higher 
abnormal returns, due to optimistic views being prevalent in the market. However, the short 
run analysis is by no means sufficient to identify overpricing at the announcement of an 
acquisition. If however the group of high BA acquirers significantly underperforms low BA 
acquirers in the long run then this would constitute evidence in favour of my hypothesis. 
5.4.4 Belief Asymmetry and Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
In this section i turn my focus towards the long run valuation effects of BA. Table 6 
reports monthly estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns to acquiring firms for 
a period of 12 months following each acquisition announcement. Long-run abnormal 
returns are reported for i) the entire UK acquisition sample and ii) acquisitions of private 
targets. Abnormal returns are measured using calendar time portfolio market adjusted 
returns and calendar time regression intercepts. Panel A reports results for BA portfolios as 
measured by Sigma and Panel B as measured by DISP. Classification of acquirers in the 
high, mid and low BA subsets is based on the original classification in Table 4. On average, 
UK acquirers lose -0.60% a month (significant at the 1% level) in the 12-month period 
following acquisition announcements when market adjusted returns or the CAPM's alpha 
are used as measures of abnormal returns. This negative pattern remains when focusing on 
acquirers bidding for private targets that represent a major part of the entire sample. When 
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regressing portfolio excess returns on the Fama and French 3 factors negative abnormal 
returns for both samples disappear. As a result, given that the Fama and French 3 factors are 
more reliable in explaining the cross section of stock returns, UK acquirers do not 
experience any long run abnormal returns. 
High mmus Low BA return differences are negative and statistically significant 
irrespective of the benchmark model and the BA proxy used. This difference is 
approximately -1.20% ( -0.85%) a month for market adjusted returns in Panel A (Panel B). 
For acquisitions of private targets, the intercepts from (high minus low) zero investment 
portfolio regressions are -1.30% (-0.83) and -0.70% (-0.77%) respectively when using the 
CAPM and FF 3-factor model in Panel A (Panel B). In all cases the negative High minus 
Low BA return differentials are statistically significant. This pattern unambiguously reflects 
that high BA acquirers underperform low BA ones in the 12 month period following 
acquisition announcements. This result is consistent with Ang, Rodrick, Xing and Zhangal 
(2004) and Diether et al (2002) in that stocks s.ubject to high idiosyncratic volatility and 
dispersion in analyst earnings' forecasts respectively earn relatively low future returns. Guo 
and Savickas (2004) suggest that the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
long-run returns can be due to a divergence of opinion premium effect. Consistent with this 
explanation, my findings suggest that the relatively higher short run gains to high BA 
acquirers are merely due to their stock trading at a premium at the acquisition 
announcement. As predicted by Miller such 'bubbles' caused by high BA will eventually 
burst leading to long-run underperformance. The strong pattern evident here is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the revelation of negative opinions is largely constrained 
'· at the initial stage of the announcement either due to short selling acquirers being expensive 
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or due to any friction that prevents arbitrageurs from driving prices instantaneously back to 
fundamental values. Given that acquisitions of private targets do not affect the bidder's float 
(i.e. supply of shares), the high premium paid by optimistic investors for acquirers subject to 
high BA cannot be arbitraged away instantaneously. 
5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I examine valuation effects of belief asymmetry around acquisition 
announcements involving private targets. The fact that UK acquirers engaging in such 
acquisitions persistently gain positive abnormal returns in the short-run corroborates the 
hypothesis that such type of acquisition announcements are perceived as 'good news' by 
investors. On the basis of the divergence of opinion 'premium hypothesis' bidder prices at 
the announcement tend to be set by optimistic investors when diversity of beliefs about their 
value is high. Accordingly, this causes the price of the acquirer to overshoot in the short run, 
therefore leading to long-run underperformance. My results confirm this hypothesis as they 
reflect a strong positive (negative) relation between short-run (long run) returns to acquiring 
firms and the degree of pre-announcement belief asymmetry about their value. This 
evidence indicates that optimistic investors' overreaction to positive information when 
belief asymmetry about the value of a firm is high, combined with ineffective arbitrage at 
the acquisition announcement, can largely explain the short and long-run performance of 
acquiring firms. It would be therefore not only interesting but also vital for future research 
to further explore valuation effects of BA around events that are expected to attract and 
further develop optimistic beliefs about the value of a stock. 
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Table 5. 1: Summary Statistics by Target Type 
The Table presents summary statistics (means and medians) by type of target fori) a sample of3528 acquisitions and ii) a sample of 1608 acquisitions for which analyst forecasts for the acquiring firm through 
1/8/E/S are available. All transactions are by listed UK acquirers, take place in the period 1985-2004 and are downloaded from Thomson Financial SOC mergers and acquisitions database. The sample is 
restricted to deals above one million dollars and where the acquirer obtains more than 50 percent of target's shares as a result of the acquisition. It excludes cases where the acquirer has another merger 
announcement within the 5-day window (t-2, t+2) where tis the announcement day. Panel A reports deal specific statistics. The transaction value (TV) is from SOC and represents the total value in million 
pounds paid by the acquirer for each bid. Relative size of the target to the acquirer is the transaction value divided by the acquirer's market value (TV/MY). 'Days to completion' is the number of days between 
the announcement and the effective date. Intra-industry transactions involve targets with the same 2-digit SIC code as that of the acquirer. Method of payment statistics are reported in percentages relative to 
each specific target type as well as the entire sample (in parentheses) where relevant Panel 8 reports acquirer specific statistics. Age is the age of the acquirer in days at the time of the announcement. The 
market value of the acquirer is reported in million pounds. Market-to-book value is the market value of equity of the acquirer divided by its book value one month prior to the acquisition. Belief asymmetry is 
measured by i) Sigma (idiosyncratic volatility), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals for the acquirer over the period (t-205, t-6), where tis the acquisition announcement day and ii) D!SP, 
the standard deviation of all !-year ahead analyst earning forecasts for the acquiring firm one month prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Panel A: Deal Statistics 
Transaction Value (TV) 
Relative Size (TV/ MV) 
Days to Completion 
Percentage of Intra-Industry 
Transactions 
Percentage of Transactions 
financeil with Pure Cash 
(percentage of entire sample) 
Percentage of Transactions 
financed with Pure Stock 
(percentage of entire sample) 
Percentage of Transactions 
financed with Mixed/Other Payments 
(percentage of entire sample) 
Panel B: Acquirer Statistics 
Age (days) 
Market Value 
Market-to-Book Value 
Belief Asymmetry (Sigma) 
Belief Asymmetry (DISP) 
All 
(n=3528) 
mean 
31.03 
0.21 
18.00 
50.14 
54.13 
5.44 
40.43 
5829 
466.19 
4.06 
0.019 
median 
5.00 
O.o7 
0.00 
5074 
99.11 
1.95 
0.016 
All Sample with Analyst Dispersion 
Private 
(n=3227) 
mean 
17.68 
0.18 
18.12 
50.26 
55.35 
(50.62) 
3.19 
(2.92) 
41.46 
(37.93) 
5762 
415.66 
4.09 
0.019 
mean 
4.40 
0.05 
0.00 
4948 
95.54 
1.97 
0.016 
Public 
(n=301) 
mean 
174.10 
0.47 
81.70 
45.51 
41.19 
(3.51) 
29.57 
(2.52) 
29.24 
(2.49) 
6540 
1007.90 
3.64 
0.019 
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median 
32.00 
0.25 
62.00 
6854 
155.50 
1.74 
0.017 
All 
(n=1608) 
mean 
46.41 
0.16 
26.00 
53.79 
56.59 
43.53 
39.05 
6081 
412.94 
4.36 
0.017 
0.087 
median 
8.70 
0.05 
0.00 
5481 
146.18 
1.99 
0.015 
0.043 
Private 
(n=1449) 
mean 
24.58 
0.13 
20.00 
54.45 
57.97 
(52.24) 
1.93 
(1.74) 
40.09 
(36.13) 
6019 
348.09 
4.41 
0.017 
0.089 
median 
7.23 
0.04 
0.00 
5369 
137.43 
2.00 
0.015 
0.043 
Public 
(n=159) 
mean median 
245.21 46.48 
0.37 0.20 
85.00 63.00 
47.80 
44.03 
( 4.35) 
26.42 
(2.61) 
29.56 
(2.92) 
6644 6854 
1003.97 282.37 
3.90 1.92 
0.0165 0.0152 
0.069 O.o38 
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Table 5. 2: Summary Statistics by belief Asymmetry and Target Type 
The table presents summary statistics (means and medians) by belief asymmetry and target type fori) a sample of 3528 acquisitions (Panel A) and ii) a sample of 1608 acquisitions for 
which analyst forecasts for the acquiring firm through 1/B/E/S are available (Panel B). All transactions are by listed UK acquirers, take place in the period 1985-2004 and are downloaded 
from Thomson Financial SDC mergers and acquisitions database. The sample is restricted to deals above one million dollars and where the acquirer obtains more than 50 percent of 
target's shares as a result of the. acquisition. The sample excludes cases where the acquirer has another merger announcement within the 5-day window (t~2, t+2) where t is the 
announcement day. Acquirers are divided in three Belief Asymmetry (BA) groups, Low, Mid and High. BA is measured by i) Sigma (in Panel A), the standard deviation of daily market 
adjusted residuals for the acquirer over the period (t-205, t-6) where tis the announcement day and ii) DISP (in Panel B), the standard deviation of all 1-yearahead analyst earning 
forecasts for the acquiring fmn one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Acquirer's market value is measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported in 
million pounds. Acquirer's past performance is measured by the mean market adjusted return over the month preceding the acquisition announcement. Relative size is the transaction 
value divided by the acquirer's market value (TV IMV). The transaction value (TV) is from SDC and represents the total value in million pounds paid by the acquirer for each bid. Market-
to-book value is the market to book value of equity of the acquirer one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Age is the age of the acquirer in days at the time of the 
announcement. H-L are the mean and median differences between the high and low BA groups. P-values for differences are reported in brackets below each difference estimate and are 
from two sample t-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the I, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Panel A: BA measured by Si2ma Target Tn~e 
All Private Public 
{n=3528} {n=3227} {n=301} 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Sigma Sigma Sigma H-L Sigma Sigma Sigma H-L Sigma Sigma Sigma H-L 
Deal!Acguirer Characteristics {n=1176} {n=li76Hn=ll76} Difference {n=1073} {n=l085} {n=1069} Difference {n=103} ~n=91} {n=107} Difference 
Belief Asymmetry (Sigma) 0.011 0.017 O.o31 0.020" 0.010 0.016 O.Q31 0.020. 0.011 0.017 0.028 0.017
8 
(mean) [0.000) [0.000) [0.000) 
(median) 0.011 0.016 0.026 0.015" 0.011 0.016 0.027 0.016" 0.011 0.017 0.026 0.015
8 
[0.000) [0.000) [0.000) 
Acquirers' Market Value 508.3 440.3 449.9 -58.40 482.5 399.5 365.0 -117.50b 777.6 927.2 1298.2 520.6 (mean) [0.376] [0.041) [0.233) 
(median) 137.9 102.7 52.8 -85.16. 186.6 155.7 101.1 -85.50 
8 
221.9 161.7 85.1 -136.8. [0.000) [0.000] [0.003] 
Acquirers' Past Performance 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 o.ooo< -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
8 
(mean) [0.073) [0.262] [0.003) 
(median) -0.000 0.000 0.000 o.ooob -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001" [0.017] [0.124] [0.002] 
Relative Size (TV /MV) 0.16 0.18 0.27 o.tto• 0.139 0.149 0.241 0.102. 0.36 0.53 0.54 0.180b (mean) [0.001) [0.004] [0.016] 
(median) 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.044
8 
0.054 0.078 0.117 0.063
8 
0.22 0.25 0.30 0.078b [0.000] [0.000] (0.034) 
Acquirer's Market-to-Book value (mean) 3.42 4.22 4.54 t.l20b 3.372 4.350 4.578 1.206 b 3.95 2.71 4.12 0.173 [0.014) [O.Oll) [0.913] 
(median) 2.10 1.84 1.92 -0.180 2.290 2.140 2.420 -0.130 1.78 2.72 1.60 -0.180 [0.262] (0.452] [0.249] 
Acquirer's Age 6598 6093 4826 -1772. 6513 6029 4739 -1774" 7136 6852 5701 -1434. (mean) [0.000) [0.000) [0.008] 
(median) 7689 5395 3565 -4124. 6366 6021 4367 -1999
8 
8052 6847 4536 -3516" )0.000] [0.000] [0.009) 
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Panel B: BA measured by DISP Target T~(!e 
All Private Public 
{n=1608} {n=1449} {n=159} 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
DISP DISP DISP H-L DISP DISP DISP H-L DISP DISP DISP H-L 
Deai/Acguirer Characteristics {n=536~ {n=536~ {n=536} Difference {n=482~ {n=476~ {n=491~ Difference {n=103~ {n=91} {n=107~ Difference 
AnalystDispersion (DISP) 0.018 0.044 0.200 0.182. 0.018 0.044 0.202 0.185" 0.019 0.040 0.165 0.146" (mean) [0.000) [0.0001 [0.000) 
(median) 0.019 0.043 0.108 0.089" 0.019 0.043 0.108 0.089" 0.021 0.043 0.123 0.102. [0.0001 [0.000) [0.000) 
Belief Asymmetry (Sigma) 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.004" O.ot5 0.016 0.019 0.004" 0.015 0.015 0.019 0.004" (mean) [0.0001 [0.000) 10.0031 
(median) 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.003" 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.003
8 
0.015 0.012 0.019 0.004
8 
[0.000) [0.000) [0.0051 
Acquirers' Market Value 416.1 503.5 319.3 -96.8 362.3 428.9 255.7 -106.5 896.2 I 095.4 1011.5 115.5 (mean) [0.114] [0.032] [0.796] 
(median) 130.4 188.9 130.8 0.40 120.1 181.0 124.7 4.60 209.2 347.3 233.5 24.3 [0.216] [0.153] [0.529] 
Acquirers' Past Performance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 (mean) [0.384] [0.575] [0.239] 
(median) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.487] [0.662] [0.320] 
Relative Size (TV /MV) 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.07< 0.10 0.12 0.18 o.o8· 0.38 0.27 0.48 0.098 (mean) [0.0541 [0.054) [0.397] 
(median) 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02. 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02. 0.25 0.13 0.24 -0.02 [0.000) 10.000) [0.969] 
Acquirer's Market-to-Book value (mean) 4.17 4.24 4.66 0.485 3.97 4.45 4.79 0.83 5.97 2.62 3.11 -2.86 [0.813] [0.710] [0.298] 
(median) 2.38 2.11 1.57 -0.81. 2.36 2.13 1.57 -0.83. 2.56 1.77 1.41 -1.15. 10.0001 10.000) [0.008) 
Acquirer's Age 5812 6436 5995 183 5624 6366 6070 
445< 
7482 6995 5171 -2311. (mean) [0.467] [0.0911 [0.0051 
(median) 5024 6255 4971 -53 4686 6185 5411 725< 8605 7070 3612 -4993" [0.377] [O.O(i9J _ 
--
[0.0071 
143 
Chapter 5: Belief Asymmetry and Gains from Acquisitions 
Table 5. 3: Short Run Gains to Acquisitions 
The table presents short-run abnormal returns to acquiring firms sorted by target type and payment method. The mean is 
the percentage average cumulative abnormal return calculated for the 5-days ( -2,+2) around the acquisition announcement 
(day 0). Abnormal return for day tis estimated as follows: 
ARu = Ru -Rm,· 
Where Rit is the return of finn i and Rmt is the value weighted market index return for day t. Cash offers include 
transactions financed with pure cash, stock offers include pure stock transactions while Mixed/Other offers comprise all 
remaining offers. The table also reports mean abnormal return differences between acquirers announcing Private and 
Public acquisitions for all payment methods. P-values for the means are reported in brackets below each abnormal return 
estimate. n, the sample size for each group is reported below the p-value. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the I, 5 
and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Payment Method 
Target Type All Cash Stock Mixed/Other 
Mean 0.921a 0.8ooa -0.543 1.281. 
All P-value [0.000) [0.000) [0.491] [0.000) 
n 3528 1910 192 1426 
Mean 1.163a 0.868a 2.010< 1.491 8 
Private P-value [0.000) [0.000) [0.070) [0.000) 
n 3227 1786 103 1338 
Mean -1.667a -0.184 -3.492 a -1.911 b 
Public P-value [0.000) [0.726] [0.001) [0.046) 
n 301 124 89 88 
Private Mean 2.829a 1.052' 5.497a 3.402 a 
Public P-value (0.000) [0.052) [0.000) [0.001) 
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Table 5. 4: Belief Asymmetry and Short Run Gains to Acquisitions 
The table reports short-run abnormal returns to acquiring firms sorted by Belief Asymmetry, Target Type and Payment 
Method. Panel A reports results for portfolio sorts (Low, Mid and High) based on Sigma, the standard deviation of daily 
market adjusted residuals that is measured over the period (t-205, t-6) where t is the announcement day. Panel B reports 
results for portfolio sorts based on DISP, the standard deviation of all 1-year ahead analyst earning forecasts for the 
acquiring firm one month prior to the acquisition announcement , The mean is the percentage average cumulative 
abnormal return calculated for the 5-days (-2,+2) around the acquisition announcement (day 0). Abnormal return for day t 
is estimated as follows: 
ARu = Ru -Rmt· 
Where Rit is the return of firm i and Rrnt is the value weighted market index return for day t. Results are divided by Belief 
Asymmetry groups (High, Mid, Low and Total) and are reported for i) all UK acquirers irrespective of target type and ii) 
acquirers bidding for private targets. Bids for private targets include bids for subsidiary targets. Results for private targets 
are further divided by method of payment. Cash offers include transactions financed with pure cash, stock offers include 
pure stock transactions while Mixed/Other offers comprise all remaining offers. P-values for the means are reported in 
brackets below each abnormal return estimate. n, the sample size for each group is reported below the p-value. a, b, c 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Panel A: BA measured by Sigma 
Target 
Type 
All 
Private 
Payment 
Method 
All 
All 
Cash 
Stock 
Mixed/Other 
Mean 
P-Value 
n 
Mean 
P-Value 
n 
Mean 
P-Value 
n 
Mean 
P-Value 
n 
Mean 
P-Value 
n 
Low 
0.3498 
(0.002) 
1176 
0.408 8 
)0.000) 
1073 
0.350 8 
(0.001) 
652 
0.233 
[0.785] 
33 
0.517b 
(0.011) 
388 
Mid 
0.905 8 
(0.000) 
1176 
1.073 8 
[0.000) 
1085 
0.821 8 
(0.000) 
629 
3.214 
[0.135] 
29 
1.299 a 
(0.000) 
427 
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Belief Asymmetry (Sigma) 
High Total 
1.509 8 0.921 8 
)0.000) (0.000) 
1176 3528 
1.951 8 1.163 8 
(0.000) (0.000) 
1069 3227 
1.467 a 0.868" 
[0.000) (0.000) 
505 1786 
2.577 2.oo5• 
[0.255] (0.070) 
41 103 
2.370" 1.491 8 
[0.000) [0.000) 
523 1338 
High-Low 
1.160 8 
[0.000) 
1.483 8 
[0.000) 
1.017 8 
(0.003) 
2.344 
[0.331] 
1.852 8 
(0.000) 
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Panel B: BA measured by DISP 
Target Payment Belief Asymmetry (DISP) 
Type Method Low Mid High Total High-Low 
All All Mean 0.240 0.846 8 0.992. 0.693 8 0.752 a 
P-Value [0.204] (0.003) [0.000) [0.000) [0.013) 
n 536 536 536 1608 
Private All Mean 0.410. 1.011" 1.224 a 0.916. 0.815 a 
P-Value [0.007) (0.001) (0.000) [0.000) [0.019) 
n 482 476 491 1449 
Cash Mean 0.670b o.81o• 1.115. 0.874 8 0.443< 
P-Value [0.037) (0.037) [0.000) (0.000) [0.098) 
n 253 289 298 840 
Stock Mean 1.406 2.714 3.442 2.147 3.302 
P-Value (0.887] [0.633] [0.176] [0.272] [0.219] 
n 9 9 10 28 
Mixed/Other Mean 0.179 1.513 a 1.229 a 0.918 a 1.050 b 
P-Value [0.540] [0.0061 [0.005) [O.OOOJ [0.045) 
n 220 178 183 581 
146 
tpter 5: Belief Asymmetry and Gains from Acquisitions 
le 5. 5: Cross Sectional Regressions 
nary Least Squares regressions of the 5-day cumulative abnormal return to acquiring firms on the following variables. Sigma, the standard 
:.tion of daily market adjusted residuals over the period (t-205, t-6) where t is the announcement day. DISP is the standard deviation of all 1-year 
d analyst earning forecasts for the acquiring firm one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Log (Acquirer's Size) is the logarithm of the 
irer's market value one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Relative size (TV/MY) is the transaction value in million pounds divided 
1e acquirer's market value. Market-to-book value is the market to book value of equity of the acquirer one month prior to the acquisition 
>Uncement. The newly listed dummy is equal to I if the acquirer became listed within the last year. Acquirer' s past performance is measured by 
nean market adjusted return over the month preceding the acquisition announcement. The stock (cash) dummy is equal to I if the payment 
tod is 100% stock (cash). The same industry dummy is equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry (i.e same 2-digit SIC). 
:I A reports regression coefficients for the entire sample (3528 deals) and Panel B for the subset with analyst forecast dispersion (1608 deals). F-
es and adjusted R2 s for each regression are reported below intercepts. P values are reported below regression coefficients and a, b, c denote 
;tical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively based on heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
na 
p 
(Acquirer's 
) 
ttive Size 
/MV) 
uirer's Market-
look value 
nmy=1 if 
11irer is listed 
tin the last year 
1uirer's past 
formance 
nmy=1 iftarget 
:quired with 
e stock. 
nmy=1 iftarget 
:quired with 
e cash. 
nmy=1 iftarget 
acquirer are in 
same industry. 
1rcept 
All 
0.298a 
[0.002] 
0.003 
[0.108] 
9.46 
0.3% 
(1) 
Private 
0.431 a 
[0.000] 
0.003 
[0.122] 
19.95 
0.6% 
Panel A: All 
All 
0.201 b 
[0.042] 
(2) 
Private 
0.344a 
[0.000] 
All 
0.216b 
(0.030] 
(3) 
Private 
0.318" 
(0.001] 
-0.008 a -0.007 a -0.007 a -0.006 a 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
0.021 a 
(0.000] 
16.26 
0.8% 
0.019a 
(0.000( 
19.06 
1.2% 
0.001 
[0.570] 
-0.000 
[0.477] 
0.009 
[0.320] 
1.126 a 
(0.000] 
-0.019a 
(0.000] 
-0.002 
[0.331] 
-0.003 
[0.151] 
0.023a 
(0.000] 
7.49 
1.9% 
0.004b 
[0.019] 
-0.000 
[0.375] 
0.006 
[0.459] 
1.348. 
(0.000] 
0.002 
[0.716] 
-0.004 
[0.117] 
-0.003 
[0.260] 
0.019a 
[0.000] 
8.32 
2.3% 
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Panel 8: With Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
All 
0.018 a 
[0.002] 
0.005a 
(0.000] 
9.83 
0.6% 
(4) 
Private 
0.017a 
(0.002] 
0.007a 
(0.000] 
9.79 
0.7% 
All 
0.435b 
[0.014] 
0.016a 
[0.007] 
-0.002 
[0.583] 
7.97 
1.0% 
(5) 
Private 
0.547a 
[0.002] 
0.015a 
[0.009] 
-0.001 
[0.669] 
9.72 
1.3% 
(6) 
All 
0.516a 
[0.004] 
0.014 b 
(0.012] 
-0.005 < 
[0.073 
-0.004 
[0.183] 
-0.000 
[0.363] 
-0.001 
[0.974] 
0.595 
[0.125] 
-0.013 < 
[0.067] 
0.002 
[0.449] 
-0.004 
[0.129] 
0.009 
[0.175] 
3.17 
1.9% 
Private 
0.556a 
(0.002] 
0.014 b 
[0.014] 
-0.002 
[0.487] 
0.000 
[0.976] 
-0.000 
[0.235] 
-0.001 
[0.932] 
0.503 
[0.20 1] 
0.009 
[0.398] 
0.000 
[0.874] 
-0.004 
[0. 130] 
0.005 
[0.508] 
2.63 
1.8% 
·' 
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Table 5. 6: Belief Asymmetry and Post Acquisition Performance 
The Table reports monthly percentage estimates of calendar time portfolio abnormal returns to acquiring firms for a period of 
12 months following the acquisition announcement. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of each 
transaction and remain for 12 months. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that have just completed an event. 
Estimates are sorted by Belief Asymmetry groups (High, Mid, Low and Total) based on the original classification in Table 4 
and are reported for i) all UK acquirers irrespective of target type and ii) acquirers bidding for unlisted targets. Belief 
Asymmetry is measured by i) Sigma (Panel A), the standard deviation of daily market adjusted residuals over the period (t-
205, t-6) where t is the announcement day and ii) DISP (Panel B), the standard deviation of all 1-year ahead analyst earning 
forecasts for the acquiring firm one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Market adjusted mean return is the grand 
mean of all monthly market adjusted calendar portfolio returns that are each calculated as follows: 
Where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return and Rmt is the value weighted market index return for month t. CAPM and 
Fama and French -3 factor intercepts (aps) are estimated by the following calendar time portfolio regressions: 
R pi -:- R ft = a P + f3 P ( R ml - R ft ) + e pi 
RP1 -Rft =aP +f3P(Rm1 -Rft)+sPSMB1 +hPHML+eP1 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return , Rft is the return on a one month T-bill during month t, Rmt is is the value 
weighted market index return, SMB is the difference in returns of value weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms during 
month t, HML is the return differential of value weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, ~p, sp 
and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ept is the error term. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics 
appear in paretheses below each parameter. High minus Low differences and corresponding t-statistics are from two sample t-
tests for market adjusted mean returns and from zero investment portfolio alphas for CAPM and FF 3-factor regressions. a, b 
and c indicate significance at the I, 5, 10 percent level respectively based on two tail t-tests except for zero investment portfolio 
regressions where one-tail t-tests are used. N.cal is the number of calendar months and n is the sample size involved in each 
portfolio. 
Panel A: BA measured by Sigma 
Target Abnormal Return 
Type Measure Low Mid 
All 
Market Adj. Mean Return 0.14 -0.32 
t-stat (0.56) (-1.31) 
CAPMa 0.19 -0.29 
t-stat (0.57) ( -1.00) 
FF a 0.26 -0.02 
t-stat ( 1.05) (-0.06) 
N.cal 211 216 
n 1119 1066 
Private 
Market Adj. Mean Return 0.19 -0.26 
t-stat (0.72) (-1.03) 
CAPMa 0.22 ~0.22 
t-stat (0.67) ( -0.73) 
FF a 0.36 0.01 
t-stat (1.40) (0.26) 
N.cal 211 216 
n 1008 973 
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Belief Asymmetry (Sigma) 
High Total 
-1.06 a -0.60 a 
(-3.03) (-2.59) 
-1.09 a -0.60 b 
(-2.81) (-2.20) 
-0.45 c -0.09 
(-1.93) ( -0.52) 
205 216 
1016 3201 
-1.04. -0.57b 
(-2.89) (-2.44) 
-1.07 a -0.57 b 
(-2.67) (2.07) 
-0.38 -0.04 
(-1.54) ( -0.23) 
205 216 
914 2895 
High-Low 
-l.21a 
(-2.77) 
-1.28 a 
(-3.23) 
-0.67 b 
(-2.00) 
200 
-1.22 a 
(-2.75) 
-1.30a 
(-3.18) 
-0.70 b 
(-2.03) 
200 
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Panel B: BA measured by DISP 
Target Abnormal Return Belief Asymmetry (DISP) 
Type Measure Low Mid High Total High-Low 
All 
Market Adj. Mean Return -0.20 -0.56 b -1.06 a -0.59 b -0.86 b 
t-stat (-0.81) (-2.03) (-3.14) (2.37) (-2.07) 
CAPMa -0.18 -0.55 b -1.05 a -0.60 b -0.84 a 
t-stat ( -0.77) (-2.03) (-3.15) (-2.36) (-3.43) 
FF a 0.24 -0.20 -0.42 -0.13 -0.72 a 
t-stat (1.30) (-0.87) ( -1.58) ( -0.71) (-2.79) 
N.cal 202 200 197 202 197 
n 467 505 484 1456 
Private 
Market Adj. Mean Return -0.15 -0.52 c -0.92 a -0.58 b -0.78 c 
t-stat ( -0.58) (-1.84) (-2.70) (-2.26) (-1.82) 
CAPMa -0.14 -0.51 c -0.93 a -0.59b -0.83 a 
t-stat (-0.54) (-1.83) (-2.72) (-2.25) (-3.07) 
FF a 0.34 c -0.13 -0.44 -0.09 -0.77 a 
t-stat (1.68) ( -0.55) ( -1.58) ( -0.50) (-2.69) 
N.cal 201 200 202 202 201 
n 431 446 428 1305 
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6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the role of opinion divergence among investors and short selling 
constraints in determining short and long-run gains from acquisitions and thus has 
contributed in both the literature related to value ambiguity and gains from acquisitions. 
Recent evidence on the significant roles of investors' divergence of opinion and short 
selling constraints in the cross section of stock returns as well as studies trying to uncover 
important determinants of short and long-run gains to acquiring firms have formed the main 
body of motivation for this thesis. My work applied a set of tests to examine whether 
Miller's overpricing components that appear to have a bearing on asset pricing can also 
determine gains from acquisitions. As originally hypothesized, proxies designed to capture 
these two important for asset pricing ingredients appear to significantly explain returns to 
firms involved in acquisitions. My evidence can help explain several anomalous stock 
return patterns related to acquisitions and suggest that the success of an acquisition in terms 
of creating value for shareholders can be to a large extent determined by the extent of 
disagreement between investors about the price of its stock preceding the acquisition 
announcement. 
Chapter 3 examines the individual role that short selling constraints play in determining 
post acquisition stock performance. Results indicate that the level of short sale constraints 
(as proxied for by institutional block-holders' ownership) plays a major role in determining 
post takeover stock performance. Further, it appears that institutional block-holders' 
ownership, both in terms of extent and persistence, plays a pivotal role in explaining post 
takeover abnormal returns. As a result, such findings suggest that the widely documented 
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post-merger underperformance puzzle could largely be attributed to less effective arbitrage 
in the case where acquirers exhibit low and/or non-persistent institutional investment. 
This result is consistent with the continuously growing literature postulating that short 
sale constraints can induce short-run overpricing and hence lead to long-run negative 
abnormal returns as efficiency takes its course. The presence of institutions is therefore vital 
in ensuring the efficiency of the takeover market since extensive BO significantly 
deteriorates short-run overpricing and thus eliminates the chances for post takeover return 
reversals. Such evidence is consistent with recent evidence that short sale constraints drive 
most common cross sectional anomalies documented in the literature and that the increasing 
significance of institutional investors can lead to gradual disappearance of certain stock 
anomalies. Accordingly, this study can form the basis for more extensive future 
examinations on the valuation implications of institutional ownership as related to corporate 
takeovers or other events and on the general role of institutions in preserving efficiency in 
financial markets through facilitating shorting opportunities. 
This work has also implications for investors, corporate organizations as well as 
regulatory bodies. First, it implies that investors should be avoiding investing in acquiring 
firms that undertake large, public acquisitions, when these firms are not backed up by 
sufficient institutional investment. Accordingly, institutional investors act as arbitrageurs by 
facilitating short selling and therefore and do not allow acquirers to become overvalued 
around or after the acquisition announcement. As a result they can prevent inefficient 
movements of the stock price later. This suggests in turn that regulatory bodies should adopt 
free short selling in all countries to promote efficient and effective arbitrage that will lead to 
a more efficient takeover market. Lastly, corporate organizations should encourage long-
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term institutional investors to act freely and short sale if necessary around a merger 
announcement. This will ensure that acquiring firms' prices will not deviate away from 
fundamental grounds by too much as a result of an important corporate decision 
announcement. 
Chapter 4 has examined the individual role of divergence of investors' opmwn in 
determining post acquisition stock performance. I consider this work as one of the first 
attempts towards examining the impact of opinion dispersion in a corporate takeover 
context and believe that this can form a good basis for future research on how divergence of 
opinion affects post-managerial decision performance. Results demonstrate that the degree 
of pre-event diversity of opinion about the value of the acquiring firm explains to a large 
extent post-acquisition stock performance. 
More specifically I find a significant negative relation between pre-event divergence of 
opinion and post-acquisition stock returns. Interestingly, while, negative long-run abnormal 
returns are mainly present when opinion dispersion is high, low dispersion acquirers are in 
the majority of cases subject to no abnormal returns. Consistent with Miller's premium 
hypothesis findings demonstrate that acquiring firms subject to high investor disagreement 
prior to acquisitions are overpriced around the acquisition announcement and thus 
underperform in the long-run as this overpricing is gradually corrected. Importantly, the 
significant abnormal returns observed in excess of the Fama-French 3-factor model imply 
that the FF model does not fully capture all the valuation components given the presence of 
wide opinion diversity. 
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The chapter has significant implications for investors. It demonstrates that acquirers can 
be already overpriced at the time of the announcement as a result of the high investor 
disagreement in the pre-acquisition period. In some cases, the price of the overvalued 
acquirer is not justified neither by fundamentals, nor by the merger itself, resulting in burst 
of its bubble after the corporate announcement. On average, investors should in the majority 
of cases avoid long-positions in highly volatile firms that become acquirers as these are 
shown to significantly underperform in the long-run. 
Lastly, chapter 5 links Miller's theory with behavioral theories based on investors' 
overreaction and subsequent burst of bubbles to explain both short and long-run 
performance of acquiring firms. For this purpose the sample is limited to acquisition 
announcements that are likely to further encourage optimistic opinions and prevent the 
pessimistic ones. The fact that UK acquirers that buy private targets experience positive 
abnormal returns in the short-run confirms that related announcements are perceived as 
positive information about the future of the acquirers by investors. 
The divergence of opinion 'premium hypothesis' implies that bidder prices around the 
announcement tend to be set by optimistic investors when diversity of beliefs about their 
value is high. Along these lines, the price of the acquirer will tend to overshoot in the short 
run, subsequently leading to long-run underperformance. My results confirm this hypothesis 
as they reflect a strong positive (negative) relation between short-run (long run) returns to 
acquiring firms and the degree of pre-announcement belief asymmetry about their value. As 
argued earlier, such evidence indicates that optimistic investors' overreaction to positive 
information when belief asymmetry about the value of a firm is high, combined with 
ineffective arbitrage at the acquisition announcement, can largely explain the short and 
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long-run performance of acquiring firms. On the basis of these findings it would be 
therefore important for future research to further explore valuation effects of BA around 
events that are expected to attract and further develop optimistic beliefs about the value of a 
stock. 
Along these lines one could examine the relation between short and long run gams 
following earnings announcements and the level of pre-event opinion dispersion. Positive 
earnings announcements are expected to attract and further develop the previously 
optimistic views about the stock and are thus likely to induce optimistic investors' 
overreaction in the same spirit that acquisition of private targets do. Therefore, companies 
subject to high investor disagreement or value ambiguity that end up beating analysts 
forecasts can generate significant abnormal gains for investors immediately after 
acquisitions. This can be expected to lead to relative underperformance as more information 
about the stock and the earnings announcement becomes available to investors and the 
'optimistic' effect that initiated the overreaction decays. Further, the overreaction effect is 
expected to be more pronounced both in terms of extent and persistence in emerging 
markets where information diffusion is slow and behavioural effects in general more 
pronounced. Dividend announcements, stock splits or any other managerial decision can 
form a basis to examine whether the degree of heterogeneity of expectations can have a 
direct impact on the event's outcome in terms of creating or destroying value for investors. 
Lastly one can suggest that my main results, mainly the ones related to investor 
disagreement, can be driven by investor overconfidence or value ambiguity/uncertainty 
rather than opinion divergence as suggested by Miller. Pastor and Veronessi (2005) for 
instance develop a model where bubbles rationally develop when uncertainty about the 
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price of a stock is high and burst later wlien investors revise their expectations. It would be 
interesting to explore whether overpricing of stocks involved in events, such as mergers, is 
rationally a product of uncertainty in the market or irrational exuberance of optimistic 
investors. Also, one may link the overreaction/overpricing hypothesis with models related to 
investor overconfidence and add more proxies such as the most commonly used 'Turnover' 
to examine by how much results may be also driven by investor overconfidence. Overall, 
behavioural elements appear to shape not only investors' but also institutions' actions and 
investments. As a result, event studies that convey information to both these kind of agents 
can form a fruitful basis to examine the extent and persistence of such behavioral biases in 
stock prices. 
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